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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is to understand and explain both the deregulation and 
subsequent reregulation policies for cable television as part of a national telecommunications 
regulatory system. The regulatory policies evolved incrementally with both national and 
local components. A case study methodology is used to analyze the participation of group 
interests in the political process, with primary attention on the role of organized interests. 
The focus of the analysis of group interest participation is undertaken in the framework of 
their influence on Congressional policy decision making. 
Three central purposes guide the analysis. The first is to explain why cable television 
was freed from regulation in 1984, then returned to extensive regulation in 1992. The second 
is to fit insights and observations drawn from the particular cases studied with the literature 
on interest groups. One particular variable examined, which is not well treated in the 
literature, is that of the affect of technological change on policy decisions. The third purpose 
is to consider whether there are lessons to be drawn from the examination of cable 
deregulation and reregulation that can add to the general understanding of regulatory policy 
development and the role of groups in that process. 
The conclusion of the study is that technological advances occur in the field of 
telecommunications in a very rapid fashion. However, the deliberative traditions of 
Congress as it contemplates policy decisions serve to both mitigate against policy decisions 
that favor short-lived technological developments and to provide broad ranging access for 
V 
various groups in the best traditions of pluralism. Establishing regulatory policy for 
telecommunications was found to be more of an iterative process than a terminal objective. 
vi 
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Cable television emerged as a telecommunications service in the 1940s. Over time, 
a regulatory regime developed incrementally with national and local components. From the 
1950s through the 1980s and 1990s, technological and associated economic developments 
affecting an increasingly large proportion of the population related to cable drew the 
attention of national policy makers. In the 1970s and early 1980s, efforts to forge a coherent 
national policy for cable accelerated. The results were cable television's deregulation in 
1984 and its subsequent reregulation less than a decade later, in 1992. 
The purpose of this study is to understand and explain both deregulation and a policy 
turnabout just a few years later. The basic analytical perspective is of the representation of 
groups in the political process. In the study, the representation of groups is distinguished 
between both organized and unorganized interests. For purposes of this study, organized 
interests will be defined as: Formally organized ass9ciations of individuals or organizations 
having shared attitudes which then attempt to influence decisions and actions of government 
in a particular policy area of their interest. Unorganized interests are defined as: 
Individuals or agents which attempt to influence decisions and actions of governments in a 
particular policy area of their interest without acting through associations, formally 
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organized for that purpose. Examples include persons, individual . compames or . 
corporations, and community or industry leaders in issue networks, as well as policy . 
entrepreneurs. Primary attention will be given to the role of organized interests, but the 
shadow of unorganized interests also will be acknowledged. 
In this case, the presidency is involved to an extent and its role examined, but the 
major center of policy decision was the Congress. Thus, the prime focus is on the 
representation of interests in the legislative process in connection with the 1984 and 1992 
acts. 
Central Purposes 
Three central purposes guide the analysis to follow. The first is to explain why cable 
television was freed from regulation to a substantial degree in 1984, then placed under more 
extensive regulation in 1992. Special attention in this is given to the role of interest groups 
in policy dynamics. 
The second purpose, for which case studies are well suited, is to fit the insights and 
observations drawn from a particular case analysis with the literature reviewed here as 
something of a rough test. Several general observations about that literature are pertinent 
for defining the task within workable bounds. The first observation is that it is rich yet 
varied in its particulars and in the perspectives set forth. A second is that in the treatment 
of group interests and their influence, often a clear distinction is not made between emergent 
and mature policy regimes. A partial exception is to be found in the deregulation studies, 
although they concern mature regimes under attack. In the case of cable television, however, 
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there was no mature system in place. As will be seen in the following chapters, there existed 
a nascent and fragmented regulatory regime featuring, primarily, hundreds if not thousands 
of cities across the country. A third observation is that a critical variable at the heart of 
dispute over cable television policy is not well treated. That variable is technological change 
and its effects. In communications, there have been rapid and profound technological 
developments for two decades or more. New technologies such as cable, wireless, and 
satellite for example, compete among themselves and with older technologies, primarily wire 
and traditional broadcasting. In general, the question is, how does the cable case fit with the 
literature? 
A final and related purpose is to consider whether there are lessons to be drawn from 
the examination of cable deregulation and reregulation that can add to general understanding 
of regulatory policy development and the role and influence of groups in that process. 
To provide a foundation for addressing these matters, the following section reviews 
the relevant literature. 
Relevant Literature 
In order to set the stage for the analysis of the influence that group interests have on 
the shaping of regulatory policy, the literature regarding interests groups is reviewed in three 
contexts. At the most general level, the place of groups in American politics is discussed. 
Then, some perspectives on group activities as they relate to the policymaking process are 
presented, and lastly, and more specifically, interest group roles and influence on change in 
regulatory policies are reviewed. The assumption that guides this review of relevant 
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literature is that the importance of interests in the analysis of policymaking grows out of the 
pluralist perspective on American government and politics. 
General Perspectives on the Role of Interest Groups in American Politics 
Increases in citizen advocacy during the late 1960s and 1970s were perceived by 
some as an indication of a revival of participatory democracy. 1 As new groups formed to 
push for changes in areas such as civil rights, environmental regulation, and consumer 
protection, the voices of such constituencies spoke more loudly in the policymaking process. 
Government, in turn, responded with many new laws and regulatory programs. America 
seemed to be regaining the ideal of participatory democracy, a welcome development to 
many given the conflict and alienation of the times. Yet, for others, the increase in citizen 
advocacy was a cause for concern. One of the more prominent critics of this development 
is political scientist Samuel Huntington, who has warned against an "excess of democracy. "2 
In Huntington's eyes, the wave of new citizen lobbies produced by the "democratic surge" 
of the 1960s "overloaded" the political system. The expansion of governmental activity 
could not possibly satisfy all competing demands, and, ultimately, the authority of 
government was undermined. Increased participation, for him, made the nation less 
governable. 
Beginning with James Madison's writings in Federalist 10, the idea of people joined 
or associated to further their common interests was perceived as a potential threat to popular 
government in America. Madison also realized, however, that the suppression of groups 
1 Harry C. Boyte, The Backyard Revolution (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1980). 
2 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Democratic Distemper,"Public Interest 41 (Fall, 
1975): 9-38. 
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would effectively extinguish the flame ofliberty. He therefore believed that with appropriate 
institutional arrangements, a proliferation of factions contending for power would check and 
balance diverse ambitions. This idea of the essential nature of factions or groups in the 
American political system has been important in the study of government and politics over 
the years. From Arthur Bentley to David Truman to Robert Dahl, political scientists have 
contended that the basic units for studying the American political system are interest groups. 
Interest groups are known variously as "pressure groups," "special interest groups," "public 
interest groups," "lobbies," and "citizens groups. "3 The traditional view of organized interest 
groups is that they lobby or attempt to influence government by pressing for action in accord 
with their policy interests. Depending on the type of group analyzed, this is viewed along 
a continuum from corruption of the process, to domination by upper-class interests, to 
merely educating decision makers on all aspects of a policy decision. In general, however, 
the conventional belief is that the broader public interest suffers whenever the narrow 
interests of particularistic groups prevail in government decision making. 
The field of political science first saw the emergence of interest group studies at the 
turn of the century. Their development was shaped by the obvious importance of organized 
interests in politics and social and political theory that argued the basic societal significance 
of groups. Arthur Bentley's work in 1908 was a starting point. It represented a shift away 
from the nineteenth century study of jurisprudence and its focus on constitutional 
distributions of power among institutions. Bentley was an early advocate of a descriptive 
political science based on a group conception of political life. His work went beyond formal 
descriptions of politics.4 He suggested a "social mechanistic" view of government that was 
3 Robert H. Salisbury, Interest Group Politics in America (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1970). 
4 See Beard's review ofBentley for Political Science Quarterly, 1908, 739-
741. 
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more realistic in empirical terms than formal normative views of how the institutions of 
government operated. In Bentley's view, the working class or elite groups were simply types 
of groups not more important than families, farm organizations, racial groups, political 
parties, interest associations and other groups in terms of their relationships with 
government. His image of government was the appeasement of many small groups, each 
with its own demands. Elitist theories held that business and organized economic interests 
were pre-eminent and to be considered in totally different categories than others not included 
among the economically powerful. Additionally, Bentley rejected the definitional 
differences between "interests" and "opinion" that prevailed in his time. Popular use of the 
terms contrasted "interests" as elite groups and "opinion" as popular will such as "public 
opinion." In his eyes, each was part of all the many and varied "interest groups" which the 
governmental process must accommodate. s Bentley believed there were no effective 
individual interests; that every group has its interest; that they always result in group action; 
and that there is no one group interest that includes everyone in society. 6 
G. David Garson writes that pluralism, in the early 20th century, became the rebuttal 
to the traditional political theory of the absolute sovereignty of the state. 7 The beginnings 
of this in practice were the nineteenth century struggles over matters such as independence 
of religious groups from state intervention. 8 This conception of the partial sovereignty of 
the state created a "framework for interpretation of the increasingly important economic 
pressure groups that appeared at this time." It also provided a rationale for protecting the 
s Arthur F. Bentley, The Process of Government, Peter Odgard ed. 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1967), 244. 
6 See Salisbury's Interest Group Politics in America. 
7 G. David Garson, Group Theories of Politics (Beverly Hills, Calf: Sage 
Publications, 1978). 
8 Ibid, 19. 
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growth of trade unionism from the intervention of a generally conservative and 
unsympathetic state. He states that, 11 At the core of the pluralistic critique was the argument 
that the state was not sovereign as jurisprudential theory held, but rather that the state was 
one of many associations in society". 9 
In the spirit of the pluralistic critique, the desirability of focusing empirically on 
groups grew among American political scientists. For example, Albert Hart noted that 
"more and more people tend to accept the theory t�at all government in America -- national, 
state, municipal or local -- springs from one source, the American people as a whole, who 
choose to exercise power through a variety of organizations. 11 10 John Dickinson used 
historical and anthropological evidence to argue that "conflict between interests is 
inevitable" 11 and that order is not suppression of conflict; order is the readjustment of human 
relations in the course of conflict, which is a never ending process. In this view, 
"Government, like the human will, is motivated by the very forces which it governs; its 
function is only to arrange them in a more orderly pattern. 11 12 
Other important studies of a descriptive nature focusing on groups were Peter 
Odegard'sPressure Politics, E. Pendleton Herring's Group Representation Before Congress, 
and S. A. Rice's Farmers and Workers in American Politics. Rice's was the most 
theoretically complex. Odegard's work was a descriptive study with little emphasis on 
9 Ibid, 18. 
10 Albert Hart, "Growth of American Theories of Popular Government," 
American Political Science Review 1907 1: 558. 
11 John Dickinson, "Social Order and Political Authority,"American Political 
Science Review, 1929 (May), 23 2: 293-328, 299. 
12 John Dickinson, "Social Order and Political Authority,"American Political 
Science Review, 1929 August, 23 3 :  593-632, 619. 
8 
theoretical problems as was Herring's book. "Thus with the rise of descriptive political 
science in the 1920's the study of politics came to be viewed as the study of influence and 
power, not the study of government and the state. The crucial distinction between the two 
lay in the abandonment of normative theory by the empirical students of group power. " 13 
For example, in his 1935 study of pressure groups and the tariff, E. E. Schattschneider 
concluded that groups achieved access to influence government through campaign 
contributions and inside connections when they were able to maintain lobbyists in 
Washington. He viewed this as a result of an upper-class bias that served to distort the 
public interest. 14 
Following Bentley, group theory for some held out the promise of serving as a 
general theoretical framework. From the 1950s to the 1960s, the group approach to the 
study of politics was believed by some to be the most influential general framework for 
analysis. 15 With the publication of Robert A. Dahl's Who Governs?, the pluralistic 
perspective and group theory became widely accepted bases for analysis in political 
science. 16 By the end of the decade, group theory changed from aspiring to be a research 
theory to now serving as an area of analysis, or research area. 17 
There is still today a general appreciation of the importance and influence of 
organized interests, despite disagreements at the normative level as to whether this influence 
13 Garson, Group Theories, 3 7. 
14 E. E. Schattschneider, Politics, Pressures, and the Tariff (New York: 
Prentice-Hall, 1935). 
15 Garson, Group Theories, 120. 
16 Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City, 
(New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1961) 1961. 
17 Garson, Group Theories, 119. 
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is good or bad. A general feeling of acceptance in empirical terms that influence by group 
interests matters in governance serves to justify a focus on organized interests in the study 
of policymaking. 
Classic Pluralism and Its Critics 
Assumptions about the importance of interest groups in the analysis of policymaking 
spring mainly from the pluralist perspective on American government and politics. Pluralism 
as a political theory is built on a recognition that groups are key actors in politics, that there 
are many sources of power and influence over government and that in a democracy, all 
members of a society can share in the exercise of power and influence through membership 
in groups and their interaction with political institutions within and outside of government. 
It is, in part, a theory of factions. It deals with the distribution of power in the political 
system. There is an assumption of equality in terms of opportunities to participate in the 
democratic process. In general, proponents of classic pluralism assume that all Americans 
belong to -- or can belong to -- groups, and that individual interests are thereby truly 
represented in political processes. Pluralism is viewed as an accurate empirical description 
of the basic nature of American political systems and is viewed normatively as the source 
of the system's strength. These views are best exemplified by the works of David B. Truman 
and Robert A. Dahl. 
Although one can trace the roots of pluralist thinking about American politics back 
to James Madison and his efforts to promote the new constitution, the more explicit 
evolution of pluralist theory, as previously noted, probably begins around 1908 with Arthur 
Bentley in his book The Process of Government. 18 This work was extended by David B .  
Truman in 1951. Truman's normative thesis was that groups comprise in the deepest sense 
18 Bentley, The Process of Government. 
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the "raw materials of politics and government. 11 It was his belief that groups embody the 
basic instincts of men in pursuit of or in defense of their interests. For Truman, writing in 
The Governmental Process, politics can be understood entirely by looking at the interaction 
of groups. 19 To him, political man is a result of the influences that groups have on him. 
Truman argues that the existence and operation of groups of interests, identified with 
particular issues, is the appropriate unit of analysis for studying the governmental process. 
He believes that a characteristic feature of the governmental system in the United States is 
that it contains a multiplicity of access points. The federal system establishes decentralized 
and more or less independent centers of power and vantage points from which to secure 
access to the national government. 2° For Truman, the success of groups in gaining access 
to governmental institutions comes as a result of interactions among complex factors which 
he places into three categories: (1) factors related to the strategic position of the group in 
society; (2) factors related to internal characteristics of the group; and (3) factors that are 
particular to the governmental institution that is the target of access by the group. 21 It was 
in this manner that Truman aimed to conceptualize a structure of pluralist interactions that 
could be observed empirically. 
Truman's defense of interest groups against critics who claim they are elitist and 
exclude the poor, ethnic minorities, and less powerful is found in the assertion that "the work 
of one political interest group, whether a business association or a group representing some 
other interest in the society -- labor unions, for instance -- results in wave-like development 
19 David B. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and 
Public Opinion, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1951). 
20 Ibid, 507. 
21 Ibid 506. ' 
1 1  
of interest group activity; other groups are created to present different claims and to push 
opposing policies, and, in tum, still other groups grow up in response to those, and so on. "22 
Robert Dahl's studies of pluralism evolved from the normative theory of the roles of 
interest groups in democracy to an empirical study of city politics to describe the roles 
actually played by particularistic interests, and finally to a synthesis of his writings as they 
relate to democratic politics. His book A Preface to Democratic Theory published in 1956 
was theoretical and influenced a good deal of thought on how the American political system 
operates. 23 In 1961, he published Who Governs? as an empirical study to follow up on Floyd 
Hunter's study of elite power in urban government settings. Finally, he synthesized these 
perspectives in his book Pluralist Democracy. 
In A Preface to Democratic Theory, Dahl argues that the definition of "normal" 
American political process is one in which "there is a high probability that an active and 
legitimate group" can be effectively taken into account at the important points in the decision 
making process.24 American democracy, in Dahl's view, is not about majority politics. For 
him, "The numerical majority is incapable of undertaking any co-ordinated action; it is the 
various components of the numerical majority that have the means of action. "25 
Dahl's study of politics in New Haven, Connecticut, discovered that policymaking 
was a process which involved coalitions of groups and politicians whose levels of activity 
22 Ibid, 79. 
23 Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1956). 
24 Ibid, 145. 
25 Ibid 146. ' 
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varied by issues and their level of concern with the issues. 26 Fundamentally, he concluded 
that through bargaining and compromise among groups and politicians, public policy 
decisions were made without any single group always being dominant. To synthesize these 
studies, Dahl wrote that pluralism as a political system builds upon the legitimacy of group 
interests as they are used to avoid conflict and saw its value in avoiding single centers of 
sovereign power. For Dahl, "The existence of multiple centers of power, none of which is 
wholly sovereign, will help ... to tame power, to secure the consent of all, and to settle 
conflicts peacefully. "27 The strongest point made by Dahl in this context is that because of 
the necessity for continuous negotiations and bargaining among various centers of power in 
order to make decisions, group members learn and perfect the art of peacefully managing 
conflict. This does not merely benefit the groups directly involved, but ultimately benefits 
all in the society in the moderation of or avoidance of conflict. Pluralistic politics typically 
result in decisions that involve limited, acceptable degrees of change in small increments, 
or incrementalism. 
Much of the criticism of pluralism is founded on an expectation of equity in political 
outcomes. Critics say that the world depicted by classic pluralism does not exist and special 
interest groups frustrate the development of American democracy. Elitist critiques attack the 
notion of equality of classes in the political process. They contend that rather than provide 
full representation in making public policy, some groups are advantaged over others. 28 The 
26 Dahl, Who Governs? 1961. 
27 Robert A. Dahl, Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict and 
Consent, (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1967), 24. 
28 See Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (Chapel Hill, N.C. : The 
University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1953); C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1959); Mancur Olson, The Logic of 
Collective Action, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965); Peter Bachrach 
and Morton S. Baratz, "Two Faces of Power," American Political Science 
Review, v. 56, December, 1962; Grant McConnell, Private Power & American 
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wealthy and well organized are favored over those trying to find their voice. In the words 
of E. E. Schattschneider; "The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings 
with a strong upper-class accent. "29 Critics also contend that pluralist theory masks "cozy" 
relationships in collections of interests both inside and outside government that exclude 
other legitimate interests. 30 
A fundamental criticism of pluralism comes from sociologists and some political 
scientists who claim that the theory does not account for groups ( or latent groups) that lack 
resources to organize for political or economic reasons. This perspective is presented mainly 
by writers and students of the elitist or stratification viewpoint. Floyd Hunter concluded from 
his study of Regional City (Atlanta, Georgia) that a power leadership existed which made 
policy decisions without the knowledge of the majority of citizens and to the advantage of 
the few in leadership positions. 31 He believed that a small number of individuals formulated 
and extended policy; that all policy makers have power but all who have power are not 
policy makers. 32 It was this study that so intrigued Robert Dahl that he undertook to test 
Hunter's hypothesis in New Haven, Connecticut. 
Democracy, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966). 
29 E. E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People, (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1960), 35. 
30 See Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People; Theodore J. Lowi, The End 
of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States, 2ed. (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 1979); McConnell, Private Power & American Democracy, ; 
Jeffrey M. Berry, The Interest Group Sociery, (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1984) 
31 Hunter, Communiry Power, 1 
32 Ibid, 7. 
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C. Wright Mills is one of the most notable critics of pluralism from the elitist 
perspective. 33 Mills uses the phrase "power elite, 11 to distinguish those who wield power 
within the ruling institutions of society and act with common interest to preserve and 
enhance their power and the power of those institutions. For Mills, this elite includes the 
holders of the top positions in the military, the executive branch of the nation's government, 
the leaders of corporate industry, and members of fabulously rich families. An often cited 
manifestation of this power elite is referred to as the "military-industrial complex. "34 
For Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, elitists look to the source of political 
power while pluralists look at the exercise of that power or the processes involved. 35 
Theodore J. Lowi argued that the ideology that interest group politics is good had 
transformed into interest group liberalism, in which government had lost its basic legitimacy 
and authority, thus inviting domination by select constellations of power in their own, 
private self interest. 36 This resulted in what Lowi saw as a systematic abdication by 
government to private groups of its power over the direction of public policies. These de 
facto delegations of government authority in tum lead to policy without law and legislation 
without accountability. 
Grant McConnell described the emergence of the circumstances detailed by Lowi as 
beginning with the industrial mobilization in America in response to the First World War. 
He observed that some governmental agencies actually assumed the task of organizing 
33 Mills, The Power Elite. 
34 The term "military-industrial complex" was used by Dwight D. Eisenhower 
in his farewell speech when he left the presidency and Washington, D. C. in 1961. 
35 Bachrach and Baratz, "Two Faces of Power." 
36 Lowi, The End of Liberalism. 
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economic groups in order to fonnulate a consensus in policy arenas to relieve the 
"government of much of its burden. "37 The danger of this was the possibility of eliminating 
public values from effective political consideration in making policy. 38 The process 
approximates in some situations to the "capture of government. "39 The major critique of 
pluralism functioning in small group constituencies is that not all groups are organized and 
not all interests are represented. This condition, McConnell believes, has serious 
consequences for democracy. 
In 1965, Mancur Olson presented an evaluation of organized interest groups which 
served to undermine the arguments of group theorists in what some viewed as the most 
devastating critique of pluralism. Olson contended that interest groups could not operate as 
Truman and Dahl had theorized under pluralist thinking because of the difficulty in 
organizing and maintaining group memberships for benefits that were collective. This 
thinking tended to support the proposition that interest groups have bias toward monied 
interests and therefore tend to ignore the broader public interest. 
In Jeffrey Berry's discussion of classic pluralism he described two principle lines of 
criticism. One was methodological in that important democratic issues are left out of the 
empirical analyses of interest groups because pluralist studies focus on too narrow a set of 
issues, for instance only those issues that reach the public agenda. 40 The other was a 
criticism on a normative basis which assumes that all citizens generally have equal resources 
for participating in interest group politics. While such criticisms attack pluralist thought on 
37 McConnell, Private Power, 4. 
38 Ibid 6. ' 
39 Ibid 6. , 
40 Jeffrey M. Berry, The Interest Group Society, 1 1 . 
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various grounds, they do not deny the importance of organized interests in the ebb and flow 
of politics and policymaking. 
Next we will look at several views on how organized interests participate in 
policymaking. 
Perspectives on Organized Interests and Policymaking 
As Schattschneider observed in his study of tariffs, interest groups can interact with 
government in various manners depending on the intensity of their interests. 41 In a 
somewhat passive mode, interest groups monitor government activity to determine what 
might affect their interests. Then, in a more active mode, an offensive mode, groups initiate 
or attempt to influence government action to favor their positions on a given issue, or, in a 
defensive mode, attempt to block action that would be a detriment to their interests. These 
activities in any particular policy area tend to establish long running and close relationships 
among the interest group representatives, the congressional sector (both members and staff), 
and the administrative or regulatory agencies involved. This leads to a discussion of views 
on the structure of the involvement of organized interests in policymaking. 
In the context of regulation, the major manifestation of the critique of classic 
pluralism is what is known familiarly as capture theory. It claims to describe how regulatory 
behavior actually works. For many years social scientists' understanding of the regulatory 
process was based on a belief that agencies are captured by the interest groups that they 
41 Schattschneider, Politics, Pressures, and the Tariff, 1 935. 
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regulate. This belief was developed by Huntington 42 and refined by others. 43 The main 
argument is that agencies are created in response to the actions and wishes of those 
regulated. Once established, the agencies continue to operate in the interest of those 
organizations. In justification of the capture-at-origin view, proponents argue that such 
regulations are needed to protect selected industries from competition, to reduce risks and 
inefficiencies. Criticism of the capture theory centers on the claim that the theory is one­
sided. That is, the theory ignores other constituencies that regulatory agencies have, not the 
least of which are public interest groups that monitor the regulatory activities of the 
agency.44 
The more systematic conceptualization of subgovernments has supplemented highly 
simplistic capture theory to describe how interest groups act to influence policymaking. 
Leiper Freeman, in one of the first sub government studies, discovered that when looking at 
the public policymaking process with regard to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, bureaus, 
committees and interest groups enjoyed a good deal of autonomy that resulted in a policy 
subsystem involving mainly the leaders of the three entities.45 He found that the relationship 
between the bureau and the congressional committee was institutionalized and 
depersonalized and that the bureau remained sensitized to the preferences of the committee. 
Emmette S. Redford found evidence of a more complex system in his study of civil aviation 
42 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the 
Railroads, and the Public Interest," The Yale Law Review 1952 6 1: 467-509. 
43 See Marver H. Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission, 
(Princeton, N.J. :  Princeton University Press, 1955); McConnell, Private 
Power, 1966; and Lowi, End of Liberalism, 1979. 
44 See Lawrence Rothenberg, Regulation, Organizations, and Politics: Motor 
Freight Policy at the Interstate Commerce Commission (Ann Arbor, Mich. : The 
University ofMichigan Press, 1994), 10. 
45 J. Leiper Freeman, The Political Process: Executive Bureau - Legislative 
Committee Relations, Rev. Ed., (New York: Random House, 1955), 14- 15. 
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policy than Freeman associated with Indian affairs. Even though he found a large 
divergence of interests, there existed a high concentration of decision making supported by 
a consensus involving the aviation industry, the administration, congressional leaders and 
trusted experts in the transportation area. This structure in tum delegated routine 
microdecisions to the administrative component of the system, reserving consideration of 
policy matters to be worked out by leaders in the industry, the agency, and the congressional 
leadership of the related committee. 46 According to Redford, subsystems serve to provide 
stability and equilibrium among interests, and they provide for interests access and 
opportunities to influence policymaking. As a corollary, subsystems also provide some 
access and representation for interests that are not dominant because of the inherent nature 
of multiple channels of access. Finally, subsystems prevent substantial changes in the 
equilibrium of interests without intervention of the next level. Subsystem actors are without 
authority to bring about radical change unless issues are raised to the highly visible arena of 
macropolitics. 47 
J efrrey M. Berry defines subgovemments as consisting primarily of a limited number 
of interest group advocates, legislators and their aides and key agency administrators who 
all interact in a continuing and stable basis to dominate policymaking in a particular area. 
The subgovernment perspective differs from capture theory in that it recognizes that interests 
other than directly regulated groups play a role in influencing policymaking. For example, 
conservationist interest groups attempt to influence policies to protect the environment, or 
consumer advocate groups participate in auto safety policymaking. In a mature 
subgovernment, participating interest groups would be involved in a close, co-optive 
46 Emmette S. Redford, Democracy in the Administrative State, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1969), 99-100. 
47 Ibid, p. 106. 
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relationship with government, seldom challenged by hostile interests from outside the 
relationship that might be opposed to their wishes. They are characterized as stable, long­
standing relationships. These relationships breed from the circumstances that allow groups 
to offer both incentives and sanctions to gain access through politicians. In general, 
organized interests can provide the following political incentives for policy makers: (1) they 
can provide important information to help make or support policy decisions; (2) they can 
assist politicians with political strategy to pass or block bills or amendments; (3) they can 
provide politicians with ideas and innovative proposals that promote their political 
viewpoints; ( 4) because they may involve long standing friendships, many times they 
provide access to entertainment, dinners, recreation and travel; and ( 5) they can provide 
assistance in election campaigns in the form of volunteers for campaign staff and 
coordinators. 48 
For Berry, relationships in the subgovernment model may in some cases lead to 
development of policy in what is viewed as a closed system. Closed systems are popular 
within political science because they validate a belief that there exists an imbalance between 
the economically advantaged and the general public interest as a result of interest group 
politics. Various labels are used to refer to these closed relationships such as "whirlpools, "49 
"iron triangles, " or "triple alliances. "so The basic characteristics of these closed structures 
are: ( 1)  that they involve a small group of actors who play a dominant role in developing 
policy in a particular field; (2) that the policymaking is consensual, with quiet bargaining 
48 Jeffrey M . .  Berry, "Subgovernments, Issue Networks, and Political 
Conflict," Rulemaking in American Politics, eds. Richard A. Harris and Sidney 
M. Milkis, (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1988), 248-25 1 .  
49 Emest S .Gri:ffith, The Impasse of Democracy (New York: Harrison-Hilton 
Books, Inc. , 1 939), 1 82. 
so Freeman, The Political Process, 5 1 .  
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that produces agreements among affected parties; and (3) that partisan politics do little to 
disrupt the autonomous and relatively stable arrangements. The negative implication is that 
the established relationships exclude other interests and do not therefore serve the "public 
interest" in the broad sense since such exclusion disallows representation by all important 
interests at the bargaining table. 51 
Another version of the subgovernment model of interest groups working with 
bureaucratic agencies is provided by Jonathan Bender and Terry Moe. Their "adaptive 
model" discusses indirect influence by interest groups on bureaucratic behavior. The model 
they present involves a three-way interaction among legislators, a bureaucratic agency, and 
at least two interest groups; one that prevails in the policy decision and another that loses. 52 
In this model, agencies adapt their behavior depending on the indicators or cues they receive 
from legislators. These cues, or "feedback," come from congressional committees or when 
presidential administrations change. 
Without denying the utility of the basic subgovernment concept, some scholars have 
taken the view that reality, including the role of organized interests, is more complex and 
variable. Redford, in Democracy in the Administrative State, identifies three levels of 
politics based on "scope of participation and involvement. "53 The first, and lowest level is 
micropolitics. At this level organized interests, individuals, firms, or even communities 
attempt to obtain beneficial decisions for themselves only. This level is characterized by 
direct interaction with the governmental entity -- usually the bureaucracy --that provides the 
51 Berry, Subgovemments, 240-241. 
52 Jonathan Bendor and Terry Moe, "An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic 
Politics," American Political Science Review 1985, 79: 755-774. 
53 Redford, Democracy, 83-85. 
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sought after benefit, such as a grant-in-aid, or a government contract. At this level, efforts 
to reduce differentiated microdecisions result in administrative procedures and bureaucratic 
rules and judgment of experts. 
The next level is the intermediate level and deals with the politics of function, such 
as the main executive departments and agencies, for example, Agriculture, Energy, the Army 
Corps of Engineers, or the Bureau of Indian Affairs. At this level, activities will involve 
interrelationships among administrative agencies, congressional committee structures, 
organized interests, such as trade associations. Alternately known as subsystem politics, this 
model involves interrelationships between agencies charged with implementing public 
policy, congressional committees responsible for legislating and oversight of the policy area 
and the salient organized interests. 
For Redford, the highest level is macropo/itics. At this level, issues such as major 
changes in entitlements and the tax code are debated and resolved with the involvement of 
the president, congress as a whole, large-scale organized interests and mass public opinion. 
The questions raised to the macro level are broad in implication and normally involve 
matters of broader issue and involve much wider interests than at the subsystem level. 
Another perspective on understanding the involvement of organized interests in 
policymaking was originally set forth in a book review in 1964 by Theodore Lowi. In it, he 
argued that: (1) the types of relationships to be found among people were determined by 
their expectations or what they intend to get from interacting from others; (2) in a political 
sense, these expectations were determined by governmental outputs in the form of policies; 
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(3) thus, political relationships were determined by the type of policy output at stake. 54 He 
extended his argument to state that for every type of policy there likely would be a 
distinctive type of relationship, or a different type of political process. These political 
relationships are power relationships, when power is defined as having a share in making 
policy or authoritative allocations. 
Lowi's intent was to replace descriptive, subject matter categories used by pluralist 
scholars with a set of functional categories. He discusses three functional categories as types 
of governmental policies: distribution, regulation, and redistribution. The distributive policy 
area is characterized by policies that can easily be disaggregated and are individually 
dispensed unit by unit. Benefits are clearly identifiable, but the cost burden is not. In this 
arena, participants are numerous, and government tries to accommodate as many citizens as 
possible with as little of the unit benefit as possible distributed to each. Competition and 
conflict among interests are not typical, and power relations are stable. Regulatory policies 
are characterized by decisions that directly raise costs and reduce or expand alternatives of 
private individuals. These policies are distinguishable from the distributive in that they 
involve direct choices as to who will be a loser and who a winner. The policy area involves 
participation of a multitude of groups that interact in conflictual interplay so that policy 
tends to be a residue of the compromises formed to accommodate coalitions seeking 
preferred policy outcome. This arena is best described by the pluralistic model. The area of 
redistributive policies is characterized by broader social impacts approaching decisions 
along class lines. This policy arena is most closely associated with elitist political theory of 
power structures. It can be characterized as involving two sides on a given issue 
differentiated on ideological bases, but clear, stable and consistent on their stances. This area 
54 Theodore J. Lowi, "American Businness, Public Policy, Case Studies, and 
Political Theory" in World Politics, Vol. 14, 1964; 671-715. 
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is therefore, given to negotiation of conflicts to maintain a balance in policies among 
dichotomous "peak associations, " Congress, and executive agencies. ss What may be most 
important from what Lowi develops is that while the relations among interests and between 
them and government vary, it is this variation by policy, policy type, and power structures 
that needs to be explained in political analyses. 56 
In The Politics of Regulation, James Q. Wilson uses his own notion of costs and 
benefits to distinguish or categorize regulations into types. 57 His premise is that the 
distributional effects of costs and benefits within the possible combinations of wide and 
narrow distributions result in four political categories: majoritarian, interest group, client, 
and entrepreneurial politics and are deterministic of actions by organized interests. First, 
majoritarian politics are expected when both costs and benefits are widely distributed. 
Interest groups or factions will not rise when no definable portion of society will pay or 
receive a disproportionate share or burden. This type closely approximates Lowi's 
distributional policy type. Second, interest group politics will mobilize in conflictual 
relationships involving particular organizations when both costs and benefits are narrowly 
concentrated. The general public (that is not involved) may be sympathetic but mostly 
indifferent. This type is similar to Ripley and Franklin's competitive regulatory policy type 
to be discussed later. Third, client politics arise when benefits are concentrated but costs are 
widely distributed. When a small group will benefit, organization of interest groups and 
lobbies will take place. Since the costs are widely distributed, and therefore relatively low 
per-capita, there will be little incentive to organize in opposition to the policy. This type 
ss Ibid, 7 1 1-713 .  
56Ibid, 709. 
57 James Q. Wilson, ed. , The Politics of Regulation, (New York: Basic Books 
Inc. , 1 980). 
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closely approximates Lowi's redistributional policy type. Fourth, entrepreneurial politics 
are expected when benefits are widely distributed (low benefit per-capita) but the costs are 
concentrated in a small segment of society. Examples are clean air, auto safety, and work 
place safety. This parallels Lowi's regulatory policy type and Ripley and Franklin's 
protective regulatory type. 
The work of Lowi also has been extended by Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. 
Franklin. 58 They subdivide the regulatory arena into two distinct types: competitive 
regulatory and protective regulatory. 59 They define competitive regulatory policy as 
involving competition between prospective deliverers of goods or services for the right to 
deliver them by winning the competition for the right as it is held by a government 
regulatory agency. Agencies that operate in this policy area would be the old Interstate 
Commerce Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. Ripley and Franklin state that the policies in the competitive 
subarena are typically routine and very protective of well established interests represented 
therein. Protective regulatory politics involve more conflict in their relationships than do 
other subarenas. The authors believe this is because this policy subarea has the ability to both 
prevent certain types of private activity and also to mandate activities in quite explicit terms. 
The examples they provide include policies in the health, safety and environmental areas 
such as the Environmental Protection Agency, Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration, and the Federal Aviation Administration. Participants must at times fight 
58 Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin, Congress, The Bureaucracy, and 
Public Policy (Homewood, Ill. : The Dorsey Press, 1986). 
59 Ripley and Franklin actually discuss a total of seven policy areas. In addition 
to the distributive and redistributive areas ofLowi, they also subdivide the 
regulatory area into subareas of competitive regulatory and protective regulatory. 
These four areas then fall under a general grouping of domestic policies. They 
also analyze structural, strategic and crisis as three additional areas and place 
them under the general grouping of foreign policy. 
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off views opposing their own, thus this subarena is characterized by controversy and 
volatility. If this argument is accepted, one concludes that individual organized interests 
have less relative policy influence, leverage, or power than more dominant interests 
operating in the competitive regulatory subarea. Therefore, the policies at issue in this 
subarea are without closed subsystems, "iron triangles" or established subsystems. Thus, the 
likelihood becomes greater that pluralistic expectations of countervailing actions by 
emergent organized interests (for example, those that believe they stand to suffer some 
decrement to the perceived quality of the environment, or the public's safety) will be more 
successful. 
Ripley and Franklin contend that distinctive political relationships are generated and 
surround each of the different policy types. Even though they will differ by policy area, these 
relationships can be structured by the following elements: (I) identification of the primary 
actors involved; (2) the basic nature of the interactions among those actors; (3) the stability 
of their interactions; (4) visibility of the policy decisions to those not involved or concerned; 
and ( 5) the relative influence of individual actors. 
The writings of Redford, Lowi, Wilson, and Ripley and Franklin represent thoughts 
about the influence of organized interests in fairly complex terms. Redford suggested three 
levels of politics, based on scope of participation and involvement. Lowi argued that the 
types of relationships to be found among people were determined by what they intend to get 
from government in the form of policies thus, political relationships were determined by the 
type of policy output at stake. He extended his argument to state that for every type of policy 
there likely would be a different type of political process. Wilson uses his own notion of 
costs and benefits to categorize regulations into types. His premise is that the distributional 
effects of costs and benefits within the possible combinations of wide and narrow 
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distributions result in four political categories. The characteristics of these distinct 
categories, in tum, predict how successful organized interests will be in their efforts to 
influence policies. Ripley and Franklin contend that distinctive political relationships are 
generated and surround each of the different policy types which are similar to Lowi's types. 
These relationships are structured by the primary actors involved, the basic nature of the 
interactions, stability of their political relationships, the visibility of the policy decisions, and 
the influence of individual actors. 
The similarity of these approaches is that each posits that interest group involvement 
in policymaking is variable on some observable dimension. The differences are in the 
dimensions that each claims will cause involvement on the part of organized interests. In 
Redford's framework, organized interests will be most active and influential at the 
intermediate level in their efforts to maintain stability and equilibrium among interests. At 
the macrolevel, organized interests play more of a peripheral role. It is this level that 
provides access for more diffused interests that lack a voice at the intermediate level. Within 
Lowi's model, organized interests will be most involved and influential when dealing with 
the regulatory type of policy. It is in this policy arena that Lowi claims the particular 
organized interests stand to gain or lose the most. They would be least influential in the 
distributive type. Clearly, Wilson contends that within the two areas of interest group and 
client politics one would find the most influential actions on the part of organized interests. 
For Ripley and Franklin, the two strongest determinants for involvement and influence for 
interests are the visibility of policy decisions and the influence of individual actors. 
Collectively, they present a useful analytical perspective to view activities related to 
regulatory policymaking in the case of cable television. 
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Hugh Heclo provides another perspective on political structures, including organized 
interests, that produce policy. It concerns what he labels as issue networks. He criticized the 
notion of subgovernments as not so much wrong as incomplete. 60 He saw sub government 
politics as evolving into "issue network" politics. These networks are more open than 
clearly defined subsystems. He defines an issue network as "a shared knowledge group" that 
ties together large numbers of participants with common technical expertise. They are made 
up of technical specialists, journalists, administrators and political entrepreneurs working 
out of varied institutional settings. Issue networks are characterized by sloppy and ill 
defined organizational boundaries; participants move in and out easily. Issue areas overlap; 
as an issue develops, new coalitions form in response. Networks are distinctive in terms of 
their large size and accessibility to new participants. They tend to be shaped in two ways: 
( 1) a central grouping involved in a wide range of issues such as when trade associations act 
as brokers of information or provide lines of communication on an issue; or (2) clusters of 
individual groups that share common interests and concerns and form coalitions. Issue 
networks can be highly conflictual when diverse viewpoints are represented. Another 
distinction is that they lack the stability of subgovernments. While Heclo viewed the simple 
notion of subgovernments made up of a limited number of key leadership individuals as 
incomplete, he recognized that they have a place in issue networks as a subcomponent on 
any given policy issue. 
For Thomas A. Gais, Mark A. Peterson, and Jack L. Walker issue network systems 
are fluid, shifting, conflictual, and characterized by multiple access points for organized 
60 Hugh Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment," The New 
American Political System, ed. Anthony King, (Washington, D.C. : American 
Enterprise Institute, 1978), 88 .  
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interests. 61 Authority is fleeting. The "insiders" of legendary iron triangles would not be 
familiar with the rapid formation and mobilization of the new coalitions that are constantly 
emerging and dissolving. The authors believe that most important changes in the 1980s in 
public policy were fashioned within issue networks. They also contend that one of the most 
important causes of this change is the rapid expansion in the number and variety of interests 
that have achieved formal representation in the American system. In addition, as the range 
of issues have increased, single subgovernments have gradually lost the capability to manage 
the issues. Mass media gets involved with distributing information about the policy 
questions and who is involved. More citizens are motivated to make their preferences known 
to their elected representatives, and the widening of the pool of participants in the conflict 
brings in some who are new to the policy area. 
Timothy J. Conlan, Margaret T. Wrightson, and David R. Beam, in their study of 
tax reform enacted in 1986, addressed the influence of recent political changes on the 
passage of tax laws, an area believed to be strongly steeped in the conventional model of 
special interest involvement in policy change. 62 The authors refer to their case study of 
changes in the tax laws as bearing on "nonincremental or breakthrough policy changes. "63 
They believed that conventional interpretations of the policy process too often neglect the 
consequences of recent institutional changes in Congress, in party politics, and in the 
techniques of political communication and coalition building. Additionally, they noted the 
often surprising ability of individual congressional entrepreneurs to initiate and shape key 
61 Thomas A. Gais, Mark A Peterson, and Jack L. Walker, "Interest Groups, 
Iron Triangles, and Representative Institutions in American National 
Government" British Journal of Political Science, vl 4, 1984, 161-185 . 
62 Timothy J. Conlan, Margaret T. Wrightson, and David R. Beam, Taxing 
Choices: The Politics of Tax Reform, (Washington, D.C. Congressional Quarterly 
Press, 1990). 
63 Ibid, 220. 
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policies. Finally, they recognized that ideas as well as interests can have a powerful 
independent influence on policymaking. 
Conlan, et al, present three theories that structure conventional understanding of 
political behavior and policymaking: (I) the pluralist/incrementalist school; (2) the 
presidential/majoritarian model; and (3) the ideational/entrepreneurial perspective. The first 
model is characterized as "business as usual. " It is the theory of incrementalism to which 
pluralism is usually linked and emphasizes outcomes as much as processes. Incrementalists 
recognize that most new policies, most of the time, involve only small departures from their 
predecessors. Incrementalism has a political explanation as well. Incremental decisions are 
normally the path of least resistance where there is a pluralistic distribution of power. The 
incrementalist model is also linked to subgovernment perspectives in that it allows 
bargaining to shape incremental changes in ways that foster acceptance by relative losers in 
particular interest groups. 
The authors characterize the second model as "old-style reform. " In the presidential­
majoritarian form of policy change, a strong president sweeps into office along with large, 
unified party majorities in both chambers of Congress. This model somewhat resembles the 
responsible party government model for overcoming structural obstacles and political inertia. 
In this approach, the president mobilizes the substantial resources of his office to construct 
a coherent legislative program and rallies the public and his party followers behind it. 
Although effective in the short run (usually in the early weeks and months of an 
administration) in a matter of time, internal forces return the system to the circumstances that 
existed prior. The presidential-majoritarian model thus links great changes in policy to 
decisive shifts in the electorate. "It accords nicely with the progressive reforms secured by 
Woodrow Wilson in 1913  and 19 14, with the outpouring of New Deal legislation under 
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Franklin Roosevelt in the 1930s, and with Johnson's Great Society program in the mid-
1960s. "64 
The authors refer to the third model as the new politics of reform, one that places 
emphasis on the significance of ideas in politics. It differs from pluralism in that it treats 
ideas as an independent creative force in the political process. 65 The significant factors in 
this model include policy ideas and professionals or academics, political entrepreneurs, and 
the news media. Conlan, et al, argue that these same elements help to explain the enactment 
of other significant legislation that is difficult to account for in terms of interest-group 
politics and presidential-party leadership. They cite as examples many consumer and 
environmental laws, as well as the deregulation of air transportation that pitted the interests 
of broad, unorganized publics against narrow, highly organized interest group opponents. 
Berry, in writing about subgovernments, issue networks, and political conflict, 
believes that the conventional view is still that policymaking takes place across institutional 
lines, (government agencies, Congress, courts, parties, and groups), and to understand policy 
decisions one must understand how key actors from different institutions and organizations 
interact. 66 He too contends that the recent growth in the number of interest groups militates 
against the operation of sub governments. The expanded number of interest groups makes 
bargaining more complex and the control and coordination by key actors more difficult. 67 
64 James L. Sundquist, Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and 
Johnson Years (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1968), 50. 
65 Conlan, et al., Taxing Choices, 240. 
66 Berry, Subgovernments, 23 9. 
67 Berry cites William Browne's identification of more than 200 lobbies 
concerned with farm, agribusiness, or rural interest as an example of proliferation 
of groups that has destabilized the agricultural subsystem. Also, Gais, Person and 
Walker's observation that the growth in liberal groups that took place as a result 
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This in turn leads to the likelihood of heightened conflict between coalitions. Both the Carter 
and Reagan administrations successfully broke down the autonomy of existing 
subgovernments, Carter by appointing citizen activists to important administrative positions 
and Reagan, in turn, by appointing administrators sympathetic to the then dominant political 
ideology of slashing the budgets of many programmatic scared cows and, in general, to the 
idea of limited government. 
The basics of what can be viewed as five distinct perspectives on the study of 
organized interests in policymaking now have been discussed. The first is capture theory, 
which also can be considered the traditional model for viewing direct interest group 
involvement in shaping regulatory policy. The second is the subgovernment model, which 
expands the components to include relevant congressional committees and subcommittees, 
industry leaders, and policy experts at times. The third perspective involves studying the 
variability of organized interest participation in policymaking depending upon various 
factors. The first subvariety is presented by Redford, who argued that "intensity of interests 11 
is the determinant of participation. The second is found in the writings of Lowi and Ripley 
and Franklin who argued that the type of policy being considered is the determining factor 
for understanding participation by organized interests. The last is Wilson's work that builds 
a model based on the distribution of costs and benefits as a determinant of participation. The 
third perspective is issue networks. This model is a dynamic variation of subgovernments 
but goes beyond them to analyze the ever changing coalitions and alliances that occur as 
policy changes are considered. The last model is one that involves the policymaking 
environment as it is influenced by institutions, ideas and interests. It includes analysis of 
of the dawn of social regulation in the 1960s and 1970s was followed by a 
reactive surge in conservative groups in the 1980s (Berry, 1988, p. 244). 
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institutional changes and ideas and how they influence policymaking in a manner that goes 
beyond the direct interactions between organized interests and decision making. 
The Influence of Groups on Policy Change 
Lastly, after consideration of John Kingdon's general point-of-view on policy change, 
we turn to several focused studies on interest groups and their influence on the enlargement 
and contraction of regulation. 
Changes in policies, according to Kingdon, do not come about only through the 
involvement of group interests. In addition to the influence of organized groups on policy 
change, there are other factors that play a role. Two of these are ideas and policy 
entrepreneurs. Kingdon addresses both in broad terms in his analysis. Policy entrepreneurs 
are members of a community of specialists in a particular policy area. They are researchers, 
staffers, bureaucrats, academics, lobbyists, and legislators. Solution ideas for problems 
"float" in these communities, continually being refined and revised at conferences, through 
papers, hearings, published articles, and legislative proposals. 68 They do not control events, 
but they can anticipate them and bend events to their purposes to some degree. Finally, 
Kingdon also recognizes that more than just reelection incentives play a role. Interest group 
pressures and coordinating votes and political power affect agenda setting as well. He 
discusses the aspect of " ideas" as goals or motivations in the sense of rational-choice theory 
other than the classic, more narrowly focused self-interested quests. He argues that 
"argumentation, persuasion, the construction of effective appeals, and the evocation of 
68 John W. Kingdon, "Agendas, Ideas, and Policy Change," in New 
Perspectives on American Politics ed. Lawrence C. Dodd and Calvin Jillson 
(Washington, D.C. Congressional Quarterly Press, 1994), 221. 
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values and ideology seem as important as interest group pressure, reelection, career 
advantage, and the pursuit of power" in the motivation of political behavior. 69 
For him, ideas are a strong underlying influence on governmental policy formulation. 
He contends that contrary to the prevalence in the academic literature that policy change is 
infrequent and difficult, there are conditions under which quite sudden and dramatic changes 
in public policy have been observed when entrepreneurs pushed their policy change ideas 
when opportunity presented itself Kingdon cites the example of the early days of the 
Reagan administration when it seized the chance to reorder budgetary priorities in the first 
ten months of 1981. These changes had far reaching influences on the government, the 
economy and the political subsystems of the day. In other examples, when Kingdon finds 
it difficult to explain such movements as abolition, civil rights, environmental protection and 
consumerism strictly on the basis of the pursuit of traditional self-interests, he attributes the 
success of these movements to the power of ideas. He contends that the history of policy 
formulation in these areas is marked by powerful interests losing when confronting the ideas 
underpinning social movements. We will return to the influence of ideas on deregulatory 
policy when we discuss several case studies below. 
Larry N. Gerston, Cynthia Fraleigh, and Robert Schwab study a number of factors 
other than organized interests that influence policy outcomes. One is agency structure, 
whether headed by a single administrator or by a commission. The occupational 
composition of a regulatory body may account for variations in the influence of interests. 
The classic comparison is between agencies dominated by lawyers and those made up of 
scientists, economists, engineers or technicians. The final environmental aspect mentioned 
by Gerston, et al, is the agency's mandate. Some are broad and wide while others involve 
69 Ibid. 
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specific goals and timetables. They theorize that agencies with broad discretion are more 
open to industry capture while those with constrained latitude due to specific mandates 
produce inflexible and inefficient regulations. 70 
Richard A. Harris and Sidney M. Milkis define regulatory politics as the struggle for 
control over administrative levers of power and policy as it is established within 
governmental institutions. Their thesis is " that regulatory politics entails mo�e than the free 
play of self-interest, that they reflect to a large degree a clash of ideas regarding how we 
ought to live. 1171 Similar to Kingdon, these authors recognized the influence of purposive or 
goal-oriented perspectives found in rational choice theory on policy change. In support of 
this thesis, they argue that the regulatory reforms of the 1970s advocated social regulations 
based on the notion that government be opened up to provide new avenues for citizen 
participation. This in tum resulted in a new kind of participatory institution that has come 
to be known as the "public interest group. " This development served to legitimize 
representation of diffuse interests in the policymaking process. As a result, there was 
heightened citizen participation, and the public interest lobbies took a "watchdog-like" role 
in following through on the implementation of social regulation policy. Another tactic used 
by public interest groups was to shift the regulatory "battleground" to the courts and call 
upon them to "oversee the implementation of policies and mediate disputes" in that 
process.72 
70 Larry N. Gersten, Cynthia Fraleigh, and Robert Schwab, The Deregulated 
Society (Pacific Grove, California: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1988), 78. 
71 Richard A. Harris and Sidney M. Milkis, The Politics of Regulatory Change: 
A Tale of Two Agencies (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) ix. 
72 Ib.d 1 , IX. 
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The Influence of Groups on Regulatory Policy 
Lawrence S. Rothenberg, writing about organizations and politics in regulation, 
discusses two main differences in the study of regulatory politics. One is the economic 
theory of politics associated with capture theory, and the other is referred to as the new 
institutionalism perspective which grows out of the political economy tradition. His basic 
premise is that a combination of the economic theory and the new institutionalism is needed 
to accurately specify the processes by which organized interests influence regulation and is 
of great importance if regulation is to be understood and explained. 73 
Rothenberg notes that from the 1950s to the late 1970s, the understanding of the 
regulatory process centered on agency capture by organized interests as theorized by 
Huntington, Bernstein, McConnell, and Lowi. This view was systematized by George 
Stigler as many saw his analysis as transforming the capture idea into scientific theory.74 But 
further empirical studies of the CAB and the ICC suggested that group dominance alone, as 
in capture theory, could not explain all features of the regulatory process as observed. Many 
scholars believed that a more general theory was needed. From this developed a multivariate 
theory of group dominance that specified that the differences in the interests of organizations 
probably reflect differences in the society. Rothenberg contends that combining the 
multivariate theory of a "balanced of organized social forces" with the univariate group 
dominance ( or capture theory) perspective will better explain public policy decisions. 75 
Antecedents of this theory harken back to the work of early pluralists such as Bentley, 
Truman, and Latham. 
73 Rothenberg, Regulations, Organizations, and Politics, 9. 
74 Ibid, 10. 
75 Ibid, 1 1. 
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In order to synthesize economic theory and new institutionalism theories, Rothenberg 
advocates treating organized interests as an institutionalized part of the regulatory 
environment by more precisely specifying the processes by which they influence agency 
performance. His ultimate theoretical objective is the development of a framework to 
determine if, when, and to what extent associations are influential and the identification in 
greater detail of the conditions governing group influence. In concrete terms, he attempts 
to better understand agency behavior by testing the economic theory on the role of groups; 
developing ideas of what conditions group influence and when, or if, groups are important 
players in the policy-making process; and devising improved perspectives on regulatory 
politics that include reasonable assumptions about institutions and specifies the processes 
of organizational influence. 76 Most importantly for Rothenberg, features of groups beyond 
those that are typically incorporated in studies of policy decisions need to be considered in 
understanding the role organized interests play in regulation and politics. Specifically, the 
features to be included are the degree of organization, the political goals pursued, and the 
capacity to achieve these goals. 77 
In summary, current thinking holds that changes in regulatory policies do not come 
about solely through the application of organized group influence. Additional factors play 
a role. Two of these are ideas and policy entrepreneurs. Ideas are a strong underlying 
influence on governmental policy formulation. Contrary to the belief that policy change is 
infrequent and difficult, there are conditions under which changes in public policy have been 
observed when entrepreneurs have pushed their ideas when opportunity has presented itself 
The characteristics of regulatory agencies also influence policy change. One is agency 
structure, another is the occupational composition of a regulatory body, and the last is the 
76 Ibid 16. , 
77 Ibid, 256. 
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agency's mandate. Furthermore, the reforms of the 1970s that opened up new avenues for 
citizen participation served to legitimize representation of diffuse interests in the 
policymaking process, adding an additional dimension. Moreover, a combination of 
traditional economic theory and new institutionalism is needed to describe the processes by 
which organized interests influence regulation. This view advocates treating organized 
interests as an institutionalized part of the regulatory environment by more precisely 
showing how they influence policy. Finally, consideration of the features of groups, such as 
the degree of organization, the political goals pursued, and the capacity to achieve these 
goals need to be included in understanding the role organized interests play in regulation and 
politics. The study of policy change in the area of cable communications is ripe for influence 
from any of these sources, and the research will be watchful for signs of their interplay. 
Selected Case Studies of Deregulation 
Several case studies were reviewed with particular attention paid to their findings on 
the role and influence of organized groups in deregulation. In all of these cases, while 
recognizing organized interests as important in regulatory policymaking and deregulation, 
it is concluded that their influence may be dilluted by other factors. 
In The Politics of Deregulation, Martha Derthick and Paul Quirk examine a number 
of deregulation cases (trucking, airlines, maritime shipping, and telecommunications) in 
which the regulatory agencies and Congress supported regulatory reform. 78 Their hypothesis 
is that when prominent regulatory problems exist, political conditions are ripe, and ideas for 
solutions backed by policy entrepreneurs and political leaders are available, the diffuse 
78 Martha Derthick and Paul J. Quirk, The Politics of Deregulation. 
(Washington, D.C. : The Brookings Institution, 1985). 
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interests of the general public can overcome particularistic business interests in a given 
regulatory policy arena. The central question driving their study was why the affected 
industries and associated organized interests were ineffectual in stopping deregulatory 
reforms. They conclude that the combination of expert analysis, opportunistic political 
leaders, and mass public sentiment can combat particularistic organized interests effectively. 
The authors identify the determining factor for policy change in the cases they 
present as the politics of ideas. Traditional notions such as capture theory, incrementalism, 
and "iron triangles" would predict that only slight adjustments in policies acceptable to 
regulated interests would have occurred. Derthick and Quirk describe a set of circumstances 
that involve perceived problems, the ready availability of solutions (ideas), and political 
conditions conducive to change that led to contrary results. 
A central ingredient in their analysis is the role of policy reform leadership. They 
discuss issue leaders in the context of champions for an idea. They argue that participation 
by a potential leader is influenced by several conditions. One is timing of the issue. That is, 
is the time "ripe" for change? Another consideration is room on the agenda. If other issues 
in Congress are more pressing at the time, a reform may not get much attention ( and 
therefore, neither will the leader). A third factor is the merits of the issue or the magnitude 
of the benefits to be derived from reform. The final factor influencing leaders' choices of 
issues to support is prior commitments which in most cases are fashioned in election 
campaigns. Essentially, Derthick and Quirk believe these cases show that the American 
political system has a greater capacity for transcending narrow interests than generally has 
been acknowledged. 79 
79 Ibid viii. ' 
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Anthony Brown, in his study of airline deregulation, discusses how the Civil 
Aeronautics Board's support for deregulation was pursued over the objections of its regulated 
clientele, thus violating the presumption of regulator-regulated collaboration. 80 Similar to 
the work of Derthick and Quirk, Brown notes that early proponents of deregulation were 
professional economists who, in coalition with certain government agencies (the Antitrust 
Division at the Justice Department, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Department of 
Transportation) pushed for deregulation. Certain individual firms and segments of the airline 
industry that stood to gain from deregulation also joined this coalition. The major opponents 
were the larger air carriers and their employees, and they were joined by secondary interests 
such as state and local organizations representing airport operators and small communities 
that had benefitted from mandated service requirements in CAB regulations. Brown 
concludes that airline deregulation was brought about by policy entrepreneurs, advocacy by 
the affected agency itself, presidential support, changes in public opinion, and alterations in 
interest group structure. 81 
In Regulation: The Politics of Policy, Michael Reagan examines deregulation in 
communications, financial institutions, and transportation. 82 He uses Wilson's typology on 
the distribution of costs and benefits to categorize the politics that surround policymaking. 83 
He offers Social Security as an example of majoritarian politics where most of society 
benefits and most expected to pay for the policy outcomes. For interest group politics, in 
which both costs and benefits are narrowly concentrated and the general public has a small 
80 Anthony E. Brown, The Politics of Airline Deregulation (Knoxville, 
Tennessee: The University of Tennessee Press, 1987), 18. 
81 Ibid, 127. 
82 Michael D. Reagan, Regulation: The Politics of Policy (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1987). 
83 Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, 366-3 72. 
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enough stake to stay out of policy fights, he cites the example of shipping regulation where 
a small population of steamship lines and major shippers are active in the policy arena. Next 
he characterizes client politics as benefits accruing to a small group but with the costs widely 
distributed. Examples given are CAB protection of airlines from competition while allowing 
them to overcharge the public prior to deregulation as well as agricultural price support 
polices. The last is entrepreneurial politics involving widely distributed benefits, while costs 
are narrowly assigned. Health and safety and environmental policies are examples of this 
category. 84 
Reagan observed that interest group and client politics categories seem most 
susceptible to capture theory, and his reasoning is simple. If a small industry group has much 
to gain or lose from a given pattern of regulation, strong incentives exist to convince the 
agency to adopt its demands. In the case of client politics, the fact that costs are so widely 
diffused works against the emergence of strong organized opposition to policies favorable 
to client industries. 85 
From an organized interest perspective, Reagan concluded that the present day 
situation is one of much greater variety and diversity of politically effective groups than was 
the case when capture doctrine was developed. A rise in the numbers, memberships, and 
economic resources of consumer, environmental, and other public interests groups86 and the 
success of these groups in influencing regulatory agencies in directions other than those 
desired by regulated industries require a modification of the assumption that narrow, 
84 Reagan, Regulation, 60. 
BS Ibid, 60. 
86 As observed by: Jack L. Walker, Origins and Maintenance of Interest 
Groups in America; Jeffrey M. Berry, The Interest Group Society; Andrew 
McFarland, Common Cause. 
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producer self-interested groups dominate public policy decisions. 87 However, such a rise in 
influence by public interest groups in the social regulation arena initiated a reactive rise in 
corporate political mobilization. The conclusion is that the political environment of the new 
social regulation is considerably more diverse and complex than that which existed until the 
1970s in economic regulation. 88 
Richard A. Harris and Sidney M. Milkis write that, historically, the purpose behind 
attempts to streamline the federal regulatory apparatus have been to make it more 
accountable, more efficient, and more responsive. Changes in regulatory "regimes" were 
seen as being caused by new ideas, new institutions and new policies, with new ideas being 
the most crucial in the opinion of the authors. 89 The new public lobby regimes were seen as 
the driving forces behind public participation in reshaping the FTC into a consumer 
advocacy agency and the EPA into an environmental protector. The authors contend that the 
EPA was an agency where the public lobby regime and environmentalist had strong 
influence through involvement in public hearings and court appeals to ensure regulations 
were enforced. Each of these cases characterizes the supplanting of particularistic economic 
interests with diffused public interest organizations. They stated that new ideas indicate the 
leadership role played by intellectual and political elites in establishing new regulatory 
regimes. These elites included journalists, social critics, the professorate and political 
activists. 
87 Reagan, 64. 
88 Ibid, 94-95 . 
89 Richard A. Harris and Sidney M. Milkis, The Politics of Regulatory Change, 
25 . 
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The authors referred to Lowi's interest group liberalism as a model that saw 
organized interests as the only effective participants in the forming of public policies. In this 
model, it is only natural that organized interests will oppose major changes, because their 
influence is predicated on existing forms of regulatory institutions and processes. 90 This 
contributes to what Harris and Milkis viewed as regulatory inertia. But the authors also 
recognize how the new social regulation regimes were characterized more by issue network 
models of interest group involvement than the subgovernment models of Lowi and Ripley 
and Franklin. "The new social regulation was initiated and pursued by activist public lobbies, 
and those organizations continue to play an important role in the implementation of 
policy. 1191 
Yet another perspective is provided by Dorothy Robyn in her case study of 
deregulation of the trucking industry in 1980.92 It was a victory of diffused, public interest, 
political forces over concentrated interests. The conclusion that must be drawn, however, 
is that Robyn's perspective is one of a different set of interests in the form of a coalition of 
regulatory reformers prevailing over a previously entrenched subgovernment that benefited 
politically from maintaining the regulatory inertia that existed before deregulation. 
Robyn's case study provides a theoretical context in which she shuns the traditional 
economic views of self-interest or utility maximization to explain the change in policy and 
builds an argument that the change was due to application of certain strategic elements on 
the part of reformers ( examples include: farm groups that supported deregulation of trucking 
90 Ibid, 36. 
9 1  Ibid, 37. 
92 Dorothy Robyn, Braking the Special Interests: Trucking Deregulation and 
the Politics of Policy Reform, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). 
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services; corporate shippers that organized to support deregulation; the president's Council 
of Economic Advisors; and public interest groups such as the Committee Urging Regulatory 
Reform for Efficient National Transportation). The four elements were: (1) strategic use of 
economic evidence and analysis to prove the benefits of reform; (2) creation of and 
maintenance of ad hoc coalitions to support reform; (3) use of transition strategies to 
mitigate opposition to change, and ( 4) strategic bargaining by the president to gain positive 
leverage in passing legislation. 
For Robyn, certain changes in economic, intellectual, and organizational climates 
were important contributors to deregulatory trends. The emergence of public interest groups 
and organized consumer concerns created changes in the organizational climate in a way 
that favored deregulation. Combined with these climatic changes was an increased tendency 
of business interests to lobby Congress more directly in efforts to counter the growing 
strength of consumer movements. 
Lawrence Rothenberg's study of the Interstate Commerce Commission and 
deregulation of the trucking industry also concludes that group theory, narrowly defined, 
alone proved incomplete for understanding the agency (ICC) most closely identified with 
capture theory. He found that in many respects group influence proved conditional. For 
Rothenberg, it was evident that any ability for a group to dominate the political process 
would be dependent upon the preferences of and the resource allocation choices made by the 
leaders of organized interests. 93 He observed that the groups that dominated prior to 
deregulation did not have adequate levels of expendable resources at their disposal to use 
in regaining the dominance they enjoyed with the ICC before deregulation. They did not 
have the political capacity to gather assistance from the three principal entities that could 
93 Rothenberg, Regulations, Organizations, and Politics, 255. 
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produce the desired change: i. e. , the ICC, Congress, or the president. The leaders in the 
American Trucking Association (ATA) and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
(IB T) were forced to make decisions about allocating the level of resources needed to effect 
pre-reform conditions. The implication is that as institutional actors change, so will the 
ability of groups to dominate in the political process. For example, as presidential 
administrations, congressional committee assignments, leadership positions in agencies, 
even committee staff members change, so will the fortunes of particular organized interests. 
This takes place as new relationships and new institutional structures are formed that require 
political maintenance in ways that differ from prior arrangements. 
Rothenberg -- as does Robyn -- assigns a good deal of credit for the increased 
saliency of regulatory reform to a response to inflationary economic conditions during the 
later part of the Ford administration and during the Carter administration.94 However, he 
places much more emphasis on changes in the administration at the ICC as a result of 
presidential appointments, as well as the personal commitment that Carter made to 
deregulating the trucking industry to symbolize his fight against the inflationary aspects of 
regulation. He does not mention the power of ideas as in Robyn's changing intellectual 
climate, nor the successful strategies in the creation and maintenance of coalitions that she 
also emphasized. His observation is that, "Presidential administrations with different 
priorities and preferences come and go; leaders rise and fall at regulatory agencies; 
congressional membership on key committees constantly turns over," producing regulation 
in flux and evolving over time. 95 
94 Ibid 217-218. , 
95 Ibid 255. , 
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In sum, these empirical case studies clearly show that regulated interests, as typified 
by capture theory, do not dominate the policy process. They serve to picture regulatory 
policy as produced by the interactions of organized particularistic interests, organized 
interests that purport to speak for diffuse interests; government institutions; policy 
entrepreneurs; policy elites; and the role that ideas play in policymaking. 
Research Procedures and Organization 
The qualitative research process is used to investigate primary data that were 
collected from records of legislative hearings, reports and floor debates Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) actions and court decisions. Interviews were 
conducted with key participants in forging legislation. Other data were taken from 
contemporaneous periodicals, including trade journals. 
Given the nature of the research problem, the analytical procedure employed can be 
explained in very basic terms. For legislation, the first step was to identify major 
participants in the 1984 and 1992 enactments, such as organized interest groups and their 
representatives, and those in Congress and the executive branch. The next stage involved 
identifying the major issues in each period and the positions of major actors on the issues. 
Following this, policy preferences of major actors are tracked from hearings, through bill 
mark-ups, to floor debates, and ultimately to final versions of the bills as passed by 
Congress. The final stage of the analysis will be to examine the crafting of policy and the 
factors that appeared to influence major actions at each of these key stages. 
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For legislation, committee and subcommittee hearings are basic sources of data. 
Selected hearings were analyzed in terms of points of interest such as the central issues and 
the nature and range of interests represented and the weight of their representation based 
upon several indicators. Additionally, attention was paid to the position asserted by the 
various interests on major issues with particular sensitivity aimed toward differences within 
interest groupings, for example, within the cable industry organizations and organizations 
representing local governments. The usefulness of this perspective has been explained by 
T. Alexander Smith when he wrote, "The way people define issues is highly significant in 
determining the scope and intensity of issue conflicts. "96 
From hearings and other sources, the concerns and leanings of congressional 
members were ascertained as reflected in their questions and comments and their expressed 
or implied attitudes toward various interests, as were their expectations regarding how 
differences in policy preferences should be resolved. 
After analyzing pertinent hearings, committee reports were examined to identify and 
describe the collective position taken by subcommittees and committees on major issues and 
to identify and discuss how the various interests fared in outcomes. 
Finally, the analysis turns to floor debates. An important consideration in this phase 
is analysis of the amendments offered, their fate, and what they indicate about the relative 
winners and losers among participating interests. 
96 T. Alexander Smith, The Comparative Policy Process, Studies in 
Comparative Politics, Series ed. Peter H. Merkl, (Santa Barbara, California: 
American Bibliographical Center - Clio Press, Inc. , 1975), 169. 
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A continuing element throughout is a comparison of House and Senate processes in 
formulating regulatory policy. Another is similarities and differences between the 1984 and 
1992 enactments regarding process, participation, winners and losers. 
Organization 
Chapter I has introduced the study with a statement of the research problem, a 
discussion of the relevant literature on pluralism and interest group participation in 
policymaking, with a special emphasis on regulatory policy. This chapter includes a 
description of how the analysis was conducted and closes by describing the organization of 
the chapters to follow. 
Chapter II covers the history of cable television from its earliest beginnings and how 
it has been affected by the various regulatory frameworks applied over time. It contains a 
more detailed discussion of the initial policy response to the emerging technology and how 
the regulation of cable television came to the policy agenda. 
Chapter ill deals with the first stages in the development of the Cable 
Communications Policy Act of 1984. Chapter IV covers the enactment of the 1984 
legislation and the aftermath of implementation of deregulation of cable TV. It also 
discusses activities of the FCC and the courts that took place from implementation as new 
calls for reregulation began. Chapter V tracks the passage of the Cable Television Consumer 
Protection and Competition Act of 1992. Chapter VI presents an analysis of the case study 
including any implications about regulatory or deregulatory policy theories that may emerge. 
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Finally, Chapter VII is an Epilogue that presents a brief summary of relevant policy 
developments affecting the cable industry since the 1992 Act became law. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE EARLY YEARS 
Cable television was developed in the 1940s, initially to provide television in 
communities where terrain or distance prevented reception of licensed television broadcast 
stations, as, for example, in Mahanoy City, Pennsylvania, in 1948.97 At that time, antennas 
were placed in areas having good signal reception in order to pick up broadcasts which, for 
a fee, were distributed to subscribers over a cable network. Today, of course, most cable 
systems have advanced beyond their original purpose of simply retransmitting local 
television broadcast signals. 
Emergence 
Cable TV has experienced steady growth over the past decades. This growth and 
development was described in 1976 "as a direct result of consumer demand for clearer 
television reception and more viewing options than were made available under the 
frequency-allocation plan of 1952."98 In 1950, cable systems were serving some 14,000 
97Paul W. MacAvoy ed. ,  Deregulation of Cable Television, (Washington, D.C. : 
American Enterprise Institute, 1977), 5. 
98Ibid, 4. Also see Congress, House, Subcommittee on Communications of the 
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Staff Rw.ort on Cable 
Television: Promise Versus Regulatory Performance, 94 Cong,, 2nd sess., 1976. 
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subscribers in only 70 communities. By the beginning of 1982, approximately 4,700 systems 
were serving more than 21 million subscribers in some 13 ,000 communities in the United 
States. Throughout the 1980s the number of systems in major metropolitan areas increased, 
although most cable systems were still located in small communities. Between 1984 and 
1992 the number of cable subscribers rose from 3 7 million to 57 million. The percentage of 
homes with cable wire available to them rose from 71 percent in 1984 to fully 97 percent 
in 1992, and the number of programming services grew exponentially. By 1995 it was 
estimated that about 60 million homes subscribed to cable television through more than 
1 1 ,000 systems. 99 
The technology's most distinguishing feature is its capacity to provide many channels 
of service. Although in 1977 an average of 10 channels were programmed per system, most 
systems were capable of offering 12 or more. By 1995, systems commonly offered a 
capacity of at least 36 channels, and some provided 54 or more. Some systems in large 
metropolitan areas offered 100 or more channels. 
"Cable television" is a deceptively uniform term which describes, without 
differentiation, three distinct forms of wired service encompassed during the period 
examined here. Cable could mean "community antenna," a four- to six-channel operation 
simply enhancing the clarity of existing television signals; or the typically twelve-channel 
"CATV," augmenting local transmissions with broadcast programming imported from other 
markets; or the more modem "cable TV, " whose twenty-four to forty-eight [or more] 
channels and two-way circuitry provided a communications network for a broad spectrum 
99 Associated Press, "Cable deregulation passes hurdle," Knoxville (Tenn.) 
News-Sentinel, Business. December 6, 1995 . 
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of private information as well as general entertainment services. All cable operations share 
the characteristics of multichannel, audience-supported, closed-circuit technique of delivery. 
The Initial Policy Response 
In the 19 5 Os, there existed many remote areas that could not receive strong, clear 
television broadcast signals. Two technologies were developed in the early stages to provide 
remedies for some regions. One was signal relay or "booster" systems and the other was the 
community antenna concept which was the precursor of cable television. Battles between 
cable and [signal] booster operators occurred predominately in small and moderate sized 
communities as these technologies emerged as the preferred means to bring television to 
remote mountainous areas. However, clashes of national significance occurred in the 
slightly larger ·cities of from 20,000 to 40,000 population range, such as Cheyenne, 
Wyoming, Helena, Montana, and Twin Falls, Idaho. Markets of this size in the west were 
too rare for service providers of either the booster or community antenna approach to 
surrender without a fight. These areas became the "staging grounds for the first 
congressional assault upon the cable challenge. 1 1 100 
Initial Congressional Involvement 
The legal authority of the FCC to regulate cable TV was, at best, murky. As cable 
television grew to become a competitor with broadcast television, regulatory policies 
regarding cable activities lagged behind and many times effectively constrained the progress 
of the medium. The FCC's jurisdiction over cable derived from the requirement of the 
1000on R. LeDuc, Cable Television and the FCC: A Crisis in Media Control. 
(Philadelphia, Pa. : Temple University Press, 1973), 8 8 .  (Much of the discussion 
of the initial policy efforts is taken from LeDuc, 1973). 
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Communications Act of 1934 to oversee interstate communications by wire or radio . What 
was complicated about this was that cable provided television programming to consumers, 
but did not do so by use of the frequency spectrum in the airwaves. The result was that the 
FCC attempted to fit a regulatory scheme based on a "spectrum scarcity rationale" to a 
medium that did not use the spectrum. Conversely, even though cable used "wire" to deliver 
its programming, it did not fit into the FCC's regulatory framework for common carriers as 
did telephone companies. 
There were some early attempts to clarify the regulatory situation. For example, in 
1954, the Senate Commerce Committee held the first ofan eight part series of hearings titled 
the "Television Inquiry. " There were four hearings held between 1954 and 1960 where 
testimony about small-market television problems was a focal point. 101 A significant 
development was the holding of a special session of the committee in 1958 by Chairman 
Warren G. Magnuson (D-Washington), a Westerner, on the problems of western small­
market television stations. He appointed his former assistant Kenneth Cox as special counsel 
for the hearings. Cox would later become a FCC commissioner. The purpose of these 
hearings seemed to be to provide a forum for complaining small station owners to attack 
rival cable systems and the FCC for its indifference to their problems. 102 
In 1956, William Grove, station manager of Frontier Broadcasting's KFBC-TV, 
Cheyenne, Wyoming, along with twelve other western broadcasters, petitioned the FCC to 
declare 288 CATV systems to be interstate common carriers �d subject to commission 




Broadcasting v. Collier, 103 the commission concluded, "It is the opinion of the staff, that, 
under the provisions of the Act, and upon certain reasonable assumptions, CATV might be 
deemed to be common carriers for hire in interstate commerce. 11 But it also stated that, 
11 Assertion of jurisdiction would require the regulation of rates and services of several 
hundred CATV systems. It would entail an administrative burden which the Commission is 
not equipped to handle. 11 The FCC essentially avoided attempts to regulate CATV s as 
common carriers because of the perceived administrative burden it would impose. Probably 
more significant was the question of whether the Commission had the authority under the 
Communications Act of 1934 to regulate the CATV industry as common carriers . As a 
consequence, in April, 1958, the FCC declared that CATV systems were not common 
carriers, because their customers did not select the particular messages they could receive. 
This development caused broadcasters to tum to Congress for relief 
One month after issuing the Frontier decision, FCC commissioners were called 
before Senator Magnuson's committee. Commission Chairman John Doerfer was the first 
witness and was subjected to contentious questioning by Special Counsel Cox. In summary, 
Doerfer rejected the suggestion by Cox that the commission had any obligation to protect 
local broadcasters from cable competition any more than it should protect them from drive­
in movies or other attractions that might develop in their service areas. 104 This response 
drew a line between the role of the FCC in protecting the public's interest and the economic 
interest of those regulated, that is, broadcasters. When Senator Frank J. Lausche (D-Ohio ), 
asked Doerfer what legislation might help the FCC carry out its responsibilities in the area 
of small local broadcast markets, he urged that Congress not take action until the 
103Federal Communications Commission, Frontier Broadcasting v. Collier, 16 
RR 1005, 1958. 
104LeDuc, Cable Television and the FCC, 90. 
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commission could complete an investigation it was conducting on small-market problems. 
In like fashion, Vincent T. Wasilewski, representing the National Association of 
Broadcasters (NAB), could not recommend specific legislation that would aid western 
members of the organization. He suggested instead that the FCC use its authority to regulate 
microwave relays to control cable growth. 105 
Ultimately, the hearings were a disappointment suffering low attendance by senators. 
On the second day, the hearings were adjourned when the last remaining senator left the 
hearing room. Reasons cited were other pressing business and limited general interest in a 
regional problem, and perhaps most accurately, that Senator Magnuson had already decided 
in advance that the FCC should control the growth of CATV and held the hearings to 
provide justification. In the end, the committee report written by Kenneth Cox contained 
every position advocated by the western broadcast witnesses. 106 The report, titled "The 
Problems of Television Service for Smaller Communities," recommended that the 
commission set up a system of priorities with the highest priority given to local television 
stations. It urged the commission to license all auxiliary services such as VHF boosters and 
CATV systems. It also advocated a prohibition on importation of network programming 
from other sources and a constant surveillance over the growth of auxiliary systems. Any 
service in a lesser priority level would have to show an absence of economic threat to the 
higher-ranking service before it would be allowed to begin or expand its services. The 
burden of proof would be on the newer technologies to show that such innovation was not 
an economic threat to existing services, thus eliminating the competitive-market nature of 




small-market broadcasters, so much so that i t  did not provide any points useful for legislative 
negotiations. 107 
Other than the report that merely recommended actions by the FCC, it appeared that 
the hearings were successful only to the degree that they stimulated interest and support from 
other western senators who before were indifferent to the controversy. They could now 
articulate a single set of preferences for commission policy in the West. 
Continued studies, findings and policies on the part of the FCC were contrary to the 
report's recommendation to give priority to local broadcasting in protecting economic 
health. 108 This prompted the Commerce Committee to request the Subcommittee on 
Communications to draft a workable bill on auxiliary television services. Chairman John O. 
Pastore (D-Rhode Island), opened hearings in the summer of 1959 with the stated purpose 
of drawing up an equitable regulatory proposal which would protect all interests, including 
the public's. Three types of bills were submitted: narrow and specific proposals of the FCC 
concerning boosters and retransmission consent; broad and comprehensive cable regulation 
from western Senators Frank E. Moss (D- Utah), and James E. Murray (D-Montana); and 
one that involved a limited set of controls on cable submitted by Senator A. S. "Mike" 
Monroney (D-Oklahoma), on behalf of the NCTA. Senator Pastore put together a 
compromise bill that was favorably reported by the Commerce Committee in September of 
1959. But the skills in formulating a compromise demonstrated during the hearings did not 
protect the compromise from the cooling-off period between the drafting and the enactment 
107Ibid, 95. 
108The FCC was wary of becoming involved in the business of ensuring the 
viability of any medium they regulated based on a 1940 Supreme Court ruling in 
FCC v. Sanders Brothers Broadcasting [309 US 470 (1940)] admonishing the 
commission to not consider economic impact when granting licenses. 
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of legislation. A month after the bill was reported, the National Cable Television 
Association (NCT A), issued a statement clarifying its position and reiterating objection to 
retransmission consent and mandatory local station carriage. It also renewed demands for 
preemption of state and local regulations and called for grandfathering existing systems. The 
cable industry then returned to the FCC and attempted to negotiate a private settlement with 
western broadcasters. 
In November, 1959, A. J. Malin, president ofNCTA, wrote to Chairman Doerfer 
proposing an ad hoc committee of station and cable owners to consider possible solutions 
to basic complaints that broadcasters had about CATV. Doerfer rejected the NCTA request, 
since Congress was struggling with the issue and he was reluctant to have the FCC back in 
the middle of the battle. It was interpreted by some that the initiative by the NCT A was 
really an attempt to slow or stop congressional deliberations on legislative remedies. 
Pastore's Bill, S. 2653 , came to the floor on May 17, 1960. Supporters were trying 
to push it through the Senate while opponents were trying to have it referred back to 
committee, killing it. By a roll-call vote, S. 2653 was defeated 18  to 37 and returned to 
committee where it died. 
An analysis by LeDuc summarizes the outcome. 109 Addressing the question of how 
the NCT A faired so well over the far more powerful NAB, he concluded that the NAB did 
not lose and the NCT A did not win. The broadcast organization did not actively campaign 
for regulation of cable television. It was the small-market broadcasters from western states 
who had taken the initiative to approach Congress on the cable TV question. This is 
probably a result of the NAB not being a unified organization of broadcasters as much as a 
1�eDuc, Cable Television and the FCC, 1 10- 1 1 1 . 
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"federation" of narrow interests. The NAB was more focused on serving larger metropolitan 
markets where the big three broadcast networks held station licenses. There was no obvious 
cohesion between major-market broadcasters, not threatened by cable, and small-market 
community operators. Furthermore, western broadcasters had little influence in the 
association at all. 
In a somewhat similar manner, the defeat of the legislation was not necessarily a 
victory for the leadership of NCT A. The association's board of directors had voted 
unanimously in 1958 to support federal regulation of CATV. Its motive was to centralize 
regulatory authority at the federal level and avoid the variations and complications of state 
and local regulations that were expanding in scope with each passing year. The concept was 
not, however, shared by its 3 00 members. The board of directors, made up of owners of 
large systems, was attempting to impose nationwide objectives on an industry that was 
basically local in nature. Most single system owners had reached accommodation with the 
regulatory bodies at the individual municipal or state levels. They had no interest in 
becoming involved with the FCC bureaucracy in Washington. 
In the final analysis, the initial groups advocating federal intervention could not 
persuade their own organizations to support their positions. They represented only small but 
vocal portions of their respective industries. Likewise, the western senators were also a 
minority in the Senate and could not gamer the necessary votes without support from at least 
one of the two national trade organizations. When the cable bill failed it was not so much 
from opposition as from lack of interest among senators whose constituents took no 
particular stand on the question. The rejection of S. 2653 was the collapse of a compromise 
among a minority of interests more than a victory or defeat of any particular faction. This 
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first effort to establish federal regulation of cable television failed because of apathy; an 
effect of the limited nature of its impact. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, state and local governments attempted to fill the 
regulatory gap by establishing their own jurisdiction over cable TV. At the same time, 
broadcasters attacked the cable operations in various courts. In addition, advancements in 
cable communications technology allowed systems to carry up to twelve channels. Cable 
operators began to use the new technology to offer urban subscribers more than the three 
networks most had received, many times with additional programming imported from distant 
markets. 1 10 
The new direction that took cable TV into urban areas placed the industry in conflict 
with a more potent coalition of opponents. It included powerful broadcasters, programming 
syndicators, and networks that were concerned with controlling the flow of television 
programming into urban markets. Similarly, the importation . of distant signals also 
threatened the independent UHF stations in urban markets. m 
The FCC largely ignored the evolution of the cable television challenge until these 
systems began campaigns to enter major urban broadcast markets in late 1964. Because it 
was unprepared for this development, the commission could only react. It imposed an 
embargo on cable systems operating in metropolitan areas until the commission could 
establish policy to apply to the cable TV situation. 
11°Ibid 1 14. , 
llllbid, 1 1 9. 
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State and Local Regulation 
Until 1972, local and state governments were the dominant force in cable TV 
regulation.112 The attempts by states to establish regulations over early cable operations 
proved difficult simply because, in general, their regulatory experience was with controlling 
large corporations providing electric power and common carrier communication services. 
Application of the traditional methods proved too cumbersome for the small business nature 
of CATV operators that prevailed at the time, and many states were not convinced that after 
expending the effort to establish such systems for regulating cable that the FCC would not 
preempt their authority in the future. As cable regulation developed in its early years, 
municipal involvement was generally found in authorizing the use of local streets and rights­
of-way and to adopting regulations to protect the safety of life and property. The first cable 
television franchises or licenses generally were granted upon the application of a prospective 
operator .113 These early regulatory arrangements were characterized by informal agreements 
that developed between small towns and the relatively small business operations of CATV 
operators.114 
For cities, not only did they seek to require cable systems to provide a wide range of 
community services, but local officials sought to tax cable operators in the form of franchise 
fees, which in turn provided local governments with a significant new revenue source. In 
the view of cable operators, the urgency of prospective operators to serve the cities was used 
to extract valuable and costly considerations that they believed were unrelated to providing 
cable television services. It was partly this history of cable operators believing that excessive 
112non R. LeDuc, Beyond Broadcasting: Patterns in Policy and Law (New 
York: Longman, 1987), 37. 
113MacAvoy, Deregulation of Cable Television, 1. 
114LeDuc, Cable Television and the FCC, 127. 
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demands were being placed on them by local governments and the view of cities that cable 
operators were not always judicious in their willingness to agree to such terms that 
influenced Congress to consider the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984. For 
operators, the franchising process had created a situation of over-regulation that exacted 
payments by them in terms of money, services, and facilities that they felt bore little relation 
to the marketplace or consumers' interests. Each franchising authority imposed a different 
set of rules and obligations on its cable system providers. Many times these terms reflected 
political considerations, not economic conditions or consumer demand. The situation had 
become one where the interests of municipal regulators, cable system owners, and potential 
cable operators differed sharply. Ultimately, Congress began to involve itself in the 
establishment of a national policy for cable communications. 
Initiating Federal Regulation of Cable Television 
By 1965 Congress had begun again to pressure the FCC to develop policy for CATV 
systems. The chairmen of both the Senate Communications Subcommittee and the House 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee became interested in the issue. However, they 
differed in their approaches. While Senator Pastore wanted the FCC to make policy 
decisions, Representative Oren Harris (D-Arkansas), Chairman of the House Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce Committee, wanted only proposals from the Commission. He did not 
want the Commission to set standards without first having the legislative authority to do so. 
In March, the FCC staff prepared rules that simply reflected those applied to all cable 
systems that used microwave to import signals in the same manner that was already being 
applied on a case-by-case basis. 1 15 The FCC had been regulating cable systems using 
usFederal Communications Commission, First Report and Order, [3 8 FCC 
683, 23 April 1965] "In the matter of Amendment of Subpart I, Part 21, to Adopt 
Rules and Regulations to Govern the Grant of Authorization in the Domestic 
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microwave broadcast band width to  transmit signals because it fit into the Commission's 
scheme for regulating "broadcasting." The "First Report and Order" contained two 
fundamental regulatory elements. One required that cable TV operators obtain the consent 
of local broadcast stations to carry their signals and the other was a thirty day non­
duplication of programming of local stations. The non-duplication element prevented cable 
TV systems from importing distant signals into a market that would show the same 
programming that local broadcast stations had exclusive rights to show. This thirty day 
period was intended to eliminate infringement on the exclusive programming rights of local 
stations. Although Senator Pastore was satisfied with the commission' s actions, 
Representative Harris was upset by the refusal of the FCC to consult with his committee 
before enacting the regulations. He immediately introduced his own CATV bill, convened 
hearings and summoned the commissioners to explain their actions. 116 Based on his 
satisfaction with the initiatives taken by the commission, Senator Pastore stated that he 
would not entertain cable legislation unless the House took positive action. During the 
remainder of the decade, several bills were debated in the House but none made it to the 
floor for full House consideration and therefore died. 
The FCC Prevails 
Federal regulation of cable began in earnest in the late 1960s in response to urging 
from the broadcast industry that it needed protection from competition by cable television's 
capability to bring in, or import, broadcast programming from distant service areas into local 
television service areas. The FCC assumed authority to regulate programming carried by 
Point to Point Microwave Radio Service for Microwave Stations Used to Relay 
Television Signals to CATV, " 700. 
116LeDuc, Cable Television and the FCC, 145 .  
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cable systems as a natural and necessary extension of its authority to regulate broadcast 
television ( also known as the ancillary doctrine). This doctrine was based on the FCC's belief 
that if cable television could have a negative competitive impact on broadcast television, any 
such negative impact in tum would adversely effect the public interest, and thus the need for 
regulation. Indeed, in 1966 the initial cable TV rules were promulgated in the Second 
Report and Order in Docket 15971, based on an inquiry and rulemaking proceeding begun 
in 1965. The FCC found that importation of distant television signals could seriously 
degrade the service offered by broadcasters, causing a reduction in service to households not 
subscribing to cable systems. In order to protect local broadcasters, rules were established 
that required cable systems to carry the signals of all local stations in their areas, to refrain 
from duplicating programs oflocal television stations carried on the system during the same 
day that such programs were broadcast by local stations, and to limit importation of distant 
broadcast signals into the service areas of local television broadcasters in the top 100 
markets. 117 In May, 1966, the U. S. District Court, Southern Division of New York ruled 
that CATV systems relaying broadcast television programs violated copyright laws. Before 
the end of 1966, the House of Representatives held hearings and a bill was produced to 
extend the FCC's statutory authority to cover CATV. The FCC also began to review and 
approve cable TV franchise agreements as they were granted or renewed by local 
governments. It attempted to extrapolate its authority over CATV from the 1934 Act in a 
piece-meal fashion as a reaction to the Commission's lack of explicit statutory authority to 
regulate cable television. This was the prevailing approach until a very important decision 
by the Supreme Court in 1968. In that case, the Commission's regulation of cable television 
was affirmed in United States v. Southwestern Cable, when it upheld the authority of the 
FCC to impose restrictions on the number of distant signals a cable television system could 
117Federal Communications Commission, CATV, 2 FCC 2d, 725 (1966). 
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import and make available to its subscribers. 118 The Court held that the Commission had 
jurisdiction under the Communications Act of 1934 to promulgate such regulations, but the 
Court warned that the Commission's authority was limited to areas reasonably ancillary to 
discharging responsibilities for regulating television broadcasting. 
The Supreme Court based its decision on the finding that CATV performed one or 
both of two functions. One, it supplemented broadcasting by facilitating satisfactory 
reception oflocal stations in adjacent areas where the broadcast signal could not be received. 
Second, it provided subscribers with signals of distant stations entirely out of the range of 
local television antennae. As the number and size of CATV systems grew, their main 
function became the importation of distant television signals. Because the use of satellite 
technology had not yet developed at that time, cable television was yet to become a vigorous 
competitor with broadcasters through the use of made-for-cable programming. Thus, at that 
time, the Court's decision effectively relegated cable to second-class status in the television 
industry. After the Southwestern case, the FCC promulgated rules in nearly every aspect of 
the operation of cable systems. While the statutory authority of the FCC to do this was 
under some doubt, the commission used its authority over broadcast transmission to 
withhold permission to import broadcast signals from those cable operators who were party 
to local government franchise agreements that did not meet FCC specifications for such 
agreements. This denial of import permission would keep a cable system from being 
profitable enough to stay in business. This regulatory approach effectively allowed the FCC 
to preempt local control of cable TV franchises. 1 19 
1 18United States et al, v. Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S .  1 57, {1968). 
119LeDuc, Beyond Broadcasting, 3 7. 
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Later in 1 972, FCC regulations requiring cable television systems to originate certain 
kinds of local public access programming were upheld by the Supreme Court as reasonably 
ancillary to the commissions's general obligation to promote diversity. 120 In a short period 
of time, based upon such interpretations, a regulatory regime was imposed upon the 
emergent cable television industry through a loose collection of separate rulings imposed by 
the FCC and upheld by the courts. 
As time passed, the FCC, as part of its efforts to protect broadcasters from 
competition, went so far as to prohibit cable from purchasing the rights to display movies 
that were more than three or less than ten years old. Similarly, a cable operator could be 
fined if he telecast sporting events that had been broadcast in the same community within 
the previous two years. With regard to syndicated programming, a broadcaster's exclusivity 
contracts were used to forbid such program retransmissions by cable television. 
Considering the question of whether the appropriate regulatory scheme had been in 
place or if another would be better suited, MacAvoy contends, "Cable television was one of 
those regulatory problem areas which official and unofficial Washington always found time 
to study but also found very difficult to do anything about. In fact, the industry had been 
intensively studied by the Congress, the Federal Communications Commission, various 
executive branch agencies, and prestigious private organizations including the Committee 
for Economic Development and the Sloan Commission."121 Similarly, the question of 
whether regulation was even necessary had been raised as early as the mid- l 970s when 
President Gerald Ford's Domestic Council Review Group on Regulatory Reform (DCRG) 
12°United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 662-63, ( 1972). 
121MacAvoy, Deregulation o/Cable Television, i. 
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in March 1976 concluded that "rules on signal use over the cable should in good part be 
eliminated. " 122 
In 1975, the FCC announced a program of structured dualism. Under this structure, 
state and local governments were given :franchising authority and responsibility to select 
cable :franchisees, establish :franchise boundaries, regulate the construction of cable facilities, 
and maintain rights-of-way. Franchising authorities were allowed to regulate rates for basic 
service while the Commission reserved exclusive jurisdiction over all operational aspects 
of cable systems, including signal carriage and technical standards. 123 By 1979, the FCC had 
issued rules regulating cable operators in the top 100 markets requiring them to: ( 1) develop 
a minimum capacity of 20 channels; (2) develop the technical capability for accomplishing 
two-way, non-voice (data) communications; (3) allocate separate channels for use by public, 
educational, local government, and leased access users, with at least one channel for each; 
and ( 4) provide production equipment and facilities for public assess use. The Commission 
also regulated the rates that could be charged on access users, thereby treating cable 
television as a common carrier. 
Cracks in Federal Regulations 
Problems in the Courts and Congress 
At the same time that the FCC seemed to be solidifying its position on regulating 
cable television, the Supreme Court was taking a different perspective. In December, 1968, 
i22lbid. 
123Federal Communications Commission, Cable Television Report and Order, 
(Washington, D. C. : GPO, 1975). 36 FCC 2d 207. 
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a Supreme Court decision held that "cable television systems which pick up programs 
originated by others . . .  were free from any liability for royalty payments."124 The Court on 
March 4, 1974125 held that cable television systems were not infringing upon network 
copyrights by intercepting and retransmitting network programs to subscribers who could 
not otherwise receive them. 126 These decisions reversed lower court rulings in these matters 
and began to undermine the FCC's regulatory approach to cable TV. 
By March, 1977 a U.S. appeals court threw out the FCC restrictions on program 
availability to cable TV operators. 127 The Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, 
held that neither the Communications Act nor the First Amendment authorized such 
regulating. The FCC, the NAB and ABC appealed this ruling. But the Supreme Court 
refused to hear their arguments and in October, 1977 left standing the appellate court 
decision that the FCC lacked the authority to restrict the programs offered by cable television 
stations. The Supreme Court struck down another FCC order that had restricted pay cable 
television's access to movies and sports events. Broadcasters, who opposed competition from 
cable television, had backed the FCC curbs. 128 
In 1979, the burden of these regulations again brought the issue before the U.S .  
Supreme Court in a second case involving Midwest Video. This time the Court ruled that 
124Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 1974, 1883 .  Hereafter cited as 
CQWR. 
125Teleprompter Corporation, et al v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. et 
al, 4 15  US 394 (1974). 
126CQWR, 1974, 6 1 8. 
127Home Boxoffice, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (DC Cir. 1977). 
128Erwin G. Krasnow, Lawrence D. Longley, and Herbert A. Terry. The 
Politics of Broadcast Regulation. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982) 249. 
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access requirements that could not be imposed on broadcasters could not be imposed on 
cable systems either. But most importantly was the statement by the Court that, "The 
Commission may not regulate cable systems as common carriers, just as it may not impose 
such obligation on television broadcasters. We think the authority to compel cable operators 
to provide common carriage of public-originated transmissions must come specifically from 
Congress. "129 
The Seeds of Deregulation Are Sewn 
After adoption of the FCC's Report and Order in 1972, there was concern about the 
need for specific regulations, and also about the appropriate regulatory jurisdiction for those 
regulations. The cable television industry was particularly interested in eliminating 
regulations it believed were excessive or duplicative and expressed :frustration about 
inconsistent or conflicting Federal, state, and local rules. For example, the force of the 
Commission's rate regulation requirement was doubted for states where local governments 
did not possess rate regulation authority . 130 
In a broader sense, the deregulation wave of the mid to late 1970s also touched the 
cable television issue. In late 1975 and early 1976 President Ford's Task Force on 
Regulatory Reform drafted legislation to deregulate the cable television industry. In addition, 
during January, 1976 the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Subcommittee on 
Communications issued a report criticizing the FCC for over-regulating cable television and 
calling for legislation to promote the cable television industry. 131 On February 5, 1976 the 
129pcc V. Midwest Video, 440 U.S. 689, 709 (1979). 
13°U.S. Congress, Senate, Senate. Report. No. 97- 170, 198 1, 56. 
131CQWR, 1976, 336. 
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Justice Department filed a brief in federal court challenging FCC restrictions on programs 
carried by pay cable television. 132 
In an effort to garner consensus on the question of appropriate regulation of cable 
television, if any, the House Subcommittee on Communications released a series of " options 
papers" in April 1977. The "options" addressed potential legislation that would establish a 
national policy on cable television. The result was that in February 1978 The 
Communications Act Amendments of 1978133 was enacted. As it turned out, the only 
provision for cable TV was that it required the FCC to regulate the rates, terms and 
conditions for making cable TV pole attachments to ensure they were just and reasonable 
unless a state regulates such factors on its own. 
The FCC Retreats 
In July, 1980, the Commission adopted a proposal to delete its distant signal carriage 
restrictions and syndicated program exclusivity rules. This ended a rulemaking and study 
that began in 1976. 134 The basis for the action was the finding in the Economic Inquiry 
Report that the viability of broadcast stations would not be substantially harmed as a result 
of eliminating the rules and that the public benefit would be substantially increased by their 
deletion. In July, 1 98 1 ,  after the Reagan administration came to office, in another major 
deregulation action, the Commission deleted the syndicated program exclusivity rules for 
cable TV systems. This only applied to cable operators in the top 100 markets and was 
designed to protect contractual agreements between copyright holders and broadcasters for 
program rights. 
i32Ibid. 
133The Communications Act Amendments of 1978, PL 95-234. 
134See FCC documents Dockets 20988 and 21284. 
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Coming to the National Policy Agenda 
Viewing Cable TV regulation from a public policy perspective, it was governed by 
a chaotic piecemeal regulatory regime. Bernard J. Wunder, Jr., assistant secretary for 
communications and information at the Commerce Department, believed that cable's initial 
slow growth was due to regressive regulation by the FCC. However, the industry began to 
boom in the 1970s once the Commission relaxed its rules and cable operators were able to 
offer more to consumers. But the piecemeal regulatory regime had a local component as 
well. It was the contention of cable operators and their congressional supporters that as 
federal regulation decreased, local and state governments stepped up their regulation. 135 
Indeed as the second Midwest Video ruling caused the FCC's presence in cable television 
regulation to diminish, local franchising authorities quickly increased their activities to fill 
the regulatory gap left by the FCC. The increase in activities came at a time when many 
major cities were deciding which cable companies should be awarded initial franchises to 
construct cable television systems and provide cable services. Local regulations were 
particularly troublesome because of their inconsistency across the nation. 
When cable TV regulation is viewed from a political perspective, the industry had 
to struggle against the interests of broadcasters and cities that were regulating cable TV. 
Broadcasters certainly worked to curtail the growth of cable television as a serious 
competitor. They lobbied hard in Congress and at the FCC to restrict cable delivery of 
programs that originated with broadcasters. 136 In 1980, Erwin G. Krasnow, then general 
counsel for the NAB, said that the broadcast industry only wanted to assure that cable 
135CQWR, 1982, 2207. 
136 "Long Faced with Federal Regulation . . .  Broadcasters Turned to Lobbying, " 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, (April 2, 1 980), 21 80-2 1 8 1 .  
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operators would pay a fair price for the programming they used, and that they not use it to 
compete unfairly with local broadcasters. However, Brenda Fox, who had been a deputy to 
Krasnow at NAB before becoming general counsel for the NCT A, stated that she believed 
the record was pretty clear about the attempts by NAB to stifle the development of cable. 
On July 22, 1980, broadcasters suffered a setback when the FCC voted to lift nearly 
all limits on the programming of cable operators, giving as part of the rationale that 
broadcasters' fears of competitive damage from cable were groundless.137 Cable television 
lobbyists had been trying to win similar concessions from Congress, but broadcasters had 
generated so much controversy that sponsors completely dropped broadcast-related 
provisions from House versions of an attempted rewrite of the Communications Act of 1934. 
One aspect of the effort that diminished NAB impact in fighting the growth of cable 
television was that about 30 percent of the cable systems were at that time owned by 
broadcasters. 
Another contributing factor to the rise of cable TV to the national agenda, was 
changes in the industry itself. As large corporations began buying groups of cable systems 
throughout the United States, a major shift in the policy position of the NCTA occurred. The 
new owners supported federal regulation of cable to preempt state or local control and end 
pattern of varied and uncertain individualized franchise agreements which made in difficult 
to apply any uniform management from the headquarters of a corporation. Conversely, small 
sized cable operators favored dealing with state and local officials, with which they had 
established working relationships, over dealing with a federal bureaucracy in Washington. 138 
Local franchising authorities, of course, felt that they were the most capable of determining 
137Ibid, 2181 . 
138LeDuc, Beyond Broadcasting, 84. 
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the aspects of franchise agreements that best suited local needs and desires and believed that 
such FCC involvement was not necessary. At this same time, cable television was becoming 
very aggressive in its lobbying strategies. A Senate aide described one tactic as, "when 
going into a community to organize a franchise, they get together a board of 20 to 30 leading 
citizens. All of them have immediate access to their representatives and senators. They are 
very aggressive and very, very effective."139 
In these developments were the beginnings of the 1984 legislation to deregulate the 
cable TV industry. The effort began as a reaction to the dominant regime of local 
government regulation through application of franchise agreements and the efforts of 
Congress to curtail the federal role. 
Deregulation and Cable Television 
The debate over cable television that intensified in the 1980s appears at first to be an 
example somewhat different from other debates over deregulation that occurred starting in 
the mid- 1970s. The conventional view of deregulation as a policy alternative had involved 
economic arenas that were marked by long standing relationships within "subgovernments" 
comprised oflegislatures, regulating bodies and the regulated industry. Some notable areas 
include trucking, airlines and telephone services. The difference in the case of cable 
television was that until the Cable Act of 1984, there existed no true national policy on cable 
television. The FCC had established various regulations through rulemaking and courts had 
reviewed them. Cities were an immediate regulatory presence for increasingly larger cable 
139 Ward White, personal interview by author, Washington, D.C., September 4, 
1996. 
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enterprises who argued the need for policy that allowed the industry to grow effectively and 
efficiently without the kinds of regulations that prevented them from competing with the 
broadcast industry in a fair and equitable manner. Broadcasting took a different tack, and 
the cities were reluctant to be divested of their prerogatives. It was a complicated mix that 




MOVING TOWARD THE CABLE COMMUNICATIONS POLICY 
ACT OF 1984 
Approximately two decades after the regulatory process began for cable television, 
Congress, for the first time, set formal national policy for this medium. Passed in 1984, the 
first cable telecommunications act was essentially deregulatory in nature. Most 
significantly, the final passage of the legislation resulted from extended negotiations among 
the National League of Cities, the National Cable Television Association, and some large 
cities. Cities and the industry long had held opposing views on cable policy. Indeed, 
according to one close observer, "One of the predominant themes in the history of cable 
television regulation has been the ongoing tension between cable operators and municipal 
franchising authorities based on mutual abuses of political and economic power. "140 The 
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 addressed some of these tensions by imposing 
uniform federal standards for specific components of cable regulation. But it focused 
primarily on limiting municipal power while imposing only a few federal restrictions on the 
ability of cable operators to exercise their market power. As one industry analyst observed, 
140 Robert F. Copple, "State Coordination of Cable Communications Policy: 
An Idea Whose Time Has Come - Again." Journal of Broadcasting and 
Electronic Media, Vol. 36, No. 2, Spring 1992, 137. 
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"It reduced and reconfigured the scope of regulation of the cable television industry, but did 
not go further. " 141 . 
More specifically, the act affirmed the authority of municipalities to award exclusive 
franchises to cable operators and made cable television the only mass medium required to 
provide access to any member of the public through channels reserved for public, 
educational, and government (PEG) use. It limited the franchise fees that municipalities 
could obtain to five percent of cable operators' gross annual revenues. It also mandated that 
local regulation of basic cable service rates end in 1987. An exception was made for 
situations in which the cable system was not subject to effective competition. In these, 
regulation of rates could continue. This became one of the more contentious aspects of the 
law to implement, since the FCC was directed by the act to define effective competition. In 
1985 the commission ruled that any cable system would be considered subject to effective 
competition if three or more unduplicated broadcast signals were available in the service 
area. Because of this criterion, most cable systems qualified for rate deregulation by 
November of 1986. The act preempted regulation of other than basic services, such as 
premium channels and pay-per-view services, and reserved it for the FCC. The law banned 
cross-ownership of cable TV services and broadcast stations in the same community and 
prevented telephone companies from entering the cable business in their service areas except 
in areas that were predominately rural and not likely to be served by cable operators. Lastly, 
the law prohibited treatment of cable operators as common carriers, provided for consistent 
procedures for renewing cable franchises, but included no ban on newspaper cross­
ownership. 142 
141 Robert Britt Horwitz, The Irony of Regulatory Reform: The Deregulation of 
American Telecommunications. (New York: Oxford Press, 1989), 244. 
142 Marvin R. Bensman, Broadcast/Cable Regulation. (Lanham, MD: 
University Press of America, 1990), 28. 
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This chapter examines the origins and development of the legislation through 1983 . 
Its completion and immediate aftermath are the subject of the following chapter. 
Overview 
The central focus of the deregulation battle that emerged was over continuing the 
development of the cable industry and choosing the appropriate regulatory policy for that 
to occur. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, two basic issues divided cable system operators 
and municipal governments. The first issue was whether or not to continue regulating cable 
television. The second was, if regulation of the industry were to continue, how should 
authority be distributed among federal, state and local governments. Moreover, continuing 
the policy of cable operators paying franchise fees to local governments was of underlying 
concern to municipal government interests. These fees provided significant revenue sources 
in return for relatively low costs in city operations . .  
The National Cable Television Association, which represented cable system 
operators, pref erred that Congress deregulate the cable television industry because cable 
operators believed they were in a competitive market. Absent total deregulation, the NCT A 
argued that any continued regulation should be at the federal level, similar to what existed 
for the broadcast industry. It believed that federal regulation was needed to preempt state 
or local control and thereby end a pattern of nonstandard and uncertain franchise agreements. 
Variegated local regulations made it difficult for the large cable corporations which owned 
many local operations to uniformly manage their subsidiaries. Also, local regulations were 
seen as unfair impediments to the development of the cable television industry as it 
attempted to compete with other video entertainment. However, not all cable operators 
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preferred federal regulation. Small, independent cable system operators favored dealing 
with state and local officials, with whom they had established successful working 
relationships, rather than dealing with a large federal bureaucracy. But, since the corporate 
cable operators dominated the leadership of the NCT A, the view that local regulations were 
burdensome prevailed as the industry's official position. 143 
On the other side of the question, the National League of Cities, representing local 
government interests, contended that regulation was vital to ensure that cable operators 
complied with franchise agreements. As an example, some franchise agreements included 
promises for expanded services that had not been fulfilled, such as data retrieval and open 
access to spare channels not used to transmit television programming. Additionally, some 
cable operators had poor performance records. Consequently, municipalities and other local 
governments took the position that rate regulation through franchise agreements was the only 
protection that consumers had against the effective monopoly of the cable operators. 
Therefore, the NLC felt that local governments were the appropriate regulating authorities, 
since they were best situated to represent each community's needs for cable services. 
Serious efforts to enact major cable legislation began in 1981. In April of that year, 
S. 898, the Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 198 1, was introduced 
by senators from four western states. The bill provided for far-reaching changes in basic 
communications policy, but focused mainly on the common carrier aspects of telephonic 
communications and not on cable communications. The Senate passed S. 898 in October by 
a vote of 90-4, but not before it was amended to eliminate contested provisions added in 
committee that would have removed the authority of states and municipalities to regulate 
143 Don R. LeDuc, Beyond Broadcasting: Patterns in Policy and Law. (New 
York: Longman, 1987), 84. 
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cable television operators. It was the first bill to deregulate the telecommunications industry 
and restructure AT&T that would reach the floor of either chamber in five years of effort. 
Despite strong support in the Senate, it was not considered in the House. There, the only 
actions taken on cable television in 1981  were hearings on miscellaneous 
telecommunications matters by the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer 
Protection, and Finance of the House Energy and Commerce Committee (hereafter referred 
to as the Telecommunications Subcommittee). 
Municipalities were angered language added to the bill limiting their regulatory 
power, since they had no opportunity to be heard. Consequently, on January 1 8, and 
February 16, 1982, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation held 
hearings specifically on cable television regulation. As a result, on March 4, 1982, the Cable 
Telecommunications Act of 1982, S. 2172, was introduced. Comprehensive hearings on the 
bill were held in April. On August 10, the Senate Commerce Committee reported the bill 
that again included provisions to restrict local regulation of cable television. Despite interest 
in the Senate, there was little support in the House because of opposition from cities. It was 
evident that there would be no action on the legislation in the House so close to the end of 
the session. Nevertheless, the cable industry still wanted a vote in the full Senate to 
encourage completion of legislative action early in 1983 when a new Senate session would 
begin, but in this they were not successful and that vote did not take place. 144 In contrast, the 
only cable television activity in the House ofRepresentatives in 1982 was a one-day hearing 
before the Telecommunications Subcommittee. The subject was whether local citizens 
interested in gaining access to cable television studios and transmission channels were 
allowed adequate participation in franchising decisions. 
144 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, September 4, 1982, 2207. 
Hereafter cited as CQWR. 
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The following year, on January 26, 1983, Senator Barry M. Goldwater, (R-Arizona), 
introduced S. 66, the Cable Telecommunications Act of 1983 that was essentially identical 
to S. 2172. It contained severe limitations on state and local regulation of cable operations, 
and the NLC immediately went on record in opposition to the bill. In April, S. 66 was 
amended to reflect a compromise worked out by the NLC and the NCTA and was approved 
by the Senate Commerce Committee. After a short delay to accommodate opposition from 
some members and to avoid a threatened filibuster, the full Senate passed S. 66 by a 87-9 
vote on June 14, 1983. 
In the House, hearings were held before the Telecommunications Subcommittee on 
May 25, June 22, and November 3 "to consider proposals to revise and clarify FCC, State, 
and local regulatory jurisdictions. "145 These subcommittee hearings were also used to 
consider the March compromise agreement between NLC and NCT A concerning regulation 
of cable TV systems. H.R. 4103, the Cable Franchise Policy and Communications Act of 
1983, was introduced in October of 1983. On November 17, the subcommittee approved a 
version of the bill that would have sharply reduced the power of cities to regulate the cable 
television business. The bill then moved to the full committee and was reported on October 
1, 1984. It was passed by the House and added as an amendment to S. 66. A conference 
committee produced a compromise version. Within hours of that action, both houses 
approved the conference report and the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, S. 66 
was passed on October 1 1. President Ronald Reagan signed it into law shortly thereafter. 
145 Congress, House, Committee on Energy and Commerce, Options for Cable 
Legislation: Hearing before the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 
1st sess. , May 25, June22, November 3, 1983. Washington, D.C. : Government 
Printing Office, 1984. (1984 CIS Microfiche H361-19). 
79 
Table 3 . 1  presents major congressional actions on cable legislation from 1981 
through 1984 in chronological order. 
Table 3 .2 presents the major congressional hearings held between April of 1979 and 
June of 1983. The June 1983 hearings were the last held before the Cable Communications 
Policy Act of 1984 was passed. The hearings are listed by date, committee, and the major 
issues discussed at the hearings. 
Table 3 . 1. Major Congressional Actions on Cable Communications: 1981 through 1984 
YEAR SENATE HOUSE 
1981 April - S. 898 introduced. June 9, & 16, and July 23, 28, -
June 2, 11, 15, 16, 19, - Hearings held: hearings held: 
"Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation "Telecommunications 
Act of 1 98 1 "  Miscellaneous, Part r•. 
July 16, - bill reported by vote of 16 to I .  
October 5-6 -consideration of amendments and 
Senate Passage. 
1982 January 18, and February 16, - hearings held: March 8, - hearings held: "Cable 
"Cable Television Regulation, Part 1 ." Franchise Investigation." 
March 4, - S. 2 172 introduced. 
April 26-28, - hearings held: "Cable Television 
Regulation, Part 2." 
Au2USt 10, - S. 2172 reported out of committee. 
1983 January 26, - S. 66 introduced. 
February 16, 17, - hearings held: "Cable 
May 25, June 22, and November 
3, - hearings held: "Options for 
Telecommunications Act of 1983 ". Cable Legislation". 
April 27, - S. 66 reported out of committee. October 6, - H.R. 4 103 
June 14, - S. 66 passed by Senate. introduced. 
1984 October 11, - Senate concurrence in House August 1, - HR. 4103 reported 
amendments to S. 66, passage with additional out of Committee. 
amendments. October 1, -passage of H.R. 4 103 ; 
passage of S. 66 and tabling of 
H.R. 4103 .  
October 11 ,  - House concurrence 
in Senate amendments to S. 66. 
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Table 3 .2. Hearings on Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 
Congress Date Committee Issues 
97th June 2, 1 1, 15, 16, 19, Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Telecommunications 
1981 Committee Competition and 
Deregulation Act of 
1981 
June 9, 16, July 23, 28, House Energy and Commerce Committee's Telecommunications 
1981 Subcommittee on Telecommunication Miscellaneous, Part 
1. 
June 22, 1981 Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Rural 
August 3, 1981 Committee's Subcommittee on Communications Telecommunications 
January 18, Februuy Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Cable Television 
16, 1982 Committee Regulation, Part 1 
March 8, 1982 House Energy and Commerce Committee's Cable Franchise 
Subcommittee on Telecommunication Investigation: Local 
Participation. 
April 26-28, 1982 Senate Commerce, Science, and Tramportation Cable Television 
Committee Regulation, Part 2. 
98th Februuy 16, 17, 1983 Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Cable 
Committee's Subcommittee on Communications Telecommunications 
Act ofl983 
May 25, June 22, House Energy and Commerce Committee's Options for Cable 
November 3, 1983 Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Legislation 
Consumer Protection and Finance 
June 6, 1983 House Energy and Commerce Committee's Parity for Minorities 
Subcommittee on Telecommunications, in the Media 
Consumer Protection, and Finance 
In the following sections, the activities and events which led to Cable 
Communications Act of 1984 will be examined in more detail. 
Cable Deregulation Gets Underway 
As the cable television industry began to prosper in the 1970s after the FCC relaxed 
its rules, the medium offered consumers more entertainment options. These included 
original programming in addition to simply providing programming from broadcast stations. 
Simultaneously, the FCC refrained from directly regulating cable television since it had no 
explicit mandate to do so . But as federal regulations decreased, local and state governments 
increased their roles in regulating cable TV. The result was a "patch-work quilt" of 
regulation that varied significantly by state and local jurisdictions. As each jurisdiction 
developed its own unique set of regulations, including franchise fee schedules and demands 
8 1  
for in-kind services, cable operators found it increasingly difficult to make consistent 
business decisions of a corporate nature on either a national or regional basis. Thus, they 
sought from Congress relief from inconsistent regulation or, alternatively, the creation of 
one consistent set of national regulations. To this end, organized interests for the cable 
industry found congressional allies, particularly from the W estem states of Washington, 
Oregon, New Mexico, and Arizona, who were willing to include provisions for regulatory 
relief in broad based bills intended to rewrite telecommunications policy. The final 
deregulation policy was produced after several cycles of introducing bills, hearings, 
negotiations with stakeholders, and finally passing a law. 
Key Players 
As the 97th Congress began in 1981 ,  the political tone in Washington was favorable 
for continuation of deregulation efforts begun in the 1970s. The Republican party held a 
majority in the Senate and the Democrats were in the majority in the House of 
Representatives. It was the first year ofRonald Reagan's two presidential terms, and one of 
his election mandates was to reduce government regulation. Several members of Congress 
were instrumental in enacting deregulation for cable television. Very early in the process, 
senators Robert Packwood (R-Oregon), and Barry Goldwater, were involved, Packwood as 
chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation and 
Goldwater as chairman of the Communications Subcommittee. A favorable factor for 
deregulating telecommunications was that Senator Howard D. Cannon (D-Nevada) was the 
ranking minority member of the committee. He was noted for his efforts to deregulate the 
trucking and airline industries and was experienced in dealing with regulatory policy issues. 
He had cosponsored bills to amend the Communications Act of 1934 during the 96th 
Congress. Additionally, senators Harrison Schmitt (R-New Mexico), and Slade Gorton (R-
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Washington), were also active in early hearings. In the House of Representatives, members 
who would play key roles in deregulating cable TV included Timothy E. Wirth (D­
Colorado ), Edward J. Markey (D-Massachusetts), and Alan Swift (D-Washington). 
Representative John D. Dingell (D-Michigan), who chaired the House Energy and 
Commerce Committee, actively sought a negotiated consensus. 146 Another significant 
participant was Representative Albert Gore, Jr. (D-Tennessee), who did not serve on the 
Communications Subcommittee until 1983 , but stayed closely involved, especially in cable 
matters, after his election to the Senate in 1984. 
In 1981 and 1982, the Senate Communications Subcommittee had four Republicans 
in the majority and three Democrats, with Senator Ernest F. (Fritz) Hollings (D-South 
Carolina), as the ranking member. The make-up of the subcommittee changed slightly in 
1983 when Senator Gorton became a member and Schmitt left the subcommittee. In the 
House, Wirth chaired the Telecommunications Subcommittee. In 1981 and 1982, the 
subcommittee had nine Democrats in the majority and six Republicans in the minority. In 
1983, the make up changed to ten Democrats and four Republicans. This is also the year 
that Al Gore joined the subcommittee, as well as Mickey Leland (D-Texas), who would 
become a key player the last hours before enactment of the deregulation law. 
Initiation: 1981 
As the 1st Session of the 97th Congress began, it was increasingly evident to both 
sides of the aisle that a new national policy was needed in the area of telecommunications. 
However, even though expectations were high that deregulation policy for 
146 Thomas Wheeler, personal interview by author, Washington, D. C., July 18, 
1997. Wheeler referred to Dingell' s efforts as "holding a shotgun wedding." 
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telecommunications finally might be passed, it was noted by Congressional Quarterly that, 
"This is the fifth year of a concerted congressional effort to rewrite the 1934 Communication 
Act. "147 Immediately upon introduction of S. 898 in April 1981, it was referred to the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation chaired by Senator Packwood. The 
bill provided for far-reaching changes in basic communications policy, focusing mainly on 
telephonic communications by common carriers. 
The partisan structure of the relevant congressional committees played a role in 
changing telecommunications policy. One result of the new Republican majority in the 
Senate was change in the make-up of the Communications Subcommittee, now chaired by 
Goldwater. During the Democrat-led 96th Congress in 1979 and 1980, it had 12 members. 
But in the 97th Congress, only four Republican senators chose to serve on the subcommittee. 
This effectively limited the Democratic positions to only three and thus reduced the total 
membership of the subcommittee to seven. 148 The reduced subcommittee size lessened the 
potential number of divergent viewpoints to reconcile when considering legislation. 
There also existed in the House a high level of interest in deregulating 
telecommunications. This was evidenced by the efforts of some members of the House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce to change standing committee rules which prohibited 
subcommittee chairmen from serving on other subcommittees. Representative Wirth pushed 
this because he chaired the Telecommunications Subcommittee but also had interests in 
energy issues. The Democrats were successful in making the change and other members 
who served on the Telecommunications Subcommittee, as well as on subcommittees they 
chaired, were Markey and Swift. Even though Gore was interested in serving on the 
147 CQWR, June, 1981, 999. 
148 Broadcasting, Vol. 100, No. 2, 26. 
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Telecommunications Subcommittee, he would not be appointed until 1983. 149 John Dingell 
was elected to chair the House Energy and Commerce Committee and Wirth was appointed 
to chair the Subcommittee on Telecommunications. 150 Both Dingell and Wirth became 
important actors in developing the final cable television policy. 
Senate Begins Legislative Activities 
The Senate began the legislative process in June when hearings on S. 898 were 
conducted by the full Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation. 
Consequently, Packwood chaired the hearings, rather than Goldwater. This was unusual 
because matters normally are considered first by the subcommittee of jurisdiction. 
According to Ward White, the senior counsel for the Communications Subcommittee at the 
time: 
In the Senate, the subcommittees in the Commerce Committee don't 
necessarily operate as subcommittees and particularly with Packwood, the 
way he operated. Packwood operated out of the full committee -- he did 
whatever he wanted. Goldwater sort of acquiesced to it -- he wasn't 
necessarily interested in doing all this. It was a personal matter. Goldwater 
wasn't particularly active at this time -- he wasn't in good health; that made 
it difficult. 151 
Packwood described his perspective: 
I was the chairman and I was very interested. And as a matter of routine, 
anything that I was really interested in and wanted to keep a strong hand in, 
I did at the full committee level rather than at the subcommittee level. That 
would keep a much better handle on it rather than have a subcommittee do 
it and come up with a recommendation. m 
149 Broadcasting, Vol. 100, No. 3, 7. 
150 Broadcasting, Vol. 100, No. 5, 24. 
151 Ward White, personal interview by author, Washington, D. C., September 
4, 1996. 




At the first hearings, the main focus of the testimony on S .  898, during five days in 
June, was AT&T. The objective was how to structure a policy that would establish enough 
competition in common carrier telecommunications to allow deregulation of the telephone 
giant. The spirit of deregulation led a desire to deregulate the telephone industry to avoid 
a court ordered divestiture. This tactic caused problems with the Judiciary Committee and 
its anti-trust interest in the pending law suit against AT&T. Ultimately, the huge telephone 
monopoly agreed in January 1982 to a court ordered divestiture which took effect in 1984. 153 
The court order broke AT & T into a single long distance company and seven separate local 
telephone companies called Baby Bells. It also ordered a spin-off of the research and 
development division, Bell Laboratories, later to become Lucent Technologies, as an 
independent company. Competition in the long distance market flourished with the 
emergence of such companies as MCI and Sprint. However, the court order precluded the 
Baby Bells from entering into the long distance telephone market and the long distance 
carriers from operating in local markets. 
Rather than a total divestiture as the court ordered, passage of S. 898 as drafted 
would establish a policy whereby AT&T would be designated as a dominant carrier under 
FCC regulation. It would require that AT&T establish fully separate subsidiaries to provide 
any other telecommunications services other than basic voice communications. It also 
limited state regulation to local exchange services, allowed interconnections between local 
telephone companies, and required carrier payments for exchange access charges to local 
phone companies. 154 The only witness listed for these hearings that could be identified with 
m CQWR, July 2, 1994, 1779. 
154 Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 
Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1981: Hearings 
before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 97th Cong., 1 st 
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the cable television industry was Gustave M. Hauser, chairman of Warner-Amex Cable 
Communications, Inc., who testified on June 19. Both his testimony and his submitted 
remarks included only cursory attention to regulation of cable television by state and local 
governments and then only in the context of how telephone companies were not subject to 
franchise fees, local rate regulations, and channel capacity set-asides as were cable operators. 
The NCT A later submitted a statement for the hearing record, but it merely addressed the 
industry's desire to cooperate with a proposed interagency task force that was intended to 
augment the establishment of fully separated subsidiaries for AT&T if it were eventually 
allowed to compete with other telecommunications carriers. 
The Communications Subcommittee, however, did hold a three-hour hearing on June 
22 on the subject of rural telecommunications that was separate from the full committee's 
hearings on S. 898. 155 Senator Larry Pressler (R- South Dakota), presided at the hearing 
which was also attended by senators Wendell Ford (D-Kentucky), Goldwater and Stevens. 
The topic of the hearing was how to ensure that rural areas would be included fully as the 
telecommunications industry underwent technological change. Witnesses testified on such 
telecommunication technologies as television translators, low-power television, direct 
broadcast satellite systems, community antenna television, and, of course, telephone 
systems. Witnesses who referred to cable television included Mark Fowler, the new 
chairman of the Federal Communications Commission; Steven Effros, the executive director 
of the Cable Antenna Television Association (CATV A); Bruce Jacobs, director of the 
Cooperative Communications Project of the National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting; 
sess., June 2, 11, 15, 16, 19, 1981. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1981), CIS S261-79. 
155 Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 
Rural Telecommunications: Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Communications, 97fh Cong., 1st sess. , June 22, and August 3, 1981. (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1981), CIS 81-S261-78. 
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and Thomas Wheeler, president ofNCT A. However, the context of their testimony was not 
regulation of cable television at any government level, but rather as a communications 
technology in competition with telephone companies dependent upon utilities that owned 
the poles to which cable operators attached their wires. The staff of the Commerce 
Committee, nevertheless, did list this subcommittee hearing in the legislative history portion 
of the committee report on S. 898, since some of the witnesses mentioned their support or 
opposition to certain portions of the bill that dealt with deregulation of the telephone 
industry.156 Interestingly, none of the hearing witnesses represented states or municipalities, 
either individually or as organized lobbies. 
On July 16, nearly a month after hearings were completed, the Commerce Committee 
met in open markup session, and S. 898, with amendments, was reported out of 
committee. 157 As the committee report showed, the NCTA won the first round of the 
lobbying battle with the cities when it acquired enough votes in committee to place 
amendments in the bill that restrained local government cable regulatory authority. They 
were not on the agenda when the hearings took place, nor were they the topic of any 
testimony during the hearings in 198 1 .  The controversial language was included by 
committee staff at the request of the NCTA in a manner considered a "time-honored 
lobbying tactic" of adding favorable language to a bill that did not deal directly, but only 
tangentially, with the industry's interest. 158 The NLC staff opposed the new language when 
156 Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation. 
Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1981, Senate Report 
97- 170, (Washington: Government Printing Office, Yl . 1/5 :97- 170, 198 1), 5-6. 
157 Ibid, 6. 
158 Congress, Senate, Senate Consideration of Goldwater Amendment No. 54 1 
and Cannon-Packwood Amendment No. 463 to S. 898, 97'11 Cong., 1 st sess. ,  
Congressional Record, 127, (October 5, 198 1): 23055 .  
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it discovered it at a time when they too were attempting to have language favorable to the 
cities' interests included in the reported bill. 
The specific language in the bill that the NLC found unacceptable essentially 
removed the regulatory authority local governments had over cable TV services. It stated 
that no government regulatory agency could II establish, fix, or otherwise restrict the rates 
charged any person either for the use or sale of cable channel capacity. 1 1 This language was 
considered by the Commerce Committee to be consistent with II general deregulatory 
objectives of the bill to minimize unnecessary non-Federal involvement in the provision of 
competitive services. 11 1s9 The committee took the position that, 11 Such services were 
nonessential and possess none of the characteristics of utility type services" and therefore 
did not require economic regulation. 160 Furthermore, it beHeved that the cable industry was 
operating in a fully competitive environment where market conditions existed to the degree 
that prices would be controlled by consumer actions. 
Understandably, when S. 898 was reported out of committee, it triggered a legislative 
battle between lawmakers who supported local governments and those who supported cable 
television operators. These circumstances eventually led to a heated debate when the bill 
was considered on the floor of the Senate on October 5 and 6. Some of the strongest debate 
was over the cable provisions which preempted the authority of cities and counties to 
regulate rates for cable while keeping the federal limits on what cable operators paid to local 
governments in franchise fees. The strongest objections came from Goldwater who said that 
they were inserted into a draft of the bill just two days prior to the mark-up session which 
was held when he was out of the country. He announced his intent to offer an amendment 
159 Senate Report, S. Rpt. 97- 170, 58 .  
160 Ibid. 
89 
to strike the section that would remove local authority. 161 Goldwater, on a number of 
occasions, had publicly promised there would be no cable television legislation without 
hearings. He, therefore, considered it a matter of honor to introduce and fight for an 
amendment that would remove cable language from the bill, because no representatives of 
the interests of states or local governments had testified at hearings on the legislation. In 
debate on the floor of the Senate, he expressed his indignation and denounced the tactics 
used to insert the language in the bill. Meanwhile, in an attempt to retain some provisions 
on cable television in the telecommunications deregulation bill, Packwood and Cannon 
introduced an amendment with compromise language that basically codified the existing 
arrangement for regulation of cable television, leaving the role of cities unchanged. 162 This 
move was not acceptable to Goldwater. The Packwood-Cannon amendment was considered 
first, and it passed 52-40. Next, the Goldwater amendment to delete most of the language 
in the bill pertaining to cable television was accepted by a vote of 59-34, thus negating the 
Packwood-Cannon language. 163 Soon thereafter, S. 898 passed the Senate by a vote of90-4. 
There apparently were attempts on the part of the Communications Subcommittee 
staff to schedule hearings and draft new legislation on cable television soon after floor 
action. These activities were not sanctioned by Goldwater and he stated so in no uncertain 
terms in a memorandum to the staff counsel, Ward White. 
Maybe you have forgotten, but I am the Chairman of the Communications 
Subcommittee. Please keep that in mind. There will be no hearings or 
legislation on cable television until I return after the first of the year, my 
absence being caused by an operation. I repeat, no hearings, and please don't 
161 CQWR (Washington, D.C. : September 19, 198 1), 1795 . 
162 Congressional Record, 127, (October 5, 198 1) : S l  1 0 1 8-42. 
163 CQWR September 19, 198 1 ,  1795 . 
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try to run around me on this because, if you do, there is going to be a loud 
noise. 164 
There were no hearings held until Goldwater's return in 1982. 
Initial Activity in the House 
In June and July of 1981, the House Telecommunications Subcommittee held 
hearings on miscellaneous domestic and international telecommunications issues. 165 Among 
them were relations between the United States and Japan on telecommunications equipment 
sales, FCC licensing of VHF broadcast stations in states lacking VHF broadcast TV stations, 
and municipal cable TV franchising processes. 
Of particular interest, the July 28 hearing focused on cable franchising. Mark S. 
Fowler, chairman of the FCC, testified about the commission's policies, objectives and 
desires to revise and improve telecommunications competition. Among the witnesses were 
Ralph Smith, vice-president of policy and planning studies for the Bertman Group, who 
testified about the potential adverse effects of cable TV franchises on broadcasting. Harold 
Horn, President of the Cable TV Information Center and Jeff Forbes, a former cable TV 
official for the State of Massachusetts, testified about cable TV ownership and access to 
programming channels. They two supported stronger regulations to guarantee greater access 
to cable channels. Mayors Ernest Morial ofNew Orleans and Thomas Taylor of Wetland, 
Michigan, along with Councilman Bob Bolen ofFt. Worth and Morris Tarshis, the director 
164 Senator Goldwater to Ward White, October 28, 1981, Special Collections, 
Howard H. Baker, Jr. Papers, University of Tennessee-Knoxville Hodges Library, 
box 17, folder 8, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Tennessee. 
165 Congress, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 
Telecommunications Miscellaneous, Part 1: Hearings before Subcommittee on 
Telecommunications, 97th Cong. , 1st sess., June 9, 16, July 23, 28, 198 1, 
Committee Serial No. 97-64; (CIS82:H361-33 v+684) ii. 
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of franchises for New York City, represented the National League of Cities, the U. S. 
Conference of Mayors, and their respective cities. They collectively presented an overview 
of cable TV services, explained the cable TV franchising process, and argued the merits of 
maintaining municipal authority over cable franchising and local regulation. Representing 
the cable TV industry were Ben Campbell, president of CATA Systems, Inc, Thomas 
Wheeler of NCT A, Douglas Dittrick, president of Tribune Cable, and Lester Green, 
president of Community Communications Systems, Inc. They argued against excessive 
local cable TV regulation by presenting examples of problems in cable franchising practices 
and offered their remedies. 166 
Moving Forward: 1982 
Many developments related to deregulation in the broadcast and cable television 
fields came in 1982. 167 In February, the Supreme Court announced it would include in its 
list of cases to hear that year one with direct bearing on the local regulation of cable 
television. In it, Community Communications Company claimed that Boulder, Colorado had 
violated antitrust laws when the city adopted an ordinance that restricted its plans to expand 
its geographic service area. The City Council of Boulder enacted an emergency ordinance 
prohibiting Community Communications from expanding its business for three months while 
the Council drafted a model cable television ordinance. Its intent was to attract new cable 
providers to enter the Boulder market under terms of the new ordinance. Later in the year 
it was held in Community Communications Co. v. Boulder that, indeed, Boulder was not 
166 House. Telecommunications Miscellaneous, Part J; hearings, 486-684. 
167 Broadcasting, " 1982: Highs and Lows of the Fifth Estate. " Vol. 104, No. 1, 
January 3, 1983, 50-59. 
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exempt from the Sherman Antitrust Act, because it was exercising a power that was not 
delegated by the State of Colorado. 168 This case triggered a renewed interest on the part of 
cities to obtain legislation to protect their authorities to regulate cable operators. 
Among other regulatory developments that related to cable issues, the FCC 
deregulated AM radio. Then it adopted rules that gave birth to low-power television 
(LPTV). 169 In addition, it adopted interim rules for direct broadcast satellites (DBS), and it 
deregulated subscription television (STV). 170 These actions affected the prospects for 
legislation favorable to cable television since they showed the deregulatory bent of Reagan' s 
FCC and underscored the existence of competing media, of which cable TV was only one. 
Thus, in both Congress and the FCC during the second year of Reagan' s presidency 
there was substantial support for the trend away from regulation by government and toward 
regulation by market forces. Opinions expressed by various committee staff members were 
that Congress was in agreement with such trends but had been unable to precisely formulate 
specific policies for cable. The belief was that what the FCC had in mind was congruent 
with congressional support, but some were concerned that the commission was moving too 
fast and, in some areas, perhaps, without appropriate authority. It was widely understood, 
168 Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 455 U.S .  40 ( 1 982) . 
169 It would be argued by cable television interests in congressional hearings 
that Low-Power Television (LPTV) constituted effective competition for cable 
programming, hence the need to deregulate cable television since LPTV was not 
regulated. 
170 LPTV was a proposal by the FCC in the 1980s to have local stations 
broadcasting to a limited geographical area, normally carrying local origination 
programming. DBS are program channels that can be received directly from 
satellites using an antenna, or dish, on the subscriber's property. STV uses signals 
that are scrambled when broadcast (not cablecast) and then decoded by a device 
attached to the television set that is available for a fee. 
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furthermore, that only Congress, and not the FCC, could provide truly meaningful 
deregulation of cable television. 171 
Second Round of Senate Hearings 
In 1982, legislative efforts to set national policy for cable television became more 
focused. Exploratory hearings were held, followed by introduction of a bill on the specific 
. topic of cable telecommunications. 
Early in the year, Packwood authorized field hearings to address cable television 
matters. In the process, he provided some members of the committee a chance to participate 
in hearings in their home states. 172 Senator Gorton, a member of the Commerce Committee, 
but not a member of the subcommittee, participated in a field hearing on January 1 8  in 
Seattle, while Harrison Schmitt held a field hearing in Albuquerque on February 16. These 
were fact-finding in nature and intended to aid in drafting legislation. Because the debate 
between cities and organized cable interests had sharpened since the committee report on S .  
898 was issued in July of 198 1, the testimony of divergent interests in the field hearings 
provided a foundation for structuring new legislative language on the issues. 173 
At the Seattle hearing, Packwood presided, and his experience with S. 898 set the 
tone. He had seen the provisions in S. 898 to deregulate cable television, as well as his own 
171 Broadcasting, January 3, 1983, 62. 
172 White interview, 1996. 
173 Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation. 
Cable Television Regulation, Part 1: Hearings before the Committee on 
Commerce, Science and Transportation, 91tli. Cong., 2nd sess. , January 1 8, 
February 16, 1982, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1 982, CIS 
microfiche S261-32). 
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compromise amendment, eliminated because state and local governments were not allowed 
an opportunity to testify on them. However, these interests were strongly represented at this 
hearing. Indeed, seven of the ten witnesses testifying represented state and local 
governments and provided most of the testimony. 
The context of the hearings was the intensified attention of cities to cable television 
regulatory issues. Mayor Charles Royer of Seattle represented the NLC. He testified that 
the organization's task force on telecommunications and cable television had met in 
December of 198 1  and instructed the "NLC staff to develop affirmative cable legislation" 
to counter the "cable industry's aggressive assertion of its interests in both Congress and the 
courts. "  The creation of a task force and specific direction given to the staff represented a 
heightened formality in the organization oflobbying efforts by the league on cable television 
issues. The NLC believed such action was necessary to insure a balanced debate on the 
issues. The position taken by local governments was that the cable industry's desires, as 
reflected in earlier legislation, failed to take into account both the public's interest and the 
legitimate concerns of state and local governments. For the NLC, it was important to 
emphasize that the public had First Amendment rights to receive information from a variety 
of sources, and also that state and local governments possessed rights under their police 
powers to set terms and conditions for the use of public rights-of-way. 174 
Conversely, the cable television industry still preferred deregulation. Alternatively, 
however, if regulation was to continue, the industry preference was for regulation at the 
federal level, preempting state and local regulations. Regulation at the federal level would 
place cable TV in a more predictable environment with nationwide consistency in regulatory 
standards and requirements. In addition, policy implementation would take place in a more 
174 Ibid, 8 .  
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familiar regulatory framework of a federal agency subject to congressional oversight and 
presidential influence. Larger cable operations, which dominated the NCT A board, felt 
more comfortable in operating within such a regulatory environment. m 
Packwood made a determined effort to extract from state and local government 
witnesses what they thought was lacking in the failed Packwood-Cannon compromise 
amendment to S. 898, which would have codified the existing arrangements for municipal 
regulations. 176 In his questioning, he emphasized his understanding that the NLC had agreed 
to the compromise and expressed his frustration that the agreement seemed to vanish prior 
to the floor debate. He repeatedly listed the points in the compromise amendment and, with 
the exception of retaining FCC authority to limit franchise fees, suggested that they were 
equivalent to the provisions the witnesses were proposing. When he asked the witnesses 
representing local governments what else they thought should be included, they did not 
respond with any additional preferences. Frank Greif of Seattle and Rose Besserman of 
Vancouver said that they hesitated to answer as to general needs since each municipality was 
unique. 177 They urged that national policy include the authority for local jurisdictions to 
negotiate with cable operators through the franchise process to satisfy a particular 
community's needs as officials perceived them. 
175 See recent writings on niches, regulatory communities, and selective 
lobbying; e.g., William P. Browne; "Organized Interests and Their Issue Niches," 
Jounmal of Politics, 1990, 52: 477-509; M. R. Mahood, Interest Groups in 
American National Politics: An Overview, (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice 
Hall, Inc., 2000); Ken Kollman, "Inviting Friends to Lobby: Interest Groups, 
Ideological Bias, and Congressional Committees," American Journal of Political 
Science, Vol. 41 ,  No. 2. (April 1997) 5 19-544; also David M. Welborn and 
Anthony Brown, Regulatory Policy and Processes: The Public Service 
Commissions in Tennessee, Kentucky, and Georgia (Knoxville: Bureau of Public 
Administration, University of Tennessee, 1980). 
176 Senate hearings, Cable Television Regulation 33-37. 
177 Ibid, 3 1-32. 
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Senators Packwood and Gorton were the only members of the Senate Commerce 
Committee to attend the Seattle hearing. Various comments made by them seemed to 
establish Packwood as an advocate for cable TV operators. This was, perhaps, due to the 
defeat of his compromise amendment to S. 898 by the efforts of the NLC. Gorton, on the 
other hand, seemed most attentive to the interests of the NLC, perhaps because the in­
coming president of the NLC was the mayor of Seattle and one of his constituents. In 
addition, Seattle's director of the Office of Cable Communications, Frank V. Greif, another 
important witness, also served as the national chairman of the National Association of 
Telecommunications Officers and Advisors. This organization was clearly acting as an 
organized voice for the interests of state and local government regulators. 178 
At the second one-day field hearing, conducted alone by Schmitt in Albuquerque, 
New Mexico on February 16, ten witnesses were heard, five representing state and local 
governments and five the cable industry. Schmitt set the tone of the hearing by stating an 
intent to build a hearing record on "case studies of how local communities, local public 
utilities, cable entities, as well as states as a whole are dealing with [the] explosion of 
opportunity from broadband communications. "179 In his opening statement> he established 
a sense of neutrality when he stated, "I have no strong opinions one way or another, except 
on the nature of the problems. . . and I don't believe that the committee, as a whole, has 
strong opinions on the solutions to those problems." What he wanted to do was to "find the 
middle ground to make sure that all existing interests are able to compete in a free and open 
178 See writings on trade organizations, interest group alliances and opposition 
by Robert H. Salisbury, John P. Heinz, Edward 0. Laumann and Robert L. 
Nelson, "Who Works with Whom? Interest Group Alliances and Opposition," 
The American Political Science Review, Vol. 8 1, (December 1987) 4: 1217- 1234; 
and Browne, "Organized Interests and Niches". 
179 Senate hearings, Cable Television Regulation, 67. 
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environment . . . while at the same time new services at lower costs are provided to the 
consumer. "180 
As testimony was about to begin, Schmitt made an important point regarding the 
proposed consent decree that was being considered to settle the long-standing antitrust suit 
against AT&T. He wanted witnesses to think about the effects the decree would have on 
cable systems as potential competitors with local telephone operating systems. Schmitt 
believed that the issue of treating cable as a common carrier would be accelerated as a result 
of the decree if it were implemented. However, little was mentioned by the witnesses in the 
context of cable as a common carrier. Most testimony centered around how to create a 
environment of open competition within a structure of local government regulation. 
The position of the cable industry at the time can be summarized from the testimony 
of Douglas Dittrick, president of the Tribune Company Cable system. He argued that the 
heart of the matter was the desire on the part of municipalities to establish total regulation 
over cable TV systems on the premise they were public utility monopolies. 181 Dittrick' s 
view was that this premise was false. In his estimation, it set the climate in many cities that 
put cable at severe competitive disadvantages. 182 He believed that regulating cable 
operations as utility monopolies put cable companies at the mercy of uncertain local politics, 
limiting their ability to make timely business decisions regarding expansions and upgrades 
or attracting capital investments to finance growth. 
180 Ibid, 68. 
181 Ibid, 70-72. 
182 Ibid, 73 . 
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Speaking on behalf of local TV broadcast media, Mac Sklower, general manager of 
KOAT-TV in Albuquerque, described what he considered unfair competition between 
broadcast TV and cable TV. His point was that cable TV was not subject to the same kind 
of operating conditions as broadcast TV. These included equal time rules under FCC 
regulations, and having to bid for programming in an open marketplace. Cable did not pay 
for the programming as did broadcasters, yet it competed with local stations for advertising 
revenue.183 
Presenting the viewpoint of cites was Steve Barshov, a staff attorney for the New 
Mexico Municipal League. Barshov addressed the issue of"open competition." From the 
perspective of the cities he was speaking for, "The only way of producing true competition 
is for the municipality to be able to impose a meaningful set of negotiating terms." If cable 
legislation would effectively "take away the city's power to in any way negotiate by making 
its franchise fees meaningless, or taking away any regulatory authority it may have, [was] 
the wrong way to go."184 Barshov endeavored to claim the high ground for municipalities 
by describing the intent of cities to protect the interests of their citizens who were cable 
consumers. He claimed the "real basis for the regulation comes from the fact that the 
municipality has to be concerned with protecting the public's interest, and that public 
interest is getting the widest amount, the most highly diverse amount of cable programming 
and on the state of the art technology as is possible."185 Schmitt delved into the way cities 
structured the use of public rights-of-way by cable operators and translated that into a right 
to regulate them. He then cautioned Barshov on using the rationale of regulating cable TV 
183 Ibid, 7 5 .  
184 Ibid, 82. 
185 Ibid, 96. 
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because it was a public service, suggesting that the municipalities themselves could be 
regulated. 186 
In all, eight issues were raised, and four of them dominated the two field hearings. 
Table 3.3 profiles them and illustrates the issue complexity that had emerged even as the 
debate was in its early stages. Not surprisingly, the most frequently raised issue was the 
authority of local governments to regulate rates charged for cable services. The second most 
frequently raised issue involved extending the pole attachment law so it would apply to 
cooperatively and publicly owned utilities and telephone companies. Cable system operators 
depended on existing power and telephone utility poles to carry their cables. In the early 
development of cable TV, there existed no regulation of fees for pole use charged to cable 
operators. Some utilities that had desires to provide cable service would charge inordinately 
high attachment fees, establish spacing specifications that effectively prevented use by cable 
systems, or flatly denied the space at all. Initial legislation to control and prevent such 
tactics exempted publicly owned or cooperatively owned utilities. Quite naturally, the cable 
industry sought to extend the pole attachment regulations to include all utilities. There were 
a large number of cooperative and publicly owned utilities and telephone systems in rural 
Washington and New Mexico. The third most frequently raised issue was whether 
municipalities should be allowed to own and operate cable systems. The fourth most 
frequently raised issue was whether the FCC should limit franchise fees. 
186 Ibid. 
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Table 3.3. Issues Raised in 1982 Field Hearings 
Issues Seattle Albuquerque 
Raised 
Support Oppose Support Oppose 
Total 
Local regulation of cable 5 1 3 2 1 1  
rates. 
Extension of pole 2 4 1 3 10 
attachment law. 
Municipal ownership of 
cable systems. 
3 3 3 0 
FCC limit of franchise 3 3 0 1 
fees. 
Federal preem£tion of state 1 1 0 1 3 and local regu atory 
authorities. 
Required access to channel 2 0 1 0 3 
capacity. 
Must-cany rules. 0 1 0 0 1 
Anti-trust protection for 1 0 0 0 1 
cities. 
Table 3.3 further shows that there was equal frequency of testimony on the topics of 
Federal preemption of state and local regulatory authority and requiring cable operators to 
provide access to commercial and PEG use of excess channel capacity. The former issue 
was the total replacement of local regulation with federal regulation by the FCC. The latter 
issue was related to allowing programmers and PEG access to channels on a cable systems 
that were not being used. Must carry rules and antitrust protection for cities were each the 
subject of only one witness. Neither of these two topics were discussed in Albuquerque. 
On March 4, 1982, Goldwater introduced S. 2172, the Cable Telecommunications 
Act of 1982. The intent of his bill was to use the information gathered from the field 
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hearings in Seattle and Albuquerque and combine it with the subcommittee' s staff research 
to formulate a viable policy for cable telecommunications. He wanted to revise and clarify 
the regulatory jurisdictions of the FCC, and of states and local governments over cable TV 
systems. Specific provisions in the bill included clarifying the FCC' s authority in restricting 
foreign ownership of cable TV systems, yet it also had a provision that would permit 
municipal ownership of cable TV systems. The bill sought to authorize state and local 
governments to award cable TV franchises and regulate the rates charged under such 
franchise agreements. This provision was balanced by another that would require the FCC 
to establish a ceiling on cable TV franchise fees. Additionally, the bill required cable 
systems with twenty or more channels to set aside channels for PEG programmers. 
The only action in the House in 1982 came just after Goldwater' s bill was 
introduced. A one-day hearing was held on March 8 by the Telecommunications 
Subcommittee in Chicago. Wirth presided at the hearing and the only other member of the 
subcommittee present was Representative Cardiss Collins (D-Illinois). It was billed by the 
subcommittee as a "Cable Franchise Investigation." 187 The stated subject of the hearing was 
local participation in cable franchise matters, but the focus of the testimony was minority 
participation and ownership of cable systems. The subcommittee heard from eleven 
witnesses who represented interests in minority involvement in decisions on cable franchise 
agreements. No witnesses appeared from either the cable industry or other 
telecommunications industries competing with cable. The only information from the cable 
industry was a written submission from Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. Edward R. 
Vrdolyak, a member of the Chicago City Council, testified about Chicago's cable 
187 Congress, House, Committee on Energy and Commerce. Cable Franchise 
Investigation: Local Participation: Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance. Washington, D. C.: 
GPO, 1982. (CIS82:H361-99: 1-56). 
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franchising process. After that a panel of witnesses spoke about the need for minority 
participation in the franchising process and service availability from cable operators. The 
last panel of six witnesses spoke on the need for and importance of minority cable TV 
ownership as well as public participation in local cable TV franchising processes. Despite 
this hearing, minority participation in cable TV franchising processes did not become an 
issue in final versions of any cable regulation legislation. However, the issue became a pre­
cursor for equal opportunity employment provisions in the final enactment. 
On April 26, 27, and 28, the Communications Subcommittee held more extensive and 
comprehensive hearings on Capitol Hill. As subcommittee chairman, Goldwater presided. 
It was clear that the hearings were intended to honor a commitment on his part to correct 
the failure to include state and municipal interests in the 198 1  hearings on S .  898. During 
his opening statement he commented about the number of communications bills that the 
Commerce Committee had considered. He spoke of his successful efforts to strike cable 
provisions from S.  898 because no hearings had been held on those sections. 1 88 
The hearings provided an opportunity for key interests to assert their basic positions. 
One of the first witnesses was the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and 
Information, Bernard Wunder. His message was that the Reagan administration, in general, 
supported S .  2 172 with certain minor reservations. Also testifying was Mark Fowler, 
chairman of the FCC. He was generally in favor of the main intent of the bill with the 
exception of some specific aspects which he specified. One aspect that pleased him was the 
elimination of the fairness and equal time provisions of the Communications Act for both 
188 Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation. 
Cable Television Regulation, (Part 2): Hearing Committee on Commerce, Science 
and Transportation. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1982. ( 1982 CIS 
microfiche S26 1-59) : 16 1 .  
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broadcasters and cable television. He was concerned that if these survived, they could be 
extended to newspapers. Then, in the event newspapers were transmitted over cable 
broadband circuits, it would be inconsistent regulation since the fairness and equal time 
doctrines did not apply to printed newspapers. His position was that any direct or indirect 
restraints on speech and the press should be eliminated, and he was adamant about protecting 
the First Amendment rights of cable. He also supported provisions requiring access to excess 
channel capacity by PEG organizations as well as commercial leasing to third parties. 
Interestingly, Fowler believed that the principal area of cable regulation was non-federal. 
He opposed the provisions calling for FCC preemption of state and local regulation of cable. 
In addition, the FCC opposed cross-ownership of cable systems by telephone companies or 
broadcast stations in the same community. It opposed limitation of foreign ownership of 
cable systems but supported reciprocity with neighboring countries if they would allow 
American cable companies to operate with status equal to cable operations in their own 
nation. At this time, no other countries, especially Canada, allowed American cable 
companies to operate in their jurisdictions. 
Thomas Wheeler, speaking on behalf of the NCT A, made the case for deregulating 
cable TV, noting that it already faced effective market competition from alternative 
communications technologies. Wheeler also outlined the NCTA position on the dominant 
issues under consideration, particularly franchising. The NCT A believed that the concept 
of"renewal expectancy'' should be established as national policy. Cable TV operators invest 
large amounts of capital in equipment and cable runs in developing their infrastructure. In 
order to borrow the monies needed, lenders need assurances operations will continue long 
enough to pay off the debt. What the cable industry wanted was a policy that as long as a 
cable operation lived up to the provision of its franchise agreement, it could expect the 
agreement to be renewed without having to enter a bidding contest to retain the operations. 
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The problem in cable industry-municipal relations, he asserted, "is not that cities and 
community groups have trouble gaining access to cable, rather that through the franchising 
process cities are demanding free of charge, channel capacity far beyond any showing of 
reasonable need or ability to utilize. "189 Regarding rate regulation, the NCT A position was 
that it should only be allowed in situations where a minimum complement of broadcast 
signals is not available off-the-air. Wheeler stated that the association was strongly in favor 
of the FCC having the authority to establish a ceiling for franchise fees that should " not . . .  
exceed the costs of a reasonable level of city regulation of cable."190 Regarding the pole 
attachment law, the NCT A strongly supported its extension, and also believed that publicly 
and cooperatively owned utilities should be included under the law. Such entities were 
monopolies that could charge whatever they wanted for such attachments, and indeed some 
had engaged in price-gouging. 
Vincent Wasilewski, president of the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) 
testified on behalf of television broadcasters. He outlined their position on cable legislation 
based on three principles: "First, fair and equitable access to programing; second, open entry 
with the ability to participate fully in ownership and development of cable television; and 
third; regulatory parity." He expressed the view that this latter principle be accomplished 
through further deregulation of broadcasting rather than establishing additional regulation 
of competing media. 191 A point made by Wasilewski would eventually present an interesting 
irony in future considerations of cable television regulation. In this hearing, one of the 
criticisms that he expressed was that "the Federal Government continues to grant cable 
systems a subsidy in the form of a compulsory license to use broadcast programing." In later 
189 Ibid, 226-228. 
190 Ibid. 
191 Ibid, 453 . 
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years, the NAB would argue that cable system owners should be both required to carry local 
broadcast signals and to pay for the use of them. 
Stephen Effros, testifying for the CATV A, pleaded the case for cable TV systems 
that served small communities with subscriber bases of less than fifty percent of those 
offered the service. But the strongest portion ofEffros' testimony came when he discussed 
the issue of municipal ownership of cable television systems. 192 Some municipalities were 
interested in taking over cable systems and running them as government operations. This 
was opposed on two fundamental points. The first was the idea that government ownership 
could control programing content and flow of information. For some this held First 
Amendment implications. The second was that others opposed it because they had built, 
equipped and developed the systems over many years and were afraid they would not receive 
adequate compensation if systems were taken over and operated like government utilities. 
Effi-os' testimony had a confrontational tone when he took Goldwater to task over language 
in the bill that provided support for municipal ownership. He cited comments made by the 
senator in television interviews expressing concerns about his perception of a "trend toward 
nationalism and socialism" in America. Effi-os went on to say, "Let us not mince words. 
Municipal ownership of cable television systems is socialism. . . . It is not only the 
government taking over a non-essential private enterprise, but the media as well." 193 
Challenged in a way that senators are not used to at hearings, Goldwater merely 
thanked Effros and called the next witness. 
192 Ibid 245-246. ' 
193 Ibid, 245 . 
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For the cities, Helen Boosalis, mayor of Lincoln, Nebraska testified on behalf of the 
U.S .  Conference of Mayors in support of maintaining the franchise process at the local 
government level. It was also the mayors' view that local government rate regulation was 
"the key ingredient to protecting the public interest."194 Franchise fees, she argued, were 
business taxes and therefore compensation for the use of public rights-of-way. This point 
would become one of the most contentious issues in the consideration of cable legislation. 
The NLC was represented by Cathy Reynolds, a city council member from Denver, 
Colorado . The main message she delivered was that the NLC believed that "S.  2 172, by 
increasing the role of the Federal Government and preempting state and local authority in 
many areas, goes too far toward a national cable policy." Furthermore, "Since local interests 
predominate, states and local governments should have primary responsibility for the 
regulation of cable through the franchise process. "m 
For Goldwater, the key section in the bill was the provision that divided regulatory 
authority over cable television between the Federal government and the states. In general, 
the cable TV industry favored some form of standard national regulation which could only 
come from the FCC. Local governments, of course, believed the most appropriate place for 
obtaining effective regulation was at the state and local levels. Goldwater stated his 
"personal" preference, "We are not looking for an excuse to have more regulation. I am 
personally looking for an excuse to do away with regulation." 196 
194 Ibid. 
195 Ibid, 448 .  
196 Ibid, 378 .  
107 
On the second day of the hearings, Senator Pressler provided some insight into his 
deregulatory leanings on the issue of cable TV. In his opening statement on April 27, 
Pressler stated, "It seems to me any satisfactory cable legislation must cover two issues: The 
nature of the industry and the nature of government regulation. Cable service promises vast 
and far reaching new technologies. But this potential is uncertain at least partly because 
there is no coherent and consistent government policy. "197 This statement established, at 
least for Senator Pressler, that there needed to be a national policy for cable TV systems, 
formulated through the federal legislative process. 
The Bill Clears Committee 
On August 10, 1982, the Senate Commerce Committee, by a vote of 13-3, reported 
the bill, S. 2172. Its major provisions served to clarify the FCC' s authority to restrict foreign 
ownership of cable TV systems. Provisions favorable to cities included authorizing state and 
local governments to award cable TV franchises and to regulate cable TV rates. It also 
permitted municipal ownership of cable TV systems and required cable TV systems with 20 
or more channels to set aside access channels for public, educational, and government 
programming. The provisions favorable to the cable industry included establishing cable 
operator's presumptive rights for franchise renewals and allowing them to extend their areas 
of coverage. Lastly, it required the FCC to establish reasonable upper limits on cable TV 
franchise fees. 198 Franchise fees were, in many cases, a percentage of cable operation' s gross 
revenues. Since there were no regulatory limits in place, fees were inconsistent across the 
nation and rising in bidding contests for franchise agreements and in renewal negotiations. 
197 Ibid, 430. 
198 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, September 4, 1982, 2207. 
108 
This situation was one of the main drivers for the cable industry to seek a national policy on 
cable TV. 
But before the bill was approved, three amendments were considered. Senator 
Gorton, in support of the cities, attempted to delete the provision that included presumptive 
rights for cable operators on franchise renewals and extensions of service areas. His 
amendment failed 4 to 7. Senator Cannon, a supporter of deregulation, offered an 
amendment to explicitly deregulate cable in cases where substantial competition existed. 
Cannon's amendment failed 4 to 1 1 . The last amendment considered was offered by Senator 
Robert Kasten (R-Wisconsin). Kasten supported a sports blackout provision in the original 
bill, but it was deleted during revision. His amendment provided for an additional franchise 
fee of three percent that cable operators would pay for cable-casting distant programming 
such as professional sports events. It was defeated by a vote of 3 to 7. 199 
The reported bill received mixed reviews from organized interests. Cable operators 
said the bill would resolve their difficulties with overlapping and uncertain regulations that 
had impeded development and would help them compete with unregulated 
telecommunications companies. However, a coalition of mayors, state and county officials, 
consumer advocates and labor representatives opposed the measure. They contended that the 
bill was an unwarranted federal intrusion into local government affairs which unfairly 
restricted local regulation of rates that a cable customer would pay and that, in effect, 




The coalition of state and local governments, along with consumer and labor 
spokesmen, lobbied hard with some senators in support of amending the legislation to make 
it more acceptable to their interests and even to block a vote on the bill. 201 Senator Gorton 
was a strong supporter of these efforts. He opposed the bill because it preempted "the 
legitimate and traditional participation of States and local governments" in regulating cable 
television services. 202 He also believed it overly protected cable companies from vigorous 
and worthwhile competition. Moreover, he said he intended to amend the bill to eliminate 
the provision that would have required nearly automatic renewal of cable operators' 
franchises.203 Furthermore, Gorton and Senator John C. Danforth (R-Missouri), who also 
opposed the bill in committee, and several other Republicans wrote Majority Leader Howard 
Baker (R-Tennessee), asking to be included in discussions about bringing the bill to the 
floor. They said they expected extended debate on the bill. Indeed, as a result of evidence 
of strong opposition, the bill was not considered by the Senate before the session adjourned. 
After the bill was deferred and at the urging of Goldwater in the Senate and Wirth 
in the House, the staff of the NLC and the NCT A met to resolve differences on the 
legislation. The negotiations to arrive at agreement on legislative content began in 
September of 1982. The NCTA was willing to negotiate on the language in order to assure 
that its interests were protected and so it would not be seen as uncooperative in resolving 
cable issues. 
201 Ibid. 
202 Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation. 
Cable Telecommunications Act of 1982. Senate Report 97-518, 97th Cong. , 2nd 
sess. , 1982, ( 1982 CIS microfiche S263-24), 49. 
203 CQWR, September 4, 1982, 2207. 
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Meanwhile, cable copyright legislation passed the House (H.R. 5949) in September. 
It was concerned with issues regarding royalties paid on retransmission of movies and 
broadcast telecasts and was an example of how a negotiated approach to differences in 
legislative interests could be successful. Amendments to the bill were negotiated by the 
National Cable Television Association, the National Association of Broadcasters, the 
National Religious Broadcasters, the Motion Picture Association of America, and the 
National Association of Public Television Stations. This was an important bill to these 
interests, since it allowed copyright matters to be handled legislatively apart from the 
deregulation issues. Many of the interests supporting the copyright legislation testified in 
hearings on cable deregulation, urging that the issue not be included in regulatory bills. The 
concern was that enactment of the copyright compromise in H.R. 5949 might be jeopardized 
by the difficulties associated with passing a broader cable television bill. 
Nearing Resolution - 1983: Movement Accelerates 
In 1982, a new Congress was elected, and there were changes in the composition of 
both the Communications Subcommittee of the Senate and the Telecommunications 
Subcommittee of the House. For the Republicans, in addition to Goldwater, Pressler and 
Stevens, Slade Gorton was appointed to the Communications Subcommittee replacing 
Harrison Schmitt . The three Democrats on the subcommittee remained Hollings, Inouye and 
Ford. In the House, changes to the Telecommunications Subcommittee were more 
numerous. Tim Wirth remained chairman. However, Democratic representatives Al Gore, 
Mickey Leland, John Bryant (D-Texas), and James Bates (D-California) joined the 
subcommittee. On the Republican side, Michael Oakley (R-Ohio) joined Matthew J. 
Rinaldo (R-New Jersey), Carlos J. Moorehead (R-California) and Thomas J. Tauke (R-
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Iowa). The subcommittee balance changed from nine Democrats and five Republicans to 
ten Democrats and only four Republicans. 
The year began with the introduction by Senator Goldwater of another cable 
television deregulation bill. Cities continued to oppose the restrictions on their regulatory 
authority as contained in the bill. But as they began to realize that such provisions would 
ultimately be enacted, they continued negotiations with the cable industry to reach a 
compromise on national cable television policy. In March, a compromise was reached and 
incorporated in the bill that cleared the Communications Subcommittee on April 2 1. The 
Senate then passed the bill on June 14 and sent it to the House. The House, on the other 
hand, had its own version of cable television legislation drafted after holding subcommittee 
hearings in May, June and November. On November 17, the Telecommunications 
Subcommittee reported a bill, H.R. 4103, that differed somewhat from the Senate bill. The 
bill went no further than the subcommittee's approval. Meanwhile, the compromise 
agreement between the NLC and the NCT A unraveled, in part over the differences between 
the House and Senate bills. This generated another round of strong lobbying by both sides 
that prevented final passage of a bill in 1983. 
The Senate Leads Again. 
On January 26, 1983, with the NLC-NCTA negotiations at an impasse, Senator 
Goldwater introduced the Cable Telecommunications Act of 1983, S. 66, which was 
essentially identical to S. 2172 of the previous year. The new version still contained 
dramatic cutbacks on state and local government authorities over cable operations. Because 
of those aspects, the NLC immediately went on record in opposition to the bill. Alan Beals, 
executive director of the NLC said, "S. 66 represents a completely unwarranted usurpation 
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of fundamental state and local franchising powers and would abrogate freely negotiated 
contracts. " Using a certain degree of hyperbole to establish local governments as the put­
upon underdogs, Beals attacked the legislation stating, "There is no need for this special 
interest legislation which would destroy the franchising powers of cities. 11204 Another 
controversial issue was the ability of franchising authorities to determine the annual fees 
paid for franchises. In the early stages of the bill's consideration, it was predicted by the 
NLC that the statutory ceiling on franchise fees would be less than the three or five percent 
in the FCC standard at that time. Municipalities viewed any reduction in the fee levels as 
a serious threat to the revenues they obtained from cable television franchises. 
Compared to the amount ofinvolvement by local governments and the cable industry 
interests, there was relatively little testimony presented at the hearings on behalf of the 
public or consumer interests. During February hearings on S. 66, held by Goldwater's 
subcommittee, Susan Buske, executive director of the National Federation of Local Cable 
Programmers, expressed concern that there was no testimony scheduled from the general 
public representing libraries, educators, or churches. She testified that, "These groups 
requested the opportunity to speak but were denied"205• It was her conclusion that the bill 
placed all resources and authority inherent in federal policy squarely on the side of the cable 
industry. This, she suggested, was contrary to the public interest standard that had been the 
basis of regulation of telecommunications for over 50 years. 206 
204 Nation's Cities Weekly, Vol. 6, No. 5, January 3 1 , 1983, 1 .  
205 Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 
Cable Telecommunications Act of 1983, Hearings before the Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Washington: Government Printing 
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The only arguments directly considered in favor of consumer interests were those 
included in statements from the NLC. Its position was that cities were the negotiators for 
consumers that could ensure they would get the best deal from cable operators. The cities 
viewed cable plant as infrastructure -- like bridges and roads -- requiring local government 
input, even in the planning stages. 207 
Speaking against any regulation of cable television, the Mountain States Legal 
Foundation (MSLF) submitted a statement at the invitation of Goldwater's staff. It was 
against the legislation on First Amendment grounds. The foundation took the position that 
cable was an important communications medium that should be free of government 
regulation at local, state or national levels. It felt that competition among providers in the 
marketplace would more properly control the medium and protect the interests of consumers. 
A key point in its testimony was the belief that cable monopolies are the creations of 
governmental entities rather than the marketplace. The MSLF's conclusion was, "Exclusive 
franchises in communications are incompatible with the First Amendment, as well as the 
pro-competitive national policies embodied in the Sherman Act and recited in this bill [i .e. ,  
s. 66]. 11208 
Because of strong lobbying efforts on the part of both the industry and cities, 
Goldwater realized that his bill was as doomed as earlier attempts to set legislative policy 
unless a compromise could be reached. He said in his opening statement at the February 
hearing that after many city officials opposed S. 2172, he asked the two sides to meet and 
resolve their differences. 209 At the same time, he indicated his willingness to consider any 
207 Ibid, 14 1 .  
208 Ibid 207-21 1 .  , 
209 Ibid 123 .  ' 
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agreement that could be reached between the NLC and the NCT A on compromise legislation 
if it could be done in time. He added: 
It is my firm belief that we need to establish a national policy for cable this 
year if that industry is to ever realize its full potential. If we do not get 
legislation soon, I mean this year, the current patchwork system of Federal, 
State and local regulation of cable will be too firmly entrenched to undo. Not 
only will the cable industry suffer, but the cities will lose, too. Ultimately, 
however, it is the consumer who will suffer the most, and I hope we can 
prevent that. 210 
Negotiating Compromises 
As a result of negotiations between the NLC and the NCTA that began in September 
of 1982, the first compromise agreement was reached on March 4, 1983 . The motivation for 
the NLC leadership to negotiate was its belief that congressional interest in deregulation, 
coupled with continuing court challenges to municipal franchising authority, would result 
in cities losing all regulatory authority over cable television. Therefore, it felt the need to 
capitalize on the stance taken by Goldwater during hearings by continuing to negotiate a 
compromise with cable operators that left cities with a role to play. 
First Compromise Reached. In these negotiations, the cable industry was represented 
primarily by Tom Wheeler, president of the NCTA. During the first round, the NLC team 
included five local regulatory administrators from Boston; Atlanta; Scottsdale, Arizona; St. 
Paul, Minnesota; and Seattle, Washington. 211 Early negotiations did not involve the United 
States Conference of Mayors (USCM) because, historically, it had not shown much interest 
210 Ibid, 124. 
211 Cynthia Pols, personal interview by author, Washington, D.C. , March 14, 
1997. Pols also remembers the first round of negotiations used no elected 
officials. 
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in cable issues. 212 Cable was more of a city council thing and not something that held much 
interest for mayors as an organized interest. However, the USCM did become involved 
when a second round of negotiations occurred because some NLC negotiators from larger 
cities became dissatisfied with language in the original compromise. 
Tom Wheeler, recalled the impetus for negotiations that came from John Dingell : 
Let me tell you a story. John Dingell was Chairman of the Commerce 
Committee in the House. And, Chairman Dingell didn't want things to break 
out into open warfare between us and the cities in particular. So he held a 
shotgun wedding. It was a white shotgun so it was a formal wedding. He, in 
essence, sat us both down and he said to us: ''Nothing's going to end up 
happening unless you reach an accord with the cities." And he said to the 
cities: "You folks run a real risk of building a negative record which will 
enable the cable folks to roll all over you at some point in time unless you sit 
down and negotiate. Why don't you folks sit down?"213 
As one of the NLC negotiators, Cynthia Pols remembered this about the process. 
"It was just him (Wheeler), Jim Mooney, [executive vice-president of NCTA] and their 
lawyer -- just the three of them. And they [NCT A] knew exactly what they wanted; had a 
game plan." Ward White recalls the principal negotiators as Cynthia Pols, who was the 
Legislative Counsel for the NLC and Jim Mooney, and various members of the Commerce 
Committee staff. He also recalled there were "a lot of meetings and a lot of it was intense. 
A lot of frustration and it went on for a long time."214 The early negotiations often were held 
in congressional staff offices because they were considered a neutral location. However, 
Tom Wheeler recalled the intensity of the negotiations near the end of reaching the first 
compromise, particularly the settings of the meetings: 
Considering that some of the sessions were in windowless, hotel meeting 
rooms at various places across the country - I remember one in some dark, 
212 White interview. 
213 Thomas Wheeler interview. 
214 White interview. 
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hotel meeting room at Dallas-Ft. Worth Airport on a Friday - I guess -- that 
then lapsed over into Saturday. I remember talcing my morning jog around 
the D/FW Airport that morning and asking myself: What the hell am I doing 
here?215 
Mooney specifically recalled "one guy from Scottsdale wouldn't agree to anything. 
The group was trying to work by consensus but he just held out and held out on critical 
issues. He jammed on everything to the point where Goldwater [ when he heard about the 
stall] said, 'You've got to agree now. I'm going to move the legislation forward if you don't 
agree."'216 
According to Mooney, Mayor Royer of Seattle and also president of NLC "had to 
step in and make a decision on the compromise because the Scottsdale representative had 
blocked the other local regulators from reaching consensus."217 At the end of the first 
negotiations, he had to take the heat from other member cities for doing that, "and that's why 
things got so messy. Because Royer had to make the decision." In defending the original 
compromise, Royer wrote to the membership as NLC President expressing his view that it 
had become apparent in the fall of 1982 that the NLC was "winning battles" but' that winning 
the war "was becoming less and less certain. " In an effort to convince city officials critical 
of the accord, his letter described that they could only get three votes in the Senate 
Commerce Committee for their position, while 13 senators favored the industry's position. 
Furthermore, in the House, key members and staff of the Telecommunications 
Subcommittee indicated there was little support for the kind of regulation that was then in 
place. Moreover, Royer asserted that subcommittee contacts indicated there was a growing 
215 Wheeler interview. 
216 James P. Mooney, telephone interview by author, Puget Sound, 
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concern for what some congressional members viewed as regulatory abuses by cities along 
with a feeling that cable operators needed regulatory relief. 218 
On March 6, 1983, the NLC's board approved the first compromise agreement and 
the NCT A approved it on March 22 . Both groups believed they had made significant 
concessions in the process. The NLC approved the agreement because ofits expectation that 
some form of legislation was clearly going to pass the Senate and that the compromise was 
better than what they would have gotten from the Senate. 219 As it turned out, this was the 
first of ultimately three cable legislation compromises negotiated with the NCT A. 
Two major areas of compromise were franchise fees and local regulation of rates 
charged to subscribers. The March 1983 compromise allowed a city to charge a franchise 
fee of up to five percent of the operator's gross annual revenues with no limitation set on 
how the fees could be used by the city. Cities had been concerned that the FCC would 
restrict the level of fees below the five percent mark and limit how the cities could use the 
funds. Cable operators were pleased that a limit was agreed to since fees in some cities were 
as high as 20 percent. Originally, cable operators wanted the fees to be used only for cable­
related purposes. As for rates charged to customers, the compromise allowed local 
governments to regulate rates for basic service in only those instances where the system was 
located in an area receiving fewer than four broadcast television signals, therefore making 
cable TV the dominant medium for television programming. 
218 Nation 's Cities Weekly, March 21 ,  1983, Vol. 6, No. 12, 1 .  
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With this compromise, Goldwater believed that he had finally succeeded in resolving 
the core disagreements between contending interests. He and the staff revised S. 66 by 
including the compromise agreement between the cities and the cable industry. The 
agreement became the substitute language inserted as an amendment to the bill. He offered 
his amended version in an executive session of the Commerce Committee on March 22, 
1983. However, the committee postponed voting on the bill after complaints were voiced 
by Democratic members that they received the amended version too late. To avoid a fight, 
Packwood and Goldwater agreed to postpone a vote. In addition, Senator Hollings, ranking 
minority member on the committee, found certain aspects of the revised bill unacceptable. 
It soon became apparent that there were thorny issues that fell outside the agreement. 
For example, Hollings and some other members were primarily concerned with making the 
bill more pro-competitive. Hollings wanted to amend the definition of cable systems to 
permit common carriers to provide cable services and cable operators to provide telephone­
like services. He was also interested in retaining FCC authority over ownership, whereas 
the bill barred the FCC from prohibiting persons to own cable systems by reason of their 
ownership of other media, including broadcast, cable, newspaper, programming services, or 
other printed or electronic information services except telephone companies. Senator James 
Exon (D-Nebraska), shared Hollings' concerns and said he feared a concentration of power 
would develop if the FCC had no authority to rule on cross-ownership matters. 
Gorton, who in representing the concerns of the NLC had opposed legislation in 
1982, praised the compromise and said he was satisfied with the bill's contents. 220 But not 
all cities represented by the NLC were satisfied with the agreement. When the first round 
of negotiations ended, the municipal regulator-types [ staff employees] took strong exception 
220 Broadcasting Vol. 104, No. 13, March 28, 1983, 86-87. 
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to the results that Royer engineered in response to Goldwater. According to Pols, "They 
then went to the US Conference ofMayors. The USCM became a repository for disgruntled 
regulators. "221 
On the industry's side, White felt there was also a split in the NCTA over objectives. 
Time-Warner was much more aggressive in trying to get things done -- they 
were always pushing. TCI [Telecommunications, Inc. ] wasn't big then; 
Time-Warner was more influential. . . But I just happened to remember that 
there was that split inside as to where they wanted to go. And Time-Warner 
was aggressive and they would hold independent discussions [lobbying] with 
people; pushing for things. 222 
Some examples of Time-Warner' s focus were consistent franchise structures, 
assurances of franchise renewals to end bidding wars whenever a franchise agreement was 
nearing expiration, and limits on what cities could include as remuneration in franchise fees 
The Compromise Begins to Unravel. After the committee postponed consideration 
of the bill, the NLC changed its position on the compromise legislation. Mayor Royer of 
Seattle wrote a detailed letter to Tom Wheeler, President of the NCT A on April 6 outlining 
major areas in the amended version of S. 66 that would have to be changed to obtain the 
NLC's continued support. 223 Basically, Royer' s letter showed that there were difficulties in 
application of portions of the agreement, for example, in the calculation of franchise fees 
within the five percent limit, and on matters not covered in the agreement. 
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NLC had problems with several sections of the bill and wanted them eliminated. 
One section they wanted taken out would have prevented the FCC from applying cross­
ownership restrictions. It wanted to eliminate the section that authorized the FCC rather than 
local authorities to establish rules and procedures for the use of access channels by the 
public, educational interests, or municipalities. A third provision it wanted removed 
prohibited the exclusion of financial instruments such as bonds, security funds, and letters 
of credit when calculating the five percent franchise fees. A fourth section to eliminate 
would prevent cable operators from obtaining personally identifiable information about cable 
subscribers. Additional problematic aspects included the voiding of existing franchise 
agreements, which would have required all franchise agreements to be reestablished under 
the new law. The section included restrictions on states and franchising authorities from 
exercising jurisdiction over matters of strict local concern as well as restrictions on the 
administration and enforcement of provisions in existing franchise agreements. 
In response to these developments, the NLC and the NCTA promptly returned to 
negotiations with the added assistance of committee staff members from both the majority 
and minority. An amended version of the agreement was written and on April 20, 1 983 it 
was fully endorsed by both the leadership of the NLC and the NCTA. Essentially, all of the 
changes wanted by the NLC were accepted by the NCT A and incorporated in the bill by 
committee staff. Those changes included: 1) eliminating a section that prevented the FCC 
from prohibiting ownership of certain cable systems so that the commission could continue 
to apply cross-ownership restrictions; 2) allowing franchising authorities and cable 
operators, rather than the FCC, to establish rules and procedures for the use of access 
channels; 3) permitting the collection of personally identifiable information about cable 
subscribers with prior written or electronic consent; 4) grandfathering franchise agreements 
in effect on the date of the bill's enactment which required a cable operator to provide 
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programming, services, facilities, equipment, or access channels; and 5) allowing states and 
franchising authorities to exercise jurisdiction over matters of strict local concern that were 
necessary for reasons of public health, safety, and welfare, including the terms and 
conditions for the granting of a franchise, as well as the construction and operation of a cable 
system. However, one section the NLC wanted eliminated, but was retained, was the 
inclusion of financial instruments such as bonds, security funds, and letters of credit in 
calculating franchise fee payments. This version of S. 66 was endorsed by Mayor Royer of 
the NLC and Tom Wheeler of the NCTA in a joint letter dated April 21, 1983. 
On that same day, the Senate Commerce Committee approved the revised S. 66 by 
a vote of 15-2. Senator Hollings' concerns about the bill were satisfied by removing 
language that kept the FCC from prohibiting certain cross-ownerships of cable systems. 
Only one amendment was added to the bill during the markup, and it was a clause granting 
franchising authorities the power to censor pornography. 224 
Although the bill fully reflected the compromise reached by the NLC and the NCT A, 
it still had significant opposition. The two senators who voted against the bill in committee 
were Frank Lautenberg (D-New Jersey), and James Exon. They believed the bill failed to 
promote competition. Provisions in the bill, as it passed the committee, precluded 
franchising authorities from considering competing applicants when renewing cable service 
agreements. Additionally, Exon disliked the bill because it allowed cable operators to 
provide data transmission services without state or local regulation. He viewed this as an 
unfair advantage over telephone companies who were subject to state regulations when 
providing these same services. He concluded that, in time, telephone companies would lose 
224 Broadcasting, Vol. 104, No. 17, April 25, 1983, 26. 
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this business to cable operators and would raise residential telephone rates as a 
consequence. 225 
Lautenberg and Exon were concerned about limiting the power of cities and local 
franchise authorities to consider competing applicants when renewing a franchise or 
removing an operator that had not lived up to a franchise agreement. Their concerns were 
shared by a dissident group of NLC member-cities. In particular, the larger cities of 
Cincinnati; Dallas; Denver; Fort Worth; Lexington, Kentucky; Miami; Nashville; New York 
City; the city and county of Sacramento; and Tucson all opposed the bill and lobbied, 
through the USCM, to have it amended on the Senate floor. 
Opposition Coalition Formed There were other organized interests that also were 
not satisfied with the committee's bill. The USCM convened a meeting of representatives 
of a number of cities and other critics of the bill which eventually led to the forming of a 
coalition opposing S. 66. The major members were the dissident cities, working through the 
USCM, AT&T, the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), 
the Telecommunications Research and Action Center, the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU), as well as educators, consumer advocates and the United Auto Workers {UAW). 
Members of the coalition saw a number of problems. One was that USCM had not 
been included in the negotiations that produced the compromise. Tom James, coalition 
spokesman and cable franchise administrator for Dallas, said the limit on franchise fee levels 
was not a major consideration for the bill's opponents. More importantly, the objection was 
that S .  66 would limit the ability of communities to ensure that cable operators provided 
adequate service at a fair price. In addition, there was concern that the bill would allow for 
i2s Ibid. 
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automatic rate increases by cable companies for basic service by up to five percent a year. 
Furthermore, another provision in S. 66 mandated cities to renew franchises if operators had 
substantially met the requirements of their franchise. Moreover, the members of the 
coalition representing educators, consumer advocates, the UAW, and the ACLU argued that, 
as written, the bill would limit community access to cable television channels and would also 
restrict the authority of local officials to hold cable systems accountable. 226 
AT&T was a late comer to the cable debate, and its concerns, which were outside the 
scope of the NLC - NCTA compromise, proved to be the most difficult for advocates of the 
bill. It objected to the portion of S. 66 that allowed cable system operators to provide non­
voice, non-entertainment, data transmission services without regulation. Since AT&T was 
subject to regulation by state public utility commissions when it provided such services, it 
believed the bill would give cable companies an unfair advantage in selling data­
transmission services. Furthermore, AT&T, at that time, was allowed to cross-subsidize 
residential telephone service with the larger profits earned in providing long-distance and 
special services. Such cross-subsidization was used to universally provide residential 
telephone service at affordable rates. AT&T argued that if cable operators could offer data 
transmission services in an unregulated manner they would do so at cheaper rates and 
thereby "skim-off'' the most lucrative of customers in this market. They contended that if 
cable "skimmed" the larger accounts, the cross-subsidies would be negatively impacted and 
residential telephone service rates would have to be increased, thereby threatening universal 
telephone service. In fact, soon after AT&T began lobbying against the bill, the National 
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners also expressed opposition to the bill. It 
wanted to maintain the authority of state regulatory commissioners to regulate data and voice 
transmission services regardless of who provided them. 
226 CQWR, June 18, 1983, 1237. 
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In early May, the Senate began to take notice of controversies associated with the 
bill. Senator Strom Thurmond (R-South Carolina), chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, announced it would hold a hearing to review antitrust implications of the bill's 
requirements to renew franchises and prohibit consideration of competing applications by 
franchising authorities when renewing contracts. Certain factions within the NLC asserted 
that the renewal provisions might possibly violate antitrust laws. This matter was later 
resolved to the satisfaction of Senator Thurmond when Packwood agreed to eliminate 
language from the bill which prohibited accepting competing applications during renewal 
proceedings. The· Judiciary Committee hearing was then cancelled. 
At about the same time, AT&T launched a lobbying campaign against the data 
transmission provision, gaining the support of senators James Abdnor (R-South Dakota), 
Mark Andrews (R-North Dakota), and Rudy Boschwitz {R-Minnesota). They feared that 
local telephone rates would increase for rural areas if an erosion of telephone companies 
revenues occurred because of competition with cable operators. So they wrote a letter to 
Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker asking to be consulted before the bill was scheduled 
for floor debate. In response, Packwood and Hollings modified the draft bill in an attempt 
to address AT&T's concerns. AT&T objected to the changes as not going far enough, 
although its representatives participated in negotiations on language. 227 
Meanwhile, supporters were still confident the bill would reach the floor of the 
Senate. Chairman Packwood and Commerce Committee members Goldwater, Ho111ings, 
Daniel K. Inouye (D-Hawaii), and Gorton reiterated their support for the bill by distributing 
a "dear colleague" letter to other members of the Senate.228 On May 21 ,  the Commerce 
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Committee agreed to the scheduling of the floor debate on S. 66 on June 13, with a vote on 
June 14. The postponement resulted partially from a threatened filibuster on the part of 
Democratic senators Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-New York), Howard Metzenbaum, and 
Frank Lautenberg. Supporters of the bill believed that the delaying action was engineered 
by AT&T and the dissident cities. 
Tom Wheeler of the NCTA was confident that amendments proposed by senators 
Packwood, Goldwater and Hollings adequately addressed the concerns of AT&T and the 
cities. Others, however, were not convinced. Abdnor was still worried about the impact that 
certain provisions would have on residential telephone rates as they were subsidized through 
universal telephone service policy. Therefore, he drafted two amendments that would 
counter the deregulation of cable-provided data transmission services by "insuring that all 
providers of telecommunications services share in the obligation of providing universal 
[telephone] service. "229 Lautenberg prepared an amendment to place the burden of proof on 
cable operators to show why a renewal should be granted rather than have a municipality 
prove why they should not be granted a renewal as the bill's language stated. Likewise, 
Senator Alan Dixon (D-Illinois ), was prepared to offer an amendment to delete the automatic 
presumption of renewal and shift the burden of proof to cable operators as well as deleting 
the provision that would grant automatic rate increases to cable operators. 230 All senators 
opposing the bill were Democrats, although not all Democrats in the Senate opposed it. 
Floor Debate on S. 66 
When the bill finally came to the floor on June 13, Packwood was the floor manager 
and Goldwater assisted throughout the debate. The major action during floor consideration 
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on June 14 was the Abdnor amendment to subject cable to the same state regulations as 
telephone companies. It represented the best hopes for the opposition coalition to defeat the 
bill. Although Abnor and Lautenberg ostensibly wanted to amend the bill to protect 
universal telephone service, the wording would have subjected cable TV operators to the rate 
regulations that telephone companies were under. 231 Had this amendment been accepted, it 
would have killed S. 66. Instead, the amendment was defeated 44-55. In its place, to 
address the stated concerns of Abnor and Lauthenburg, the Senate adopted a policy of 
promoting universal telephone service at reasonable rates to be subsidized by 
telecommunications companies. That amendment passed 97-0 and kept the bill alive. 
In further floor actions, the Senate also turned back an amendment sponsored by 
Lloyd Bentsen that would have grandfathered all existing contract agreements about 
regulated rates for all services. Bentsen' s amendment would cause any new requirements 
to apply only to franchise agreements created after passage of the bill, excluding, or 
grandfathering, agreements negotiated before the new law went into effect. It was defeated 
by a vote of 19-79. The bill, as reported from committee, allowed grandfathering of existing 
agreements that regulated rates for basic services for five years or half of the remaining term 
of the franchise agreement, whichever was longer. Additionally, the Senate voted 26-72 
against an amendment by Dixon that would have removed the automatic rate increases 
provided in the bill. Finally, the Senate voted 82-16 to table, or kill, another Dixon 
amendment that placed the burden of proof on a cable company to show that it had 
conformed with applicable law before its franchise was renewed.232 This was Dixon' s 
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attempt to undermine the renewal expectancy aspects of the bill which favored cable 
operators. 
Senate Passes S. 66 
On June 14, 1 983, the full Senate voted 87-9 to pass S. 66. However, the wide 
margin of victory for the bill did not reflect the hard-fought efforts of AT&T to defeat it. 
Cable operators, on the other hand, lobbied strongly for passage of the bill to gain some 
relief from what they felt to be overly burdensome and uncertain local regulation which they 
believed had stymied the development of their industry. The NLC also lobbied for passage 
of the bill because of its belief that it was their last best hope to retain some authority over 
cable operations in their communities. However, as events would proceed, the faction of 
discontented cities within the NLC and USCM would continue to work against passage of 
the measure. 
S. 66, as passed by the Senate, was essentially based on the compromise agreement 
negotiated between the NLC and the NCT A. The provisions that were favorable to the 
organized interests of cities authorized state and local governments to award cable 
franchises; allowed a local government to acquire a system at fair market value if a company 
defaulted; and allowed local governments to require access to channels for public, 
educational and governmental purposes. The provisions favorable to cable operators 
included barring any level of government from prohibiting ownership of systems because 
of owning other media; allowing cable operators to automatically raise rates by five percent 
a year; limiting to five percent of gross annual revenues the fees that cable firms would be 
required to pay; and requiring state or local governments to automatically renew a franchise 
except under limited circumstances. These favorable conditions for cable operators were 
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obtained in concert with the positions that they testified for, lobbied for, and negotiated with 
the NLC. 
Even though the bill finally passed the Senate, it still had opposition to contend with. 
Several major cities still opposed the bill, and a day after it passed the Senate, the USCM 
unanimously adopted a resolution criticizing the bill at a meeting in Denver. When the 
matter of regulation of cable television was taken up by the House of Representatives, the 
organized interests began to struggle again for the inclusion of their preferences in 
legislation. 
Support/or the Compromise Fades 
As the cable TV debate moved from the Senate to the House, support for the 
compromise among NLC member cities continued to wane. Even though at the annual 
meeting of the NLC in July, the board of directors reaffirmed its support for the compromise, 
it also noted the substantial concerns of a growing number of cities regarding various 
portions of the agreement. The NLC board then took the position that it would not oppose 
efforts on the part of some cities to alter the compromise, and that the NLC staff would 
provide technical assistance in those efforts. 233 
At that meeting, Sidney Stahl, who represented a number of cities on cable 
legislation, presented some of their views on the situation. He stated that: 
The League now finds itself in the uncomfortable position of having agreed 
to certain things in the compromise which a large part of its membership 
finds totally repugnant. The League neither wants, on the one hand, to 
renege on a deal, nor on the other hand, to embrace legislation which violates 
233 Nation's Cities Weekly Vol. 6, No. 34, August 22, 1983 1 - 6. 
the fundamental and sacred principles of all local and state governments. It 
is indeed a dilemma for the League. In one case, the League risks losing 
credibility with Congress; and in the other, it risks losing credibility among 
its members. 234 
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Stahl further stated that the foremost issue was the inherent right of local 
governments to retain jurisdiction over local matters. This issue was most significantly 
present in S. 66 regarding rate regulation at the local level. However, Stahl said, "Rates are 
not the issue. The issue is local control. "235 
Gradually, the position taken by the NLC began to change. At the time of the July 
meeting, over 150 cities had passed formal, official resolutions in opposition to S. 66. In 
addition, the U.S. Conference of Mayors and the National Association of County Officials 
had passed similar resolutions. A resolution was adopted subsequently by the NLC's 
Transportation and Communication Steering Committee at a meeting in Seattle on 
September 23 and 24, 1983 that appeared to reject the NLC-NCTA agreement. The 
committee recommended that the NLC should pursue cable legislation as long as three 
conditions were satisfied. First, legislation should not limit the options oflocal governments 
to regulate the rates charged by cable operators and that basic service should be defined by 
negotiations between cable operators and :franchising authorities. Second, maxtmum 
competition should exist in franchise renewals with no expectation or presumption of 
renewal on the part of incumbent franchise holders. Third, all existing franchises and all 
franchises in the proposal stage should be "grandfathered. " That is, existing franchise 
agreements would not be subject to the provisions of the law when it takes effect, but be 
234 Ibid 1. ' 
235 Ibid. 
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allowed to continued under provisions of agreements either in-place or being actively 
negotiated when the law is enacted. 236 
The House Considers Cable Television Legislation. 
While the Senate was preparing for and completing floor action, in the House, the 
Energy and Commerce Committee's  Subcommittee on Telecommunications prepared to 
hold hearings on its own cable television bill, H.R. 4103 . The first two hearings took place 
on May 25, June 22, even while support for the compromise was fading. The last of three 
hearings took place on November 3, 1983 . The first version of the House 
Telecommunications Subcommittee's bill had much the same language as S .  66. However, 
it did include a few additional provisions. The notable differences included provisions added 
by Wirth that required cable operators to set aside some of their channels for lease to 
commercial users ( similar to common carrier use), a ban on cross-ownership by newspapers 
or broadcast television stations, and a guarantee to cable operators of access to potential 
subscribers in multiple-unit dwellings. 237 
Chairman Wirth stated that he believed the major issues in deregulating cable TV, 
in addition to such matters as franchising and rates, included mandatory access to 
commercial leased channels and common carrier status for data transmission channels. 238 
Wirth felt that with access came diversity and that diversity of ideas is in keeping with the 
purposes of the First Amendment. Expressing his views on the concerns of AT&T, he 
stated, "Arguments by telephone companies that data transmission services offered by cable 
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operators should be regulated as common carriers do not belong in the debate about cable 
deregulation 11239 
Considering the S. 66 Compromise. The House subcommittee appeared to be less 
disposed toward the NLC-NCTA compromise than the Senate, although it figured 
prominently in the first two hearings. Early in the hearings, it became evident that the House 
intended to exercise independent judgment. 240 When testifying at the May 25 hearing, 
Mayor Royer of Seattle noted that, "At the urging of you, Mr. Chairman [Wirth] , Senator 
Bob Packwood, chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, Congressman Swift and 
others, the NLC and the NCTA decided to sit down to see if we could reach some agreement 
so that we could bring a skeletal compromise to you for legislation. 11241 The response of 
Representative Al Swift was, "Our role is to examine this [compromise] and be sure it is in 
the public interest -- and we will do that -- and I am sure we won't agree with everything in 
it any more than anyone else does. 11 He went on to say, "The time to compromise is when 
nobody can win clearly. If you wait to negotiate until it is clear you will lose you don't have 
much place from which to negotiate. 11242 Finally, Wirth added, "As I have said before, it 
seems to me that the compromise is a very useful framework, but the Congress is not in the 
business of asking outsiders to go out and draft legislation and just rubber-stamping that 
deal. "243 He also stated that R.R. 4 103 made a number of significant and substantial 
improvements over the compromise, especially with respect to leased access by program 
providers, or cable channels. 
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The concerns and leanings of members as reflected in their questions and comments 
began to reveal their attitudes toward the choices facing them. Wirth stated that the bill 
would have to embody two fundamental principles. First, it would have to provide an 
environment in which the cable industry could flourish so that the American public would 
benefit, and second, the legislation would have to incorporate the goal of assuring the 
American public of the widest possible diversity of programming and information sources.244 
On the second day of the hearings, Wirth addressed how to assure diversity through access 
to the electronic media by those other than the licensee or owner of the media. He believed 
this was one of the greatest challenges in establishing communications policy. Wirth stated, 
11 Access itself is not the goal; diversity is the goal. Access provides an effective means of 
meeting the goal, guaranteeing that a diversity of viewpoints can be heard without relying 
on rules or regulations concerning cable program content. 1124' In cable television there are 
two basic types of access provisions and thus two principal tools for assuring the public as 
wide a variety of information sources as possible. "The first category of access is public, 
educational, and governmental access -- known as PEG. The second form of access is 
known as leased or third party commercial access. Both forms of access are means of 
assuring information source diversity, which is clearly one of the key federal interests to be 
addressed by cable legislation. The legislative goal is to promote diversity, consistent with 
protecting the economic interests of the cable industry. 11246 
On the issue of cable competition with telephone, Wirth stated: 
Should cable's provision of telecommunications services be regulated? If so, 
how? The telephone industry has argued that cable should be regulated as a 
common carrier by the States. The fact is, however, that telephone 
244 Ibid, 292-293. 
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companies are not regulated because they transmit voice and data, but 
because they offer universal service as an effective monopoly. The cable 
industry does not have that kind of market power -- and should not be 
regulated like the telephone industry. Historically, the subcommittee has 
been very much on record related to market power and market share, and it 
seems to me the issue is a very different situation where one firm has one­
tenth or ten-tenths of 1 percent of the marketplace and another has 98 
percent. That is one of the very fundamental purposes of regulation to 
protect consumers from the excess of monopolies in terms of prices and 
output. When there is competition in the marketplace, then we do not need 
to regulate to prevent monopoly. 247 
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When Representative Ed Markey questioned Mayor Edward Koch of New York 
regarding the NLC-NCTA compromise agreement, he referred to, and seemed to support, 
federal legislation to promote localism. Koch opposed federal regulation of cable and 
preferred the status quo as it existed in New York City and New York State. 248 
Representative Matthew Rinaldo, speaking on the issue of the cable industry competing with 
the telephone industry at local level said, "The cable system [potentially] provides a service 
of the same sort that is being provided by the local telephone company. Should the cable 
system service be regulated in the same manner as the phone company service? As I stated 
at the last cable TV hearing, it seems to me that equity requires that similar regulatory 
schemes be imposed on all entities to the extent that they provide similar or identkal 
services. "249 
House Commerce Committee Chairman John Dingell, in a �tatement to the 
subcommittee, directed its members to consider the following questions: How to construct 
a regulatory system which would recognize the changes which had already occurred in the 
cable industry, yet would be forward-looking and not preclude the development of necessary 
247 Ibid, 976. 
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249 Ibid, 295. 
134 
regulation as the industry changes? How to assure fairness would exist for all participants? 
How to avoid the problem of the 1934 Communications Act which set up two categories into 
which every service had to fit, broadcast and common carrier, even though as the technology 
developed some services began to cross the line, such as cable? How to assure that cable TV 
would be as universally available to all citizens as the telephone had become?250 
It began to appear as though the compromise between the NLC and the NCT A was 
going to collapse. Soon after Wirth introduced H.R. 4103, NLC president Charles Royer 
wrote a letter to him outlining in detail the League's opposition to numerous provisions in 
the bill. The letter also stated that the NLC position supporting the compromise worked out 
with the NCTA in the spring would be reassessed by the full membership at the annual 
meeting in November. Royer noted that Wirth's bill failed to provide municipal franchising 
authorities with adequate authority to ensure diversity of information or to protect other 
essential interests of consumers. 251 
When the last of the three hearings was held in November, conflicting views were 
quite evident. Wirth's bill was severely criticized by Representative John Bryant, (D-Texas) 
and a good number of the witnesses testifying before the subcommittee. Bryant 
characterized H.R. 4103 as a "bail-out" for the cable industry and said he did not believe the 
industry had demonstrated a compelling need for federal preemption of the existing contracts 
between cable operators and franchising authorities. 252 Instead, he introduced an alternative 
bill, H.R. 4299, that would have allowed municipalities to retain their existing power to 
negotiate and enforce cable contracts. Because of differences between the language in H.R. 
lSO Ibid, 298-300. 
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4 103 and S. 66, the NLC opposed Wirth's bill. 253 Mayor Royer, speaking for the NLC, 
testified that H.R. 4103 had provisions that did not reflect the compromise that S. 66 was 
built upon. He said that language in Wirth's bill contained "adverse interpretations of 
ambiguous or incomplete provisions of the compromise. "254 Cities had become very 
concerned about three principal provisions of the bill. One freed most cable systems from 
rate regulation on all but the lowest tier of services. Another gave cable operators an 
expectation of renewal, and finally, still another allowed operators to renege on franchise 
promises in some cases when conditions changed substantially. Also Royer, following up 
on a letter he had earlier sent to Wirth, reminding him that support for the compromise 
among the NLC member cities was eroding and might disappear completely.255 
The U.S. Conference ofMayors represented the cities that were dissenting from the 
compromise worked out with the NCT A, and this was its first testimony in that role. Mayor 
Gregory Sparrow of DeKalb, Illinois, testifying for the USCM, said that the conference 
shared the goals of the legislation. But it believed that the goals could "be achieved without 
erecting a structure which, regardless of initial intent, had the end result of protecting the 
industry from the marketplace, and from itself. "256 
The NCT A defended the bill, and while it testified that H.R. 4103 was not a "bail­
out" for the industry, it did acknowledge that many cable operators had gotten into trouble 
because of promises made during franchise bidding wars. Also defending the bill, Stephen 
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Eftros, of the CATV A, said he believed it was needed to bring order to the industry on 
behalf of all. He said, "The absence oflegislation will be chaos. "2s7 
To further complicate passage of a bill, opposition by the telephone industry was 
presented by Robert Blanz, president of Mountain Telephone and Telegraph Co. He 
objected to the provisions that prohibited states from regulating cable as long as cable did 
not provide conventional or "switched voice" telephone services. Even though cable only 
intended to provide data transmission services and not voice transmission, he said since 
telephone companies are regulated by states, the exemption for cable operators would put 
the telephone industry at a competitive disadvantage. He believed the solution was to 
regulate all who provide the service or free all who contend in the market. To this end, 
Representative Swift introduced H.R. 4229 that would permit state regulators to have 
jurisdiction over cable systems when they provide data transmission services. 258 
Other organized interests also found fault with R.R. 4103 .  James MacNaughton, 
speaking on behalf of the National Satellite Cable Association {NSCA), representing satellite 
master antenna television (SMATV), testified against the provision that established a 
statutory right for cable companies to serve tenants in apartment buildings regardless of the 
landlord's wishes. This, he believed, would give cable a competitive advantage over 
SMATV service.259 Additionally, Sue Miller Buske, speaking for the National Federation 
of Local Cable Programmers, testified against the way the bill treated access to cable 
channel capacity for use by public, educational and governmental entities. The bill allowed 
only a "reasonable" amount of channel capacity for PEG access. She complained that the 
257 Ibid, 966. 
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bill did not define " reasonable," and that this would impede franchise negotiations and 
eventually end up in the courts. 260 
The only witness claiming to speak for the general public's interest was Jamie Love, 
representing Ralph Nader's consumer organization. Love testified that he believed that both 
H.R. 4103 and S. 66 would harm consumers. In his estimation, the bills were not truly 
deregulatory, but would create a world where entry was limited by a franchise award. Love 
testified, the House bill " is deregulatory in the sense that it relieves the cable operators of 
the obligation of increased services and lower rates, but it still retains the protection against 
competition. "261 
On November 16, 1983 the Telecommunications Subcommittee approved H.R. 4 103 
in a voice vote despite efforts by some committee members to delay consideration. 262 
Representative John Bryant had moved to delay the vote until December 6, 1983 so that the 
NLC's full membership could take a formal policy position on the bill. This motion failed 
by a vote of 9-5, but it was supported by Representatives John Dingell and James Broyhill 
(R-North Carolina), who were two key members of the full committee.263 Dingell was 
chairman and Broyhill was the ranking minority member, and as such, they were ex officio 
members of the subcommittee. 
Just prior to the vote by the subcommittee, a key amendment was accepted that 
established equal employment opportunity quotas in the cable industry. The amendment 
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reflected an agreement reached between Representatives Leland, Cardiss Collins (D­
Illinois ), and the NCT A. This provision in the bill would become an issue later when the 
Senate ultimately considered passage of the Cable Communications Policy Act after 
conference committee meetings in 1984. 
The subcommittee members who voted passage of the bill, such as Chairman Wirth, 
and representatives Leland, Swift, Jim Bates (D-California), Tom Tauke {R-Iowa), Michael 
Oxley (R-Ohio ), Edward Markey, Al Gore, and Matthew Rinaldo, believed that 
subcommittee action was necessary to force the cities to take a reasonable and responsible 
position on cable legislation.264 The vote was intended to "move on" with the legislation and 
the necessity for doing so was characterized by Tauke when he said, "If we wait around for 
the mayors to be happy, we are going to wait forever. 11265 
Differences Erode Compromise. But HR 4103 contained restrictions that the cable 
operators opposed, including a requirement that a percentage of channels on large systems 
be set aside for third-party commercial programming leased access. It would also prohibit 
cable system owners from owning other media properties, including daily newspapers in 
their home communities, required landlords to allow cable into their buildings only if the 
cable firm offered compensation under an FCC approved formula, and allowed cities to 
require public, educational and government channels on a cable system. 
After subcommittee passage of the bill, Alan Beals, executive director of the NLC, 
said that his organization was pleased to see that a number of improvements were made in 
the bill by the subcommittee. However, the NLC continued to have major problems with 
264 Ibid, 16. 
265 Broadcasting Vol. 105, No. 21 November 21, 1983, 29. 
139 
the bill in the particular areas of the restrictive definition of basic service, the provisions 
allowing the cable operators to renege on services and facilities required in franchise 
agreements, and the franchise renewal provisions. 266 Meanwhile, those city officials aligned 
with the USCM were still dissatisfied with the bill and, along with the telephone industry, 
. continued to oppose the legislation. 267 When the NLC convened for its annual meeting in 
late November, a formal vote was held on support for H.R. 4103. In that vote, the League 
formally withdrew its support for the legislation. It also adopted a formal resolution calling 
for significant revisions to the bill. 268 
Committee Members Urge Renewed Cooperation. Wirth began the task of renewing 
cooperative activities by the cities and the NCT A. He defended his bill during a luncheon 
speech at the NLC convention and chastised the League for abandoning the compromise269• 
Wirth said, "It is my own belief that the repudiation of your leadership's compromise is a 
result of enormous and often systematic lack of information about the bill, little awareness -­
if any -- about the changes the subcommittee recently made, little if any response to requests 
for assistance in making further changes, and perhaps most disappointing, a failure to focus 
on the big picture, on what is really important in this legislation. " 270 Wirth hit particularly 
hard on the lack of responsiveness by the cities. He said, "I have been asking city 
representatives since early this year to furnish the subcommittee with a specific legislative 
enforcement package. After months of asking we received a small package of enforcement 
266 Nation's Cities Weekly Vol. 6, No. 47, November 21, 1983, 16. 
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ideas from the League staff only the night before the subcommittee markup. "271 He also 
stated that when he asked the cities' representatives to help resolve disagreements over the 
bill's contents, he was told "there was no interest in cleaning up the bill. " Wirth reiterated 
that municipal authority over cable television was under serious challenge by recent FCC 
decisions that limited cable rate regulations and franchise fees, the massive lobbying 
campaign on the part of the telephone industry to treat all non-video cable services as 
common carrier activities subject to state regulations, and private lawsuits attacking the 
fundamental authority of cities to grant franchises. 2n He concluded by cautioning the cities 
that the best chance to resolve the matter was to improve legislative policy through 
congressional action, but that it would take participation and continued support by the cities 
themselves. 
When the NLC rescinded its support for the compromise worked out in support of 
S. 66 and voiced opposition to H.R. 4103, the NLC and the USCM, became united, thus 
ending their differences and enlarging the coalition opposing the bill. Because of this united 
opposition and the cities claims that the terms of S. 66 were too favorable to the industry, 
no further progress was possible in 1983 . 
Conclusion 
Regulation of the cable TV industry had evolved over many years. Since there 
existed no national policy on the regulation of the industry, and the FCC had at various times 
271 Ibid 
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been deemed without authority over the medium, regulation developed at the local and state 
level. Within this framework, the regulation did not evolve consistently across states and 
municipalities resulting in many dissimilar aspects. 
However, the technology associated with cable telecommunications became very 
sophisticated and the medium matured rapidly. The main example of this was the ability to 
transmit programming produced by cable owners and others over satellite signals. This 
development made cable TV systems a valuable commodity. Further development of the 
cable television industry was stymied due to difficulty in attracting the amounts of capital 
investment needed. This resulted from the uncertainty inherent in a collection of regulatory 
restrictions that varied from city to city. Cable TV system owners began to challenge some 
of the regulations in the courts and with increasing frequency, the courts reached decisions 
favorable to cable operators. This eliminated some by not all of the state and local 
restrictions. But still, a cohesive and comprehensive national policy was needed. At the 
suggestion of the courts and initiatives by cable TV industry interest, Congress sought to 
establish a national policy. 
The time was ripe for the cable TV industry to approach Congress. Deregulation had 
become the dominant policy choice in the economic regulatory arena. The best the industry 
could hope for was to be deregulated entirely and operate in a free market for video 
communications, but they would settle for a national regulatory policy under the authority 
of the FCC similar to that applied to the broadcast industry. As could be expected, the 
parties that stood to lose the most in such a regulatory change activated their organized 
interests to counter such a campaign. Municipalities and state regulators began to lobby for 
a national policy that would maintain the status quo and solidify the authorities they had 
structured over several decades. Using the argument that they were best suited to serve as 
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public "watch dogs" for consumers, cities and municipalities strove to maintain the revenue 
sources that they derived from regulating cable TV operators through local .franchise 
agreements. 
As the issue became more contentious between the main antagonists of cable TV 
operators and local governments, congressional leaders pressed the two sides to negotiate. 
After several iterations of compromise agreements, S. 66 passed the Senate on June 13 ,  
1983 . 
A vision of the movement toward deregulation begins to focus as the developing 
technology of cable TV intersects with institutionalized methods for dealing with 
telecommunications policy decisions. Before the maturing of cable television as a 
communications medium, the existing regulatory policy relied on a framework comprised 
of two main yet distinct approaches. One was telephone (and telegraph) which performed 
as common carrier services and were regulated as such. The other was broadcasting which 
used the air-waves, owned commonly by everyone, but regulated by the government. Both 
the regulators and the relevant industries were comfortable in this structure. The technology 
used for cable television is a hybrid of these two approaches and, therefore, fit into neither. 
So regulation became problematic because the existing policy approaches did not match well 
with the technology. Moreover, the dominant actors in the broadcast and telephone sectors 
of communications regulatory structures each wanted to share in the lucrative new sector. 
This also led to issue conflicts over whether the medium should be regulated at all 
since it did not fit into the existing policy framework. Because some attempts had been 
made to regulate at local and state levels, due to the use of public rights-of-way, a vested 
interest in continuing that relationship was created by municipalities. They attempted to 
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define the issues as one of consumers being overwhelmed by a monopolistic industry. 
However, legislators choose to define the policy issue in terms of the need for protection and 
nurturing of a developing new technology, one that operated as an under-dog when 
competing with the larger more dominant and mature broadcast industry that thrived in the 
existing regulatory policy scheme. 
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CHAPTER IV 
COMPLETION, AFTERMATH, AND REACTION 
As the second session of the 98th Congress began in 1984, cable legislation faced a 
difficult road. Expectations were that there would be an intense debate on the Wirth 
deregulation bill centered around the policy differences among the cable industry, those 
cities opposed to the measure, and the telephone companies. The full House committee 
appeared to be divided on the bill, although 23 of the 42 members had co-sponsored the 
measure. Complicating matters further, Representative Dingell, the chairman of the full 
committee, opposed the bill as approved by the subcommittee. 273 And, if a bill passed the 
House, it was expected that there would be a difficult conference because of substantive 
differences between Senate and House versions. 
The Legislative Struggle Continues 
Late in the session, cable legislation became law. In the process, the various 
contending interests were central players in crafting the compromises that always are at the 
heart oflegislative struggles, especially those that address complex and contentious matters. 
273 Broadcasting, Vol. 1 06, No. 1, January 2, 1984, 7 1 .  
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The measure's effects included some unexpected turns leading, very soon thereafter, to 
demands for a legislative adjustment. 
The NLCActs 
The NLC considered its fight over H.R. 4103 to be one of its highest legislative 
priorities for 1984.274 To that end, it promoted a grass-roots campaign by the cities in 
opposition to the bill as drafted. Its members were urged to make every effort to meet with 
their representatives in Congress as soon as possible to point out that the bill could 
potentially end all rate regulating authority for municipalities. Further, cities were 
encouraged to enlist the support of cable subscribers, church members, unions, and 
educational groups to express opposition to their representatives. City officials were urged 
to speak to organized service groups, fraternal organizations, and speak on radio talk shows 
as well as to generate support through local television appearances and press editorials. 
Through this approach of lobbying the general public, the cities hoped to capitalize on the 
fact that 1984 was an election year when congressional incumbents would be especially 
sensitive to concerns expressed at the local level. The driving force for this undertaking was 
NLC's belief that it was up against a powerful industry that was prepared to take every 
advantage of the deregulatory atmosphere that prevailed in Washington. 275 
Building a Coalition 
In addition to the campaign within its member cities, the NLC also sought support 
from other organized interests. Some of the organizations that joined the cities in opposition 
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to H.R. 4103 were: the National Association of Counties; the National Association of 
Regulatory Utility Commissioners; the American Public Power Association; the National 
Rural Electric Cooperative Association; the National Black Media Coalition; the American 
Library Association; the American Council on Education; the Consumer Federation of 
America; the Communications Workers of America; the AFL-CIO; and the National 
Federation of Local Cable Programmers. Also, organized representation of cities united 
when the USCMjoined the coalition with the NLC after their collective opposition to S. 66 
and H.R. 4103. 
The opposition was encouraged when Chainnan Dingell made an important speech 
at the January meeting of the USCM in Washington.276 The chairman reiterated his dislike 
for the bill as written, describing it as "unabashedly bad. " It did "not adequately address and 
protect the legitimate interests of municipalities and consumers. "277 This was followed by 
instructions to the mayors on how to lobby for their interests. Dingell believed they needed 
to strengthen their lobbying efforts and urged the USCM to present a united front with the 
NLC. He warned the mayors against speculating on whether or when the bill would be 
scheduled and ifthere would be a tremendous clash in the full committee. He also stated that 
ever since the NLC had reversed its position at its annual meeting in November 1983, it had 
been woefully ineffective in persuading Congress that the status quo was acceptable and that 
there was no need for cable television legislation. On the contrary, he reported that there 
existed substantial sentiment in his committee that there were very serious problems with 
regard to the granting, regulation, and renewal of cable franchises and that these problems 
were not being adequately addressed, because of a perceived lack of capability to address 
them at the local level. According to Dingell, it would be a very serious mistake to assume 
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that the bill would not be heard by the full Energy and Commerce Committee or that no 
cable legislation would be enacted in this Congress. He reiterated that the cable industry had 
demonstrated in the fight in the Senate that it was a "formidable adversary with a politically 
adroit trade association. "278 He then reminded the mayors that they and their allies had a 
fresh opportunity to present a unified case on Capitol Hill. 
Toward Resuming Negotiations 
While he was critical of the bill, Dingell did not take sides. He preferred a negotiated 
compromise between the major interests and proposed that the two primary parties -- the 
cities and the industry -- engage in good faith dialogue with the purpose ofreconciling major 
differences. But he warned the mayors that any attempts to delay negotiations would be 
unacceptable and suggested that the House committee's staff be allowed to monitor the 
talks. 279 As he concluded his speech, he stated his desire that the process go forward in a 
fair and balanced way, with neither side having unfair leverage. "The industry," he said, "has 
a legitimate fear that the cities might use any [negotiations] as an opportunity for delay, 
hoping to run out the clock and thus kill any cable legislation" in this session. "On the other 
hand, 11 he continued, "the message has been delivered to the mayors at various stages of the 
legislative process that you'd better make a deal and cut your losses because the train is 
pulling out of the station. "280 
278 These comments of Congressman John Dingell are paraphrased from the 
text of his speech before the Transportation and Communications Committee of 
the United States Conference of Mayors, January 6, 1984 as reprinted in Nation's 




The cable industry was beginning to sense that if the legislative effort failed, it could 
take its case to the FCC where the Mass Media Bureau was showing an eagerness to 
deregulate the industry. James McKinney, its chief, indicated that he would propose a rule 
making in the summer of 1984 to free cable operators from some municipal regulations. The 
NCTA also avowed that if the FCC didn't act, it would pursue the issue of local government 
regulation of the industry in the courts. 281 
On the other hand, the NLC took the position that if the FCC established rules on rate 
regulation, the courts would provide protection for them. The cities believed that the courts 
would conclude that the FCC lacked statutory authority under the Communications Act of 
1934 to regulate cable television directly. The FCC's rule-making proposal, they believed, 
was merely a pressure tactic. 
The cities received another push from Dingell in remarks to a congressional-city 
conference in early March. He again expressed his view that the Wirth bill was anti­
consumer and inequitable and reiterated his commitment to opposing and voting against it 
as it was then written. 282 He also told delegates to the conference that there was "no 
constitutional precedent and no reason for Congress to want to tell local officials how they 
can regulate an industry with such an impact on their localities. "283 In urging the resumption 
of negotiations, Dingell said that the cities should not be forced to surrender to an agreement 
if they could not live with it. Furthermore, he said, "Cities should negotiate from a position 
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of strength knowing that they, as elected officials, have more power of influence on 
Congress than any other group" if they used it.284 
It appears clear that Dingell intended to take the lead in passing cable legislation in 
the House. He showed that he preferred a negotiated compromise, but he also laid out the 
road map in such a way that the absence of such compromise would not stop Congress from 
formulating policy in this area on its own in a fashion that it saw fit. This last aspect surely 
established incentives for cities to participate in making the best deal they could. At that 
point, negotiations resumed. 
Another Round of Negotiations 
By the end of January, the NCTA, NLC, and USCM had agreed to another round of 
negotiations to resolve differences that were preventing consideration of legislation in the 
House. When negotiations commenced, the cities were interested in retaining regulatory 
authority over rate increases, service quality, equipment enhancement and the granting of 
franchises. They also opposed language in the House bill that allowed cities to escape from 
franchise agreements for unforeseen changes in conditions that would be determined on 
case-by-case basis. On the other side of the table, the cable industry wanted limitations on 
the amount of franchise fees that cities could charge and assurances of franchisee renewals. 
They opposed language that had been added to the House bill that required a percentage of 
channel capacity be made available for third-party commercial access. 
One significant departure from previous negotiations when the new round began was 
the cities' use of elected officials as negotiators. A negotiating team was named comprised 
284 Ibid. 
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of three members from USCM and three from NLC. The negotiators for the local 
government interests were: Dick Fulton, mayor of Nashville; Dick Callageri, mayor of 
Pittsburgh; Paul Zeltner, councilman and former mayor from Lakewood, California; Tom 
Volgy, vice-mayor of Tucson, Arizona, (he was the de facto chair for the group );Minette 
Trosh, councilwoman from Charlotte, North Carolina; and Carol Bellamy, council president 
from New York City.285 For Tom Wheeler, one of the industry negotiators, three people 
stood-out in his mind as having an impact on the negotiations. The first was Charles Royer, 
the Mayor of Seattle and President of the NLC. Although not one of the negotiators, he was 
closely involved. The second was Tom Volgy the city councilman from Tucson. (Mooney 
remembered Volgy as a man of somewhat "mercurial" temperament. "He used to get quite 
excited during some of these meetings, when we made a second deal."286) The third was 
Susan Herman from New York City, who accompanied Carol Bellamy and provided staff 
support. 287 
Prior negotiations for the first compromise were conducted with regulatory staff from 
a few cities and staff of the NLC. Since some of the larger cities that were not directly 
represented balked at the first compromise, it was believed that representation by elected 
officials rather than staff would result in a more acceptable outcome. Therefore, the NLC 
Board wanted elected officials to negotiate this round. As Jim Mooney recalled, 
This thing went through a couple of iterations. We negotiated a deal with 
Cynthia [Pols] and George [Gross] . But between the Senate concluding 
consideration of that bill and the House initiating consideration of that bill, 
in the winter of 1983-84, there was a revolt inside the NLC in which a lot of 
the people who were principals of the NLC -- you know, mayors, and so 
forth -- said that they just weren't going to take the deal. They didn't care if 
the NLC had negotiated it or not. So, we basically had to do it again" This 
28s Pols interview. 
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time while Cynthia and George were present, it was really with a group of 
four or five principles. 288 
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In this arrangement, the elected officials were expected to negotiate highly technical 
issues regarding cable television deregulation. 289 Pols remembered the negotiations as a very 
difficult process. "I was the technical expert but also the generalist. I was the only one who 
knew the legal side, yet we had to bring in this gaggle of people -- to be political on our side 
-- who didn't know the law or the legislative process, but we had to face people who devoted 
their entire lives [to representing the cable industry interests] ."290 Unlike the first round of 
negotiations, the cities would have 10 to 15 people at each session. In comparison, "after 
Wheeler left the NCT A, it was only Mooney with just his attorney; and he knew exactly 
what he wanted. "291 
We had this difficult process trying to get all those people to agree on stuff. 
All of these people were trying to deal with these nuanced [sic] issues of 
legislative language on the issue of regulation which wasn't something that 
was their natural bailiwick. We were very much at a disadvantage from a 
technical sense to be told you have to negotiate with these people and you got 
to use elected officials when they're [ cable industry] going to use their 
specialists. It was always hard for us to get our people there, [ on the Hill] 
and they had to be prepared to move on a dime to talk about cable. We were 
at an inherent disadvantage in the process and it was a process that was 
dictated by Congress. 292 
Cynthia Pols felt there were many intrinsic power inequities in the negotiating 
process. 293 She believed that was because "cities don't ever give campaign contributions. 
288 Mooney interview. 
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Whatever relationship cities' officials have are a question of loyalties and political 
relationships, not a financial one like the NCTA where they have established access to 
legislators. Plus once we reached an agreement -- we had a pretty detailed agreement that 
was close to legislative language, but it wasn't quite legislative language, and obviously it 
wasn't legislative history."294 At that point, it was all provided to committee staff people to 
tum into legislative language. They were on Wirth's staff and were 
"totally tight with the cable industry. They [staff] were going off and having 
fancy lunches while they were drafting the language -- getting clauses here 
and there -- that weren't supposed to be there and trying to change things and 
stuff that we hadn't talked about. Trying to get an advantage they weren't 
entitled to. We actually had to bring our negotiators in after the agreement 
was drafted to meet with Dingell to basically tattle on his staff people 
because they had been doing all these things for the NCT A and I couldn't get 
them to do the right thing." 295 
This round of negotiations was lengthy, taking place over a nine month period in 
1 984. At times the tone was strained. According to Jim Mooney, "There was very little 
lightness to those negotiations. There wasn't much camaraderie in those rooms. Frequently, 
in situations like that, the two sides can be pretty friendly with each other, on a personal 
basis. But that really wasn't the case in this instance. There was something about cable TV 
issues that leads . . .  that causes emotions to run hot. "296 This temper of the negotiations lead 
to an impasse in late March. The major sticking points were the franchise renewal and rate 
regulation provisions in the legislation. At that point, Mooney said that the NCT A would 
push hard for a bill, but would not accept just any bill. 
Eventually, a second compromise agreement was reached among USCM, NLC and 
NCT A on May 28. The compromise that resulted allowed cities to continue to regulate rates 
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29s Ibid. 
296 Mooney interview. 
1 53 
and service tiers for four years through franchises, rather than immediate preemption oflocal 
authority. But after four years from enactment, they would no longer regulate the rates 
charged to subscribers and the full deregulation of rates and tier structures would take effect. 
Other features of the compromise included an agreement on administrative due processes 
for cities to use in renewing existing franchise agreements and the continuation of existing 
franchise agreements regarding services, facilities and equipment. However, facility and 
equipment requirements for new agreements differed. Since the negotiators agreed to 
differentiate between franchise agreements either in-place, or in the final stages of 
negotiations, and ones that would be negotiated under any new legislation, the franchising 
authority would be entitled to establish minimum facility and equipment requirements for 
new agreements. It also allowed for negotiated contract modifications if circumstances 
beyond the control of the system operator warranted. Franchise fees would be limited to five 
percent of gross revenues from cable operations, and the federal government would be 
prohibited from restricting the use of franchise fee revenues by cities. For existing 
franchises, the franchising authority would be entitled to enforce customer service 
requirements. An important key provision of the proposed agreement was that all three 
parties, NCT A, NLC, and USCM, would support the compromise all the way through 
passage by the House and the House-Senate conference.297 Pols said she thought the 
compromise was "a fair package overall. "  Len Simon, speaking for the USCM, said, "Given 
the political situation and dynamics, this is the best deal we believe" could be achieved at 
the time. 298 That accord was unanimously agreed to by all of the negotiators representing 
the cities, but since the NCTA had not granted its negotiator authority to approve, it was 
approved by the NCTA board. 
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The House Bill Clears Committee 
John Dingell, was credited with bringing the parties back to the table and making it 
all happen. 299 Dingell said he would hold a markup on the bill in late June, but he also 
recognized that other issues could still impede the process. It was noted that several 
consumer groups had made it known that they were not entirely satisfied with the direction 
the legislation was taking, and it was expected that Bell operating companies would strongly 
oppose the bill and some of its provisions that allowed cable to transmit data without being 
subject to state regulations. 300 
On June 26, the House Energy and Commerce Committee reported H.R. 4103 .  The 
major change to the subcommittee bill was the inclusion of the compromise language created 
in negotiations between the NLC, USCM and the NCTA. No changes were made to the 
compromise and no language from other sources were inserted in the bill. 
Compromise Breaks Down Again 
Before the House bill could reach the floor, a significant event occurred that 
ultimately caused the collapse of the second agreement. Jim Mooney recalled that within 
a month of that deal being concluded, there was a decision by the Supreme Court, handed 
down on June 18, which tossed the deal into a "cocked hat," because it fundamentally 
undermined some of the legal assumptions about limits to the authority of the FCC which 
were the basis of the agreement. Although the bill as negotiated between the two sides was 
reported from the House Commerce Committee, that's as far as it went. Support for it had 
pretty much evaporated on both sides in light of the decision. In Mooney's words, "So there 
2
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we were at the end of June with everybody pretty much convinced that this process had 
ended inconclusively and unsuccessfully. "301 
The decision, Capital Cities Cable Inc. et al. v. Crisp, struck down Oklahoma's ban 
on cable transmission of wine advertisements. 302 What was most damaging to the 
compromise was not the issue of advertising wine, but rather the aspect of the ruling that 
affirmed the authority of the FCC to preempt state and local regulation of cable television. 
Even though Oklahoma did not prohibit the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages 
within the state, it did, in general, prohibit the advertising of such beverages. In 1 980, the 
Oklahoma Attorney General (Crisp) determined that the state' s advertising ban prohibited 
cable television systems operating in Oklahoma from retransmitting out-of-state signals 
containing such beverage commercials, particularly wine commercials. 303 Capital Cities 
Cable, Inc. and other cable op�rators sued in Federal District Court seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief when they were threatened by the state with criminal prosecution. After 
winning relief in U.S .  district court, it was reversed by the court of appeals. Capital Cities 
appealed to the Supreme Court. It held that application of Oklahoma's alcoholic beverages 
advertising ban of our-of-state signals carried by cable operators is preempted by Federal 
law. 304 The Court held that FCC rules permitted Oklahoma to regulate such local aspects as 
franchisee selection and oversight of system construction, but requiring cable operators to 
delete commercial advertising in signals carried in compliance with federal regulations 
clearly exceeded its limited jurisdiction and interfered with an area that the FCC explicitly 
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preempted.305 It was also held that Oklahoma's advertising ban was in conflict with FCC 
regulations requiring cable operators to carry signals from local broadcast stations in full, 
and FCC rulings permitting and encouraging cable operators to import distant out-of-state 
broadcast signals. 306 The Court's decision limited the scope of the local government 
involvement in cable television to responsibility for "non-operational aspects of cable 
franchising, including bonding agreements, maintenance of rights-of-way, franchisee 
selection and conditions of occupancy and construction."307 It held that the FCC had 
preemptive authority to assure the orderly development of new cable technology into the 
national communications structure. 308 With such a clear decision from the Court about their 
view of the limited authority of states and local governments while acknowledging the broad 
authority of the FCC, many in the cable industry wanted to abandon the legislative route in 
favor of pursuing their policy needs with the FCC. 
Within five weeks of the Crisp decision, the FCC added to the confusion when it 
issued a final rule in the Community Cable TV, Inc. , case, also known as the Nevada 
decision. The rule preempted vast numbers of state and local franchise agreements in ways 
that substantially deregulated cable TV operators. Bolstered by the Crisp decision, the 
FCC's final ruling, issued on July 25, 1984, included language that dismissed the NLC's 
petition for reconsideration on procedural grounds. This occurred despite the fact that the 
petition of the NCT A was accepted for consideration, even though it had not been filed in 
a timely fashion. That final ruling reiterated a November 8, 1983 ruling that limited state 
305 Ibid, 700-705 . 
306 Ibid, 705-709. 
307 FCC, Excessive Over-Regulation - CATV, 54 FCC 2d 855, 863 (1 975). 
30s Ibid. 
157 
and local regulation of rates to the first tier of service. 309 It also expanded the ruling to 
nullify all franchise requirements which required the provision of particular services. 310 The 
final ruling included a statement that, "Allowing market give-and-take to occur without 
adding government as an additional participant is the better course in fostering development 
of program services for the public. "311 
The combination of these rulings seriously jeopardized the compromise formulated 
between cities and cable operators. Many in the cable television industry now felt that they 
did not need to compromise with local regulators in the cities. Since the FCC was known 
for its pro-deregulation stance during the early 1980s, some NCT A member companies 
wanted to vacate the legislative approach completely and cast their lot altogether with the 
FCC for full deregulation. However, the NCTA board recognized that while the FCC was 
sympathetic to the industry at that time, future commissions might have a different 
perspective. The board ultimately supported the legislative approach to create statutory 
protection for the industry through statute law; something that regulatory agency rulemaking 
alone could not do. However, it no longer supported the bill as written. It sought revisions 
to H.R. 4 103 that were more closely aligned with the Supreme Court's Crisp ruling affirming 
the authority of the FCC to preempt state and local regulators. . Seeking these revisions 
effectively withdrew their support from the compromise. NCTA wanted less local authority 
over subscriber rates to reflect decisions by the Supreme Court and the FCC. It also wanted 
assurances of franchise renewal, restrictions on the use of franchise fees paid to local 
authorities and free access to multi-family dwellings and apartment buildings. 312 The NCTA 
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believed the cable industry was in a "no-lose" situation. If the legislation with the changes 
it sought to reflect the Crisp decision became law, it would have a solid regulatory 
foundation for building the future. If the bill were defeated, the cable industry could go to 
the seemingly friendly courts and the FCC to solidify the recent deregulatory rulings by 
seeking additional ones. 313 
City officials remained committed to legislation to establish their authority over cable 
franchises in light of the rulings by the FCC and the Supreme Court. To this end, the NLC 
board reaffirmed its support for H.R. 4103 at a July 1 3  meeting and called for immediate 
action by the House to pass the bill. 
The influence of the Supreme Court and the FCC as other institutional actors in the 
policy process had led to another breakdown in the legislative process. James Mooney 
summarized the situation succinctly when he said, "What happened, of course, was that the 
political and legal tidal wave set off by the Supreme Court's Crisp decision had swamped 
the legislative boat. "314 
Resu"ecting the Compromise 
Soon, however, caution overtook the cable industry. Concern developed within the 
NCT A that pressing hard for much more than was then in the bill would disrupt what had 
been a relatively smooth working relationship with Congress. Many were asking whether 
the NCT A could succeed with its new demands without alienating its key congressional 
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allies, especially Wirth who had authored the original House version. 315 While some in the 
NCT A believed they were in a win-win situation from a business standpoint because of 
deregulatory leanings in the courts and the FCC, others worried about the political aspects. 
If they could not adequately justify reneging on key points in a signed agreement between 
the NCT A and the cities, the industry's reputation on Capitol Hill and its ability to move, 
block, or influence legislation in the future could be impaired. 316 Cable companies were 
concerned about relying on regulatory rules and court decisions that could be reversed by 
future commissioners or judges. Many still desired regulatory protection written into the 
statute books, but protection now informed by Crisp. 
When the compromise nearly collapsed, Senator Goldwater attempted to revive the 
negotiations by repeatedly warning cities against abandoning the compromise process. In 
a speech before the NCT A in July, he had warned cities that if they reneged again on the 
compromise, he intended to use all of the resources at his command to ensure that the FCC 
deregulated the cable industry and preempted state and local regulations to the maximum 
extent allowed by its authority. 317 Seemingly ignoring Goldwater' s  threats, the NLC and the 
USCM told the NCT A in late July that they were not prepared to reopen negotiations on the 
bill on the industry's conditions. Further, they intended to push for passage of the legislation 
with or without NCTA's support. The NLC and USCM geared up to lobby Congress during 
the three-week recess from August 13 to September 5, 1984, and even cities that had 
opposed the bill prior to the compromise agreement were now pressing for its passage. 
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Wirth also continued to pressure both the cities and the NCT A to resume 
negotiations. He still felt there was time for both sides to bargain in their best interests. 318 
So the door on renewed negotiations had not been completely shut. James Mooney of 
NCT A said, "This bill has been pronounced dead by the trade press at least six times within 
the previous eight months. Each time, lo and behold, it emerged from the ashes. "319 
Additionally, Dingell issued a letter castigating the industry for "greed and arrogance" and 
threatened that the ultimate victim could be the cable industry itself 320 Yet another tactic 
intended to break the impasse was used by Goldwater. Following through on a threat he 
made in July, he wrote a letter, dated August 10, to FCC Chairman Mark Fowler, in which 
he expressed his anger with the cities for their unwillingness to negotiate changes to the 
House cable bill that the industry wanted in order to reflect the conditions resulting from the 
Supreme Court and FCC rulings . .  He told Fowler, "If we don't get legislation out of the 
House, I want you to throw the whole damn book at the cities and give cable everything you 
can under your power. I've never seen such double-crossing, double-talk and downright lying 
as I've heard from the cities. And, I think it's time we get the word across to them. "321 
The Third Negotiations 
The board of directors of the NCT A voted in early September to authorize Jim 
Mooney to again negotiate with representatives of the cities for legislative language 
acceptable to both sides. 322 While the vote was not unanimous, it was a strong indicator of 
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the desire to reach a viable compromise so legislation could be passed. Two provisions in 
the House bill that were particularly difficult to accept by some in the NCT A were the 
grandfathering of rate regulation for tiers and the continued regulation of and the structrure 
of tiers for four years after the date of enactment. A group within the NCT A felt that since 
the Supreme Court had, in the Crisp decision, affirmed the FCC's preemptive authority, 
which was followed by the FCC's quick exercise of that authority with its Nevada decision, 
that to give in on these issues in a legislative compromise would be retrogressive, given the 
industry's regulatory position vis-a-vis these decisions. But even with the lukewarm 
prospects of new talks, the chances of passing legislation were still small, as only three 
weeks remained until Congress was scheduled to adjourn. 
After the NCTA board indicated a willingness to modify some of its demands to 
entice the cities to resume negotiations, Packwood stepped up the pressure. He stated in a 
letter to the NLC that, "Next year may be too late. Our legislative schedule may prevent 
consideration of cable legislation, and in the meantime, the courts and the FCC may further 
define the limits of existing [municipal] regulations. "323 In addition, after the cable industry 
showed flexibility on the issues, Dingell, who had castigated the industry by letter and begun 
to favor the cities, strongly suggested to the USCM and the NLC that they resume talks with 
the NCT A. Yet another factor in the decision by the cities to renegotiate was the awareness 
of difficulties they would have in trying to pass the legislation without the support of the 
cable industry. Because the bill had to pass through the House Rules Committee before it 
could move to the House floor, and the NCT A had demonstrated that it had the political 
leverage to block actions in the Rules Committee, the NLC and USCM realized they would 
need to compromise. 324 It became a widely shared view that if a bill were to pass, it would 
323 Broadcasting, Vol. 107, No. 12, September 17, 1984, 3 1 . 
324 Ibid. 
162 
have to take place before the end of the legislative session. Next year would bring in a new 
Congress, and the process would have to begin anew, if there were interest in the 
committees. The courts and the FCC might not wait until the next Congress could enact 
legislation on cable telecommunications. Markey articulated this perspective when he stated 
on the floor of the House during final consideration of H.R. 4103 that, "One result of the 
deregulation mania is that unless Congress enacts a cable bill, the Supreme Court will do it 
for us."325 In Markey' s  view, cities and consumers would not be included in the Supreme 
Court's or FCC's considerations of cable TV policy. Mooney' s recollections agreed with 
that assessment of the policymaking environment at the time: 
That view was pretty much the prevailing wisdom through July and most of 
August. That's when people who are supposed to know their way around 
Washington earn their money, and I earned my money. We got together 
again, this time with Cynthia and George only and cut the deal that became 
the 1984 Cable Act; that was in early September. Everybody understood that 
not only did we have to move that bill fast, because the session was coming 
to an end, but you had to move it fast because the shelf life of these things 
had proved to be very short. Unless you got the damn thing enacted fast, a 
new group of dissidents would spring up on one side or the other and start 
picking it apart. 326 [Emphasis mine.] 
The renewed negotiations did not always run smoothly. Even though the NLC and 
the USCM had authorized their negotiators to approve any deals worked out, at least 
preliminarily, the NCTA required approval by its board of directors, meaning no final 
authority resided with Mooney as the negotiator. The negotiators reached an agreement on 
September 19, but it was rejected by the NCTA board because some of the larger cable 
system operators did not believe they really needed to compromise. They believed both the 
courts and the FCC were on their side. The board's action prompted Dingell to issue a 
strongly worded statement condemning the cable industry's "intransigence at the bargaining 
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table" and expressing "only anger and disappointment at the greed and arrogance of those 
leaders of the industry who have tied the hands of the negotiators. "327 But on September 24, 
the NCT A board approved a new position which incorporated the key provisions of the 
NLC-USCM proposal. 328 Thus, by September 29, 1984, cities and cable TV operators had 
agreed to their third compromise on cable television legislation. The compromise focused 
mainly on H.R. 4103 's provision to grandfather rate regulation of basic tiers of service and 
franchise aspects that prohibited cable operators from removing programming from the basic 
tier until four years after the law went into effect. The cities accepted the NCT A' s offer for 
a more limited grandfathering provision to protect systems that had already repackaged and 
repriced as a result of the FCC's Nevada decision. In return, the NCTA accepted the cities' 
offer to reduce the period of continued municipal rate regulation from the four years 
contained in H.R. 4103 as it passed committee to two years. 329 
House Passage, Conference, and Enactment 
The bill was scheduled for a House vote the first week in October. Then a procedural 
compromise was formulated that allowed the measure to be brought up under suspension of 
the House rules. This meant that debate would be limited to 40 minutes and amendments 
could be offered only by the chairman of the Energy and Commerce Committee, Dingell, 
or Wirth as the chairman of the Telecommunications Subcommittee. In return, a two-thirds 
vote was required for passage. Opposition to the bill was expected to come by way of attacks 
from the telephone industry over the issue of regulating data transmission services and from 
the real estate industry over language regarding access to apartment buildings and other 




multi-family dwellings by cable operators. 330 However, the opposition was resolved through 
last minute negotiations with those interests. 331 
A compromise amendment negotiated by Swift resolved the telephone industries 
opposition. Wirth explained the change in summarizing the bill on the floor. 
Concerns expressed by the telephone industry with the original draft were 
addressed and resolved during full committee consideration. To resolve the 
concerns of the telephone industry, a compromise amendment by Swift 
narrowed the definition of cable service and was adopted by the full 
committee. 332 
Rinaldo further clarified the compromise, "The Swift amendment limited the 
definition of cable services to only include the type of video and other general programming 
that are available to subscribers. "333 Additional language favorable to the telephone industry 
was described by Dingell, language that addressed "protections for telephone companies 
regarding cross-ownership and pole attachment rules. "334 Dingell stated that there was no 
remaining formal objections from the telephone industry. The opposition from realtors 
stemmed from a provision that prohibited owners of multi-family dwellings from preventing 
of interfering with provision of cable service to residents. That opposition was eliminated 
when Wirth and his staff deleted the section from the bill. 
Other changes to H.R. 4103 after it was reported by the committee were explained 
briefly by Wirth. "Under the most recent compromise agreement between the cities and 
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cable industry, municipal rate regulation for basic service is grandfathered for two years, but 
cable operators cannot be forced to retier, replace, or reprice services which have already 
been lawfully changed. "335 The version considered on the floor would deregulate the rates 
charged for basic cable service in two years in order to allow market conditions to dictate 
prices compared to the reported verison that had a four year transitional period for municipal 
rate regulation. 336 
Several other changes also were made. These included clarifying renewal provisions 
whereby franchising authorities and cable operators could agree to renew a franchise without 
implementing administrative procedures and protection for cable operators against "unfair 
denial of the franchise. "337 A provision was added to allow the FCC to grant waivers to 
telephone companies allowing them to own cable systems where cable service would 
otherwise be denied to local residents. A clarification was made in the equal employment 
opportunity provision providing that a finding of failure to employ members of minority 
groups and women at the prescribed parity levels did not by itself constitute a violation. 
Additional clarifications addressed provisions that authorized the receipt of satellite cable 
programming for private viewing by individuals, at Gore's behest, and a provision extending 
the time for appeals of state pole attachment rules to at most 3 60 days if authorized by state 
rules. In all, there were sixteen clarifying amendments that changed the bill from the version 
reported by the House Energy and Commerce Committee. 338 
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The House passed H.R. 4103 by the required two-thirds margin on October 1 ,  
1 984. 339 Describing the major thrust, Wirth characterized the bill as setting "forth franchise 
procedures and standards to encourage the growth of cable and to ensure that cable systems 
are responsive to the needs and interests of the local communities they serve. "340 
The differences between H.R. 4103 were notable. S. 66, as passed by the Senate, 
included provisions on regulation of rates and services that allowed for franchising 
authorities to regulate rates for basic cable services for five years following enactment. 341 
Others included provisions on renewals, unauthorized interception of[stealing] cable signals, 
protection of subscriber privacy, and finally, restrictions on the regulation of basic cable 
services, facilities, and equipment. 342 
Since the Senate had passed S. 66, the House was also considering that bill. Wirth 
moved to amend S. 66 by replacing all language after the enacting clause with the provisions 
ofH.R. 4103 that had just passed the House by two-thirds vote. 343 In this action, the House 
approved S. 66 as amended by its bill H. R. 4103 .  Next, the House and Senate appointed 
conferees to resolve differences in the two versions of S. 66. 
In the Senate, appointment of conferees was blocked by the opposition of several 
conservative senators led by Senators Orren Hatch (R-Utah), and Jesse Helms (R-North 
Carolina), who objected to equal employment provisions championed by Representative 
339 Ibid, 27987. 
340 Ibid, 27975 . 
341 Ibid, 27987-2799 1 .  
342 Ibid. 
343 Ibid, 27989. 
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Mickey Leland, who negotiated them with cable lobbyists. The guidelines were similar to 
existing FCC regulations, but the Senate Republicans objected to what they viewed as 
quotas. They used a Senate tradition of putting a "hold" on the bill to delay action. On 
October 5, the bill's sponsors, Goldwater and Packwood agreed to strike the affirmative 
action section. That prompted Senator Metzenbaum, a supporter of the provision to place 
a counter-hold. On October 1 1 , Representative Leland and other House backers agreed to 
drop all references to percentages of jobs to be filled by women and minorities. Instead, new 
language strengthened the FCC's power to enforce its then current regulations regarding 
affirmative action. According to a Wirth aide, the passage of the '84 Act was a "battle­
royale;" 
At the last minute the conservative Republicans -- Jessie Helms-types -­
suddenly discovered that this law contained the strongest affirmative action 
provisions anywhere in any federal law. They said : Oh my God!  What are 
we doing here? Had you been there, you would have seen Tim Wirth, 
physically, getting the papers from the Senate and walking them to the House 
so that the bill could be passed. And had he not done that, and basically, 
bludgeon -- not committee staff, but official floor staff, people to hurry up 
and get the papers and stuff -- it wouldn't have passed ! Just as an example, 
the bill passed because at 1 0  o'clock that morning, a deal on affirmative 
action was reached with Orren Hatch. It required Wirth to expend an 
enormous amount of political capital to gain the support needed. 344 
The law passed both houses on October 1 1, the last day of the session, after House 
Democrats and Senate Republicans resolved differences over an affirmative action 
provision. 345 
Observations and Reflections 
Clearly, the enactment of a national policy for cable television was not a 
straightforward affair. There were many starts and stops. It seems evident, however, that 
344 David Aylward, personal interview by author, Washington, D. C., April 28, 
1998 . 
345 CQWR, October 13 ,  1984, 2670. 
168 
the largest single factor that finally lead to passage was the strategy of focusing on cable 
telecommunications in a specific manner rather than to include efforts to establish cable 
televison policy within broader legislative actions intended to completely rewrite the 
Communications Act of 1934. When the broad, comprehensive method was attempted, there 
were too many other controversial issues to block enactment for reasons unrelated to cable 
telecommunications. The focused approach allowed the main antagonists · to compromise 
on provisions in a fashion that gave neither all that they wanted but yet provided for the most 
favorable outcome that could be expected in the governmental policymaking environment 
of the time. It also allowed certain peripheral issues such as copyright payments and "must­
carry" rules to be sorted out in separate legislative actions in a manner which avoided 
undermining the efforts to clarify and establish a national cable policy. 
The new policy did involve other institutional changes that would soon come to the 
fore. As LeDuc was to observe later, the legislative language of the Cable Communications 
Policy Act of 1984 seemed to have established that Congress had reserved the right to 
preempt any state or local regulation it considered to be in conflict with federal mass 
communication policy.346 By deregulating basic cable subscription fee controls and 
establishing a nationally uniform procedure for franchise renewal, the federal government 
seemed intent on expanding its jurisdictional base in an effort to free the cable industry from 
I 
as many of the varied franchise requirements as it could. "To accomplish that objective, the 
federal government used an incremental process that would eventually deprive state and 
local governments of any meaningful role in the regulation of cable telecommunications. "347 
346 LeDuc, Beyond Broadcasting, 1 5 1- 1 52. 
341 Ibid. 
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Moreover, the FCC's direct authority over cable TV as granted in the act strengthened 
the capacity of the commission to use preemptive federal authority to diminish the role of 
state and local governments in the field of cable regulation. There was reason to expect that 
it would be used not only by the FCC but also by countless cable and pay-TV operators and 
by satellite-dish retailers and owners, who would claim under the act the same rights in order 
to attack a broad range of state or local operating restraints in the federal courts. 348 
Who Won and Who Lost? 
When a piece of legislation that is hard-fought by such polarized representation is 
finally enacted, the inevitable question is, "Which interests won and which ones lost?" 
Packwood addressed the question by saying "Clearly, cable TV was the winner on 
deregulation. "349 From the perspective of the cities, Pols thought it ended up a 50-50 
situation. "Cable did well with rate deregulation. Cable was content. Cities were content 
initially, then the rates started to go up and up and up. In 1987 and 1988, cable rates started 
to re-emerge as a problem. "350 
Cable TV Industry 
Speaking for the cable industry, Tom Wheeler reflected on the question saying, "I 
hope we were the winners. It was a landmark piece oflegislation. "351 He believed the cable 
348 Ibid, 173 . 
349 Packwood interview. 
350 Pols interview. 
351 Wheeler interview. 
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industry was by far the winner because uniform policy was established. "The cable industry 
finally held its nose and lost on some issues because of the greater good being served by 
uniform policy being established. A couple of examples [where we lost] were the lease 
access provision, . and Chairman Wirth wanted a provision for requiring access to a 
percentage of channel capacity based on system size. "352 More favorably, on the issue of 
franchising fees; there was a franchise fee cap put at three percent to five percent which, it 
was widely accepted to mean, de facto, five percent. This was virtually an increase in fees 
for all franchising authorities. "But it was clear that the cities would sign nothing that didn't 
have that kind of cap in it. When you're running a multi-billion dollar business, five percent 
of your gross is a LOT of money."353 These were the kinds of things where the industry had 
to hold its nose and swallow hard. But, still the overriding necessity for the cable industry 
was to have some kind of uniform federal policy. 
Jim Mooney, who followed Wheeler as President of the NCTA, said he thought the 
cable industry won in 1984 because "the cable industry was able to make a good case that 
it offered the promise of improved television service in the United States;" that it offered a 
greater diversity of programming choices to people at relatively modest costs. It 
successfully made the case that "its development was being hampered by the demands of 
local franchising jurisdictions, who traditionally had been the licensing authorities for cable 
systems, for all kinds of freebies and for gold-plated systems that were basically, 
uneconomical. "354 He believed that the industry convinced Congress that something had to 
be done to rein in the power of local franchising authorities because they had so complicated 
3S2 Ibid. 
353 Ibid, emphasis Wheeler's. 
354 Mooney interview. 
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the business with uneconomic requirements and other difficulties. "If the technology and the 
medium was to be able to grow and develop and flower," relief was essential.355 
Senator Packwood attributed the cable industry's success to their attitude. "Here's 
something they passionately wanted. And passion is underestimated. "356 He did not view 
the cable TV question as a truly large public issue. "It's not a major issue, it's not a Viet 
Nam. In a climate of deregulation -- and certainly on the Commerce Committee at the time 
-- they were pushing for deregulation. "357 And they were pushing at a time when it was 
harder and harder to defend the theory of scarcity. "Certainly on cable it was hard to defend 
the theory of scarcity. There was no scarcity of cable. Scarcity was disappearing as a 
rationale. So they [ cable industry] wanted it badly, and there was less strong opposition. "358 
In Packwood's recollection, the cities wanted the money and they wanted the power. 
Cities 
Ward White saw cities as the losing interests in the enactment of cable deregulation. 
"But, in the end, I don't think the cities lost that much. The cities might have lost some of 
their regulatory controls but they complained that consumers were still holding them 
responsible for rate increases. They couldn't do anything about it but they had to take the 
rap. I suppose they could thank themselves. "359 White remembered that the subcommittee 
355 Ibid. 
356 Packwood interview. 
357 Ibid. 
358 Ibid. 
359 White interview. 
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staff didn't pay too much attention to the cities. He recalled that some of the subcommittee 
members did for personal reasons, but, it was not the staff's concern to look out for the cities. 
We were more concerned with the authority exercised by the cities and the 
idea that the cities and the cable industry were involved in a lot of very shady 
deals here in the franchise wars and people were not happy with that. There 
was a real effort at that point to take the authority away from the cities 
because of that and that's one of the things that helped originate this 
legislation in the first place. That was a different [time] back in the late 70s 
and early 80s. 360 
Broadcasters 
Describing the National Association of Broadcasters perspective, Jack Goodman, 
NAB's Vice President for Public Policy, said, "In 1984, the cable industry was clearly the 
big winner, although they had to give up certain things to the cities ." For the most part, they 
got the cities neutralized and made it much, much more difficult for the cities to impose 
onerous conditions on franchise renewal. "It made it much harder for them to even 
challenge a franchise renewal. And they [NCTA] got price deregulation -- a major, major 
victory in 1984. "361 Broadcasters also lost in their attempts to get "must carry'' provisions 
in cable legislation. The Courts had too recently struck down such requirements as 
infringements on First Amendment rights of cable operators. 
Telephone Industry 
Regarding the telephone industry, Ward White believed, 
The telephone industry, to some extent, was a loser because they were 
permanently kept out of cable. Not that they would have gone into it, but 
that they were kept out probably delayed their serious consideration of 
getting into the video marketplace as a result. But they had a lot to do at the 
time with the divestiture and all the other changes that were taking place in 
360 Ibid. 
361 Jack Goodman, personal interview by author, Washington, D.C., July 1 8, 
1997. 
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the industry. They probably were losers. They were always trying to get 
their pound of flesh out of everybodt. They complained that they were left out but they didn't try to get in on it. 62 
The issue of most interest to the telephone industry was the potential for cable 
systems to carry non-voice data transmissions. They did not want so much to exclude cable 
from the market as much as they wanted to assure that the same regulations would apply to 
cable systems carrying data transmission as did the phone companies. They did not want 
cable to get what they viewed as an unfair advantage if cable were not subject to the same 
state fee regulations for common carrier services. They attempted to get language in the 
bills that would effectively subject data transmission services by cable operators to the same 
requirements as phone companies. 
According to White, one strategy that did not work well for the telephone interests 
is that they set-up an organization called BellCore for joint marketing purposes, but also to 
lobby. "It had a legislative operation, supposedly, representing all the Bell Companies who 
owned Bell Core. "363 The Bell Companies were attempting to get what they could out of this 
bill, even though this organization is not listed among hearing testimony. This strategy 
failed when Pacific [Bell] lobbied members on their own "which irritated the hell out of 
everybody else in the telephone industry. "364 
Consumers and Pole Attachments 
Consumers were not mentioned by any interviewees as either winners or losers at the 
time of enactment of the law. However, it was a consensus that after full implementation 




of the bill took effect in 1987, that rates rose at a consistently steep rate. At that point, many 
consumers believed they had lost in the deregulation effort. Certainly, interest groups that 
claimed to represent consumers, such as the Consumer' s Union and Ralph Nader' s 
organization, believe from the onset that consumers were losers when deregulation was 
enacted. 
Another issue that received attention early in the efforts to develop cable television 
policy was that of pole attachment regulations. When local governments and cable operators 
were first encouraged to participate directly in the legislative process, pole attachment rate 
abuse was an important issue to operators. This can be attributed in part to the pending 
expiration of laws that addressed pole attachment availablility and rates. However, as the 
development of legislation waxed and waned, the issue of regulating pole attachment 
agreements and rates evaporated from the agenda. The issue was dealt with by separate 
legislation that renewed existing pole attachment laws before the 1984 Act passed, thereby 
eliminating the question from consideration in cable deregulation efforts. 
Other Views 
Another slant on the question of "who won and who lost" was provided by David 
Aylward, a former chief counsel and staff director for the Telecommunications 
Subcommittee. For Aylward, the question was how the "prevailing political winds were 
blowing?" 
The biggest underlying theme for the politics [ of the issue] and runs from '7 5 
through the passage of the Act in '84, is cable [viewed] as the underdog. 
Cable as the new kid on the block; cable as the potential solution to the 
monopoly of the networks. Cable as the solution to the arrogance of the 
networks, and whether it's violence or politicians fearing three people 
controlling news or whatever. 365 
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In Aylward's view, with the legitimation of cable as a competitive television 
medium, the broadcast networks lost some of the perceived power they were believed to 
have through their ability to control the presentation of political news. 
Aftermath of Deregulation 
Full implementation of deregulation under the 1984 Act was not in place until 
roughly 1987, but by that time pressure from the public for reregulation had already begun. 
That pressure came in the form of complaints to elected officials that the cable industry's rate 
increases, as well as service deficiencies, were unacceptable. Furthermore, in late 1989, the 
Congress began to consider reregulation of cable TV in response to growing complaints 
about the cable industry's excessive control of the market for programs. By then, the major 
foci of the legislative efforts were to both reregulate cable subscriber rates and bring control 
over monopolistic vertical and horizontal integration within the cable industry. 
Consequently, the Cable Communications Policy Act became more of a beginning than an 
end in itself 
Cable Advances 
In the aftermath of legislative enactment, the cable industry's position was solidified 
by FCC decisions implementing the new law and by several judicial decisions advantageous 
to it. 
365 Aylward interview. 
176 
The Federal Communications Commission. After enactment of the 1984 Cable TV 
Act, cable deregulation rules were implemented by the FCC on April 28, 1985, when rate 
regulation and other provisions of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 began. In 
response to public complaints about the cable television industry after deregulation, the FCC 
modified the criteria for determining effective competition for cable operators. Their new 
criteria established effective competition as either: (1) the availability of six unduplicated 
broadcast television signals in the community or (2) an independently owned, competing 
multichannel video delivery system available to 50 percent of the homes passed by the 
incumbent system and subscribed to by at least 10 percent of the homes passed. However, 
this effort on the part of the FCC to redefine effective competition did not adequately 
diminish the complaints of excessive market control. Under the six-signal rule, the bulk of 
cable subscribers were still dependent on unregulated services. 366 One significant note is that 
when the 1992 act ultimately passed, it included a definition of effective competition that 
was more stringent than the six-signal test devised by the FCC. 
In October, 1985, under authority of the 1984 Act, the Commission eliminated 
technical signal quality standards for cable TV systems. The FCC would retain authority so 
local authorities could not impose technical standards more rigid than federal. 367 This 
agency action was viewed as a win by the cable industry and a loss by local government 
interests. 
Such steady advances by the cable industry attracted the attention of television 
broadcast interests. On March 24, 1988, a Notice of Inquiry was issued by the FCC 
366 Leland J. Johnson, Toward Competition in Cable Television (Cambridge, 
Mass: The MIT Press, 1994), 6. 
367 FCC Docket, MM Docket 85-3 8. 
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requesting data, empirical studies, and other information concerning the availability of 
broadcast signals on cable television systems. The commission sought information on any 
specific harms that broadcast stations may have experienced as a result of not being carried 
on a cable system within its service area or of being carried by a cable system on a channel 
number other than which it broadcast over the air.368 Apparently, this action resulted from 
broadcast interests attempting to bring the regulatory powers of the FCC to bear on the cable 
industry. Then, in August 1988, the commission requested further comments on a proposal 
to eliminate the rule which prohibited common ownership of cable TV systems and national 
television networks. This was viewed as a victory by broadcast networks over cable 
interests. 
But the rapid growth and integration of cable operations under deregulation also 
brought negative regulatory action. The Time-Warner merger formed a cable television 
entity with both the capacity to create programming and the cable franchises to distribute 
it. 369 This caused executives from network affiliates and independent TV stations to fear an 
"increased blurring of the dividing line between cable TV and broadcast TV_
,
mo To them, 
the idea of cable operators setting up independent streams of programmng was a new and 
serious threat. The FCC reacted in 1988 by imposing a syndicated exclusivity rule to protect 
local broadcasters and the value of syndicated TV programs they purchase from cable 
carriage . 371 It guaranteed local stations exclusive showing, in their geographic areas, of 
reruns and other shows when purchased on an exclusive basis. 
368 FCC 54"' Report, :M?\1 Docket 88-138, March 24, 1988. 
369 Peter Newcomb ''Norman Lear, Meet Adam Smith" Forbes; Vol. 144, Issue 




Regarding telephone ownership of cable services, one of the things the FCC did 
when implementing the 1984 Act was take the cross-ownership language from it and apply 
it through a footnote to prevent any kind of telephone ownership. According to White, 
"Telephone cross-ownership hadn't necessarily been contemplated by the Congress -- they 
[FCC] went beyond what they should have." This tact by the FCC provided added incentive 
for telephone companies to seek TV reregulation in the late 1980s. "Early on I was one of 
the people that motivated, started agitating to change the FCC's rules which we got changed 
in a 1988 [FCC] decision."372 
Judicial Actions. Following enactment of deregulation, the cable industry also 
benefitted from favorable rulings by the courts. One case involved Preferred 
Communications' denial of a franchise to expand cable service to a particular neighborhood 
in Los Angeles , California. Preferred challenged the exclusive franchise system, claiming 
it violated the company's First Amendment rights. Exclusive franchises were common 
nationwide, so the case was important to both cable TV and to cities . At first, a federal 
district judge dismissed the case, finding that the First Amendment did not apply as argued 
by Preferred. But in March, 1985, the 9th U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed and 
reinstated the lawsuit . To the cable industry, the appeals court decision was one more step 
toward recognition of cable TV as a form of "electronic publishing'' meriting the same 
constitutional protections that newspapers enjoy.373 On June 3, 1986 the Supreme Court 
issued its decision in Los Angeles v. Prefe"ed Communications.314 Ruling 9-0 in favor of 
cable, the Court found that cable TV operators have First Amendment rights but declined 
372 White interview. 
373 Krasnow, "The Process of Broadcast Regulation. " 
374 City ofLos Angeles v. Preferred Communications 476 U. S. 488 (1986). 
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to define their scope until lower courts decided whether a city may grant an exclusive 
territorial franchise to a single cable company. 
In another case, just a few months after the 9th Circuit ruled in Prefe"ed, the U. S .  
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia struck down federal rules requiring cable 
operators to retransmit the programming of all local television stations operating within their 
service area. In 1985, in Quincy Cable TVv. FCC,31s the court concluded that the FCC's 
regulation requiring cable TV systems to carry certain local TV stations was 
unconstitutional. This court case was viewed as a win by the cable industry with respect to 
the broadcast industry. The court said, these "must carry'' rules, in effect for more than 20 
years, violate the First Amendment freedom of cable TV operators. 376 The FCC did not 
appeal that decision. But the NAB did ask the Supreme Court, without success to review 
and reverse. This, too, was a victory for the cable industry and a loss for broadcasters. 
However, White said, "Must carry developed later on as more of an issue. As the more cable 
improved, the more broadcasters were concerned about it. "377 
The FCC amended its rules in light of Quincy. These, too, were challenged. In 
December 1987, the Federal Appeals Court for the District of Columbia Circuit handed 
down its decision in a case involving the revisions. Century Communications Corporation 
and others sued the FCC claiming their First Amendment rights were violated by these 
scaled down must-carry rules. The appeals court decided: 
Although the FCC has eliminated the more extreme demands of its initial set 
of regulations, its arguments in the case leave us unconvinced that the new 
must-carry rules are necessary to advance any substantial government 
375 Quincy Cable TV v. FCC, 768 F. dd 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
376 LeDuc, Beyond Broadcasting. 
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interest, so as to justify and incidental infringement of speech under the test 
_ set forth in United States v. 0 'Brien. 378 
On March 23, 1987, by a 7-2 vote, the Supreme Court affirmed a decision by the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals which limited the power of states to ban or regulate 
'indecent' programming on cable TV, striking down Utah's effort to confine such 
programming to the hours between midnight and 7 am. Without issuing an opinion, the 
justices upheld a lower court ruling that such restrictions violated the First Amendment. 379 
This constituted a win by the cable industry over the states and over the concept of cable 
being regulated by any entity other than the FCC. As expected, cable industry victories in 
the courts ultimately led to the seeking of legislative relief by the aggrieved parties -- i.e. , 
the losers. 
Varied Assessments and Reactions to Deregulation: 1986-1987 
There were a variety of events that precipitated the move to reregulate the cable 
television industry. These included the regulatory rulings by the FCC and the winning 
record that the cable industry enjoyed in the courts. Some believe that the winning record 
that the cable industry amassed led to a certain degree of overconfidence which in turn led 
to a steep and steady rise in rates charged to cable subscribers. 
378 Century Communications Corp. v. FCC, 266 U.S. App. D.C. 228; 835 F. 2d 
292 (1987). 
379 Wilkinson v. Jones, 480 U. S. 926 (1987), affirming Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 
F. 2d. 989 (1986). 
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Close observers, including interests affected by cable operations, had varying views 
on the deregulated industry and its development. For one, Packwood' s view was favorable. 
He summarized it this way, "Cable promised us in 1984 when they got deregulation there 
would be more channels and better quality: better quality technically, and better quality in 
programming. All of that I believe they delivered. They kept their end of the bargain, 
therefore I believe the consumers came out of it better. "380 He believed the services offered 
began to blossom under deregulation. He continued, "They were really starting to move, in 
that era, from just sort of re-broadcasting networks, or something like that, to do cable 
programming. Unfortunately, because local cable ownership was more disparately owned 
then, we had a few cable companies that would dramatically raise rates and that would 
irritate some significant member of Congress. "381 
In general, the more critical reactions were from two factions. One consisted of 
competitors in the communications marketplace, particularly networks, broadcasters, 
satellite service providers, and telephone companies. The other consisted of consumers 
concerned with rates and services. 
Competitors ' Reactions 
The rapid success of cable systems under deregulation created tremendous economic 
power for the industry and became problematic for competitors. Clearly, one of the driving 
forces behind demands to revisit the deregulation of the cable television industry was the 
broadcast television industry. Giving the cable industry' s perspective, Mooney listed the 
critics as broadcasters, the telephone companies, some of the self-styled consumer 
380 Packwood interview. 
381 Ibid. 
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organizations, and others who had either an institutional or commercial interest in seeing 
cable reregulated. 382 
In the pioneering days of community antenna TV operations, the broadcast networks 
ignored the medium. But soon after the Cable Act of 1984 was fully implemented in 1987, 
the success of cable television had become apparent, and broadcasters wanted their share; 
the nation's "Big Three" television networks independently began to lash out at cable 
television. The financial success of cable TV was reported by Nielsen Media Research as 
54.8 percent of US households receiving cable by 1989, compared with only 18.2 percent 
subscribing in 1979. 383 Moreover, cable television systems had become extremely valuable 
business assets. Indeed, cable systems had become among the most valuable media assets. 
Fortune magazine reported that one corporation, TCI, had the potential to become the richest 
media company in the US. In addition to generous operating margins, there was predictable 
income year after year because the cable systems business was noncyclical, .  TCI had 
concentrated on building shareholder value by leveraging the business with debt in order to 
buy new cable systems. 384 However, a public relations problem resulted from their success 
and rough tactics had gained the company a reputation as a bully. 33s 
Consumer Concerns 
When asked what he believed initiated the movement to legislatively reregulate the 
cable industry, Mooney replied, 
382 Mooney interveiw. 
383 Walley, "Cable TV: Wounded Networks Go for Jugular;" Advertising Age, 
Vol. 60 sl-s2. 
384 Knowlton, "Want This Stock? Its up 91,0000/o," Fortune, Vol. 20, Iss. 3, 
July 3 1, 1989, April 10, 1989, 97-104. 
385 Knowlton Ibid. 
It's a complicated subject. There was a great deal of resentment among the 
public about what people considered to be unreasonable rate increases and 
poor customer service. And I think that feeling -- to a very substantial degree 
-- provided the foundation, as it were, for elected officials in Washington to 
take seriously the possibility that cable might be reregulated. 386 
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When asked if it was deregulation that caused consumers to be upset, Mooney 
continued, "It wasn't so much deregulation they were upset about, it was the consequences 
of deregulation; it was prices and customer service. They'd call their congressman, or write 
to their congressman or make their views known to their local officials who would be in 
touch with the relevant members of Congress. "387 
Supporting Mooney's assessment, Roy Neel, former staff aide to Senator Al Gore, 
Jr., was sure that Gore's staff got more than a couple thousand letters over a four year period. 
And they almost always related to some abuse by a cable company in the 
State of Tennessee or elsewhere. We had a notorious case in Tennessee. A 
company out of Connecticut bought a system of small cable companies in 
Tennessee. They came in and were arrogant and not only took cable 
customers for granted, but were impersonal about it. And they, basically, 
picked on the wrong state to do this, because that alone energized Gore. 
They turned Gore into a real enemy. They grossly mishandled their politics 
on this, frankly. Part of its easy [to say] in hindsight, but it was as "ham­
handed" as it gets, by the industry and by individual companies.388 
Jack Goodman, of the NAB, recalled the level of consumer response as, "If you 
talked to almost any congressman's office, they would have a stack of letters from 
subscribers saying -- complaining -- about the outrageous cable rate increases. "389 
386 Mooney interview. 
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388 Roy Neel, telephone interview by author, Washington, D. C. , September 5, 
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In addition to the letters received by members of Congress, the press also created 
pressure for reconsidering deregulation. Jim Mooney recalled that the local press also liked 
to "cable bash." 
Complaining about cable rates was a favorite story of many daily newspapers 
in the second part of the 1980's, and in the early 1990's. The Bureau ofLabor 
Statistics even got into this a little bit, by highlighting the cable component 
of its monthly consumer price index when they made their reports. 
Presumably, because it thought there was popular interest in the subject. And 
so every month, or every couple months, you'd see a story on the wire 
services which would be reprinted by papers all over the country to the effect 
that cable rates went up so much last month or so much within the past few 
months. You know, two or three times what the increase had been in the 
consumer price index. Stories like that never ever failed to get some ink. 
There was also a lot written in the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal 
and nationally conservative press on the subject. 390 
If these sources of pressure weren't enough, Ward White admitted that the US 
Telephone Association (USTA) helped create the history of rate increases which dramatized 
this and made it clear to the Congress that there was a problem with rates.. According to 
Ward White, "We did it through studies that we paid for and gave them the results -- it just 
happened to be timing and knowing what motivates members. "391 
Packwood downplayed the issue of rate increases, recalling, 
Rates like this are like electric rates or telephone rates -- people pay attention 
to them then think nothing of paying $3 for a gin & tonic, but if their bill 
goes up $3 a month on cable, they're outraged [ emphasis mine] . Most of the 
cable companies raised their rates -- for one -- they've had their rates held 
down for several years. And they raise their rates, but boy, they sure dig right 
in and provide better technical equipment and better programs. 392 
390 Mooney interview. 
391 White interview. White joined the U.S. Telephone Association upon 
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Eventually, concerns expressed by cities over deregulation led to calls for 
considering several policy alternatives, including: 1) to let things continue as they were; 2) 
to follow National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and FCC 
policy positions, which viewed the franchise process as an obstacle to competition and the 
expansion of viewer choices; or 3) to follow the NLC's proposal, which included greater 
protection from First Amendment damage claims, broader authority for local governments 
in franchise renewals, and restrictions on concentration of cable ownership. 1 1393 
Pressure for Reregulation Mounts 
Indeed, the financial success of the cable TV industry was clearly rooted in the rates 
charged for their services. The "bully'' attitude was manifest in their rate policies. As a 
consequence, the rate at which fees for cable service increased under deregulation had 
become the "battle cry" of proponents of reregulation. However, another important cable 
oversight issue before the Senate Communications Subcommittee was how to eliminate 
discriminatory practices in the provision of programs produced by cable TV corporations. 
It was believed that major cable operators were preventing competition from other 
technologies by limiting their access to the programming needed to serve consumers. 
Shirley Hobbs Scheibla described Congress' views on new regulation for cable in 
Barron's writing that, "The Cable Act of 1984, which took effect December 29, 1986, was 
supposed to spur the cable television industry's growth with the help of deregulation. As a 
393 David J. Atkin, and Michael Starr, "The US Cable Communications Act 
Reconsidered, " Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 14, Iss. 4, August, 1990, 3 15-
323. 
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result, cable now has control of much of the information and entertainment available. "394 
Congressional leaders began to predict a new cable law by the end of 1990. For example, 
one draft bill would have barred a cable company from controlling more than 10  percent to 
15  percent of the national market and allow telephone companies to enter the market to 
create competition. The industry's view was summarized by TCI's Robert Thompson, who 
saw "vertical integration as the most critical regulatory issue. "395 
When Congress began considering legislation to impose new federal controls on the 
booming cable television industry, the measure was the most ambitious reregulation effort 
undertaken during the Reagan-Bush era. 396 The legislative battle over reregulation pitted the 
cable industry, its congressional defenders and the Bush administration against pro­
regulation law makers, broadcasters, telephone companies, and consumer groups. 
Proponents of the measures said new controls were needed to protect consumers and 
competitors from price gouging, poor customer service, and discriminatory business 
practices. Opponents to reregulation said the federal government should not interfere in the 
cable market and warned that the legislation would increase cable rates, not lower them. 397 
394 Shirley Hobbs Scheibla, "Clear Signal : Congress Views New Regulation 
for Cable, " Ba"on's, Vol. 70, Issue 8, February 19, 1990, 16- 17. 
39s Ibid. 
396 Congressional Quarterly, Congress and the Nation, Volume VIII 1989-
1992, (Washington, D.C. : Congressional Quarterly, 1993), 4 16. 
391 Ibid. 
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Congress Considers Reregulation: 1988-1989 
The various congressional hearings held between 1987 and 1 990 tended to focus on 
three general themes. One was the percentage increase in cable rates that occurred after the 
end of rate regulation took effect in 1 987 in accordance with the 1984 Act. The second was 
the monopolistic characteristics of the cable television industry resulting from vertical 
integration of programming, distribution, and local service provision; in particular, the 
practice of volume discounting of programming to large multi-system owners (MSO) was 
viewed by Congress as generally unfair to small cable operators. 398 The third was the lack 
of programming availability to other media such as satellite dish systems and other wireless 
television service providers. 
Because he had a sizable rural constituency, Senator Gore soon became zealously 
interested in how the satellite dish owners and the dish industry, as a whole, were treated by 
cable operators. At one point in 1988, he became so adamant about the cable TV industry's 
lock on satellite signals that he took an unorthodox approach when he proposed an 
amendment to a tax bill (S. 2238). His amendment required that satellite television 
programming available to cable companies also be offered at competitive prices to 
individual owners of satellite dish receivers, to ban discrimination against non-cable 
distributors, to dish owners and to require the FCC to promote availability of satellite 
network programming in rural areas. However, a motion by Sen. Inouye to table the motion 
effectively killed the amendment by the vote of 43-36.399 
398 Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 
"Oversight of Cable TV'' Hearings before the Subcommittee on Communications, 
10l 8t Cong., pt sess., November 16, 1989, CIS No: 90-S261-27; Y4.C73/7 : S.hrg. 
101 -464. 167- 1 89. (Hereafter referred to as the Oversight of Cable TV hearings. 
399 CQ Almanac, 1988, 58s. 
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A former assistant to Gore recalled that, 
While I don't remember substantively where Inouye was on that issue. I 
remember him as generally being supportive of the cable industry when they 
opposed that floor amendment. So as a substantive matter, he probably didn't 
like it. But probably more importantly, Inouye was the Communications 
Subcommittee chairman in the Senate and it's considered a real legislative 
insult to a committee chairman to use an appropriations bill as a vehicle to 
get Se_nate �ssage of something that hasn't been voted out of the relevant 
cornnuttee. 
It is not unusual for the chairman of the relevant committee to oppose a substantive 
amendment on an appropriations bill as being outside the normal course for enacting 
legislation. 
In reaction to negative assessments of the 1984 Act, by 1989 Congress was actively 
considering reregulating the cable TV industry. Additionally, the FCC had opened a notice 
of inquiry into cable TV providers' service performance. Another source of pressure for 
change in the regulatory environment for the cable television industry came from the 
telephone industry. On September 22, 1989, the FCC proposed eliminating rules prohibiting 
telephone companies from providing video programming. The commission had previously 
adopted a cross-ownership rule in 1970 which prohibited telephone companies from entering 
the cable television market. That was because it was concerned that the monopoly position 
of telephone companies would likely hinder the development of an independent cable 
industry. However, by 1989, the FCC believed that the public might benefit from new 
services and technologies provided over broadband facilities. 401 The telephone industry was 
400 Thomas Rogers, telephone interview by author, New York, N.Y., 
September 23, 1998 . 
401 Denise M. Drialo, "Telephone-Cable Cross-ownership: Repealing 
Prohibition," Rural Telecommunications Vol. 8; Issue. 1 ;  Winter 1989; 55-59. 
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anxious to capitalize on the perception of that opportunity. The troubles of the cable TV 
industry were seen as opportunities for telephone companies. 402 
Legislative Activities. In the early months of 1989 a flurry of bills were introduced 
to address perceived problems with the deregulation of cable television, indicating a 
substantial level of concern. 
On January 25, 1989, S. 168 - The Cable Television Programming Competition and 
Consumer Protection Act of 1989 was introduced by Senator Larry Pressler. It 
prohibited price discrimination and exclusive distribution for satellite-delivered 
programming. 
On April 18, 1989 S. 833 -- The Cable Television Subscriber Protection Act of 1989 
was introduced by Senators Metzenbaum and Lieberman. It redefined the terms 
"effective competition" under the 1984 Cable· Act to allow regulations of basic cable 
service unless the cable community was served by more than one multichannel, non­
broadcast, video programming distributor. The bill was introduced after the Senate 
Antitrust Subcommittee earlier examined anticompetitive practices of the cable 
television industry. 
On April 18, 1989 S. 834 -- The Competition in Cable Television Act of 1989 was 
introduced by Senators Metzenbaum, Pressler and Lieberman. It prohibited 
unreasonable discrimination in the sale of programming to distributors, and 
prohibited any one cable company from owning systems that served more than 25 
percent of the cable subscribers in the country. This was clearly intended to limit the 
402 Michael Warr, "Pulling Cable TV and Telcos Together, " Telephony Vol. 
2 18, Issue. 3, January 15, 1990. 
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size of large MSOs. It also contained provisions to reqmre fair access to 
programming. 
On May 3, 1989 S. 905 -- The Cable Consumer Protection Act of 1989 was 
introduced by Lieberman. It amended Section 623 of the 1984 Cable Act to allow 
regulation of cable rates and permit states or franchising authorities to regulate cable 
service. It also authorized a state to deny a cable franchise renewal or transfer of 
ownership or control of a cable system on the grounds of extensive media ownership, 
and placed conditions on licensing upon compulsory carriage of local broadcast 
signals. A companion version, H.R. 2222, was introduced in the House by 
Representative Christopher Shays (R-Connecticut). 
On May 18, 1989 S. 1068, an untitled bill -- Offered by Gore, it provided a 
comprehensive multi-titled legislative solution to the problems that Gore he believed 
faced the television consumer. The bill allowed franchising authorities in areas 
without competition to regulate rates for the lowest-priced tier -- which Gore referred 
to as the "life line service. " That tier also included the local broadcast stations. In 
addition to allowing telephone companies to provide cable services, it required cable 
operators to provide access to the system for all programming services and ensure 
that programming services affiliated with cable operators were available to all 
program distributors on a non-discriminatory basis. 
In addition to Gore, co-sponsors included senators Slade Gorton and Wendell Ford. 
At the same time a companion bill, H.R. 2437, was introduced in the House by 
Representative Rick Boucher (D-Virginia) with fourteen co-sponsors. These bills would 
have rees�ablished local government regulation of cable rates in areas with only one cable 
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system. But more troubling to the cable industry was the provision in both bills to allow 
telephone companies to offer cable services as long as the funds were not provided by 
telephone ratepayers. 403 
Late in the year, two other major bills were introduced. On November 15 , Senator 
John C. Danforth, and Representative Jim Cooper {D-Tennessee ), introduced S 1880 and HR 
3 826, respectively. Similar to the Gore and Boucher bills, these allowed local rate regulation 
in areas with only one cable system and barred programmers with connections to cable 
systems from discriminating against other cable systems. The major difference was, they 
did not contain provisions to allow telephone companies to operate cable systems. 404 
Provisions in the bills to restrain the cable industry's market strength included restoration of 
"must-carry" rules, which required cable operators to air most local television broadcasters. 
This provision was destined to be a problem since federal courts had struck down the must­
carry rules in 1985 and again in 1987 after the FCC attempted to restore them under pressure 
from Congress. 405 Another provision in Danforth's bill proposed to limit the overall number 
of subscribers for any MSO to 15 percent of the national total. 
Table 4. 1 summarizes congressional actions from 1989 through 1992 when 
legislation passed . .  
403 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Volume 46, 1990. (Washington, D.C, : 
Congressional Quarterly, Inc) 371. 
404 Ibid. 
405 Quincy Cable TV v. FCC and Century Communications v. FCC. 
192 
I 
Table 4.1. Congressional Actions Related to the Cable Consumer Protection and 
Competition Act of 1992: 1989 - 1992 
YEAR I SENATE I HOUSE 
1989 January 25, 1989 - S. 168 introduced. 
Hearings in April, June, October and 
Hearings held in June and August 
November. No Votes Taken 
April 18, 1 989 - S. 833 and 834 introduced. May 18, 1989 - HR-2437 introduced 
May 3, 1 989 - S.905 introduced. November 15, 1989 - HR  3826 introduced 
May 18, 1989 - S-1068 introduced 
November 1 5, 1989 - S. 1880 is introduced. 
1990 Hearings held in March and April. Hearings held in March, April, and May 
July 1 9, 1990 - S. 1880 reported by July 13, 1990 - HR. 5267 introduced. 
Commerce, Science and Transportation September 6, 1990 - HR 5267 reported by 
Committee. House Energy and Commerce Committee. 
September 10, 1990 - HR  5267 is passed by 
the House. 
1991 Hearings held in March and June. Hearings held in March and June. 
January 14, 1991 - S. 12 Introduced. No Votes Taken 
June 28, 1991 - S. 12 reported by Commerce, 
Science and Transportation Committee. 
, 
1992 January 31 ,  1992 - S. 12 passed by Senate. July 23, 1992 - S. 12  passed by House. 
August 1 2, 1992 - Senate disagrees with Request for a conference. 
House Amendments. Agrees to a conference. September 14, 1992 - Submission of 
September 21, 1992 - Senate agrees to Conference Report on S. 12. 
Conference Report on S. 12. September 17, 1992 - House agrees to S. 12 
October 5,  1992 - Conference Report. 
October 5, 1992 - Presidential veto 
overridden. 
I 
When the 101st Congress began in 1989, Senate assignments hardly changed. 
However, changes in the House were "nearly impossible to keep track of"406 One notable 
change on the House Committee on Energy _and Commerce was the appointment of 
Representative Ed Towns (D-New York) to take the place of Mickey Leland who had died 
in a plane crash in Ethiopia while on a trip to visit refugee camps. Towns' appointment was 
backed by both Dingell and the Black Caucus. 407 
406 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 45, (Washington, D.C., 




With the Democrats now in control of the Senate, the Senate Commerce, Science and 
Transportation Committee had eleven Democrats and nine Republicans. Hollings was the 
chairman of the committee and Danforth was the ranking minority member. The 
Communications subcommittee was made up of seven Democrats and six Republicans. This 
was an increase over the 1988 subcommittee that had six Democrats and five Republicans. 
The chair was Inouye and Packwood was the Subcommittee's ranking minority member. 
Other Democratic members of the subcommittee that carried over from the 100th Congress 
included Ford, Exon, Gore, and John F. Kerry (D-Massachusetts). Senators Bentsen and 
John Breaux (D-Louisiana) were new to the subcommittee in 1 989, and Hollings left the 
subcommittee when he became committee chair. The Republicans members, in addition to 
Packwood, that returned from 1988 were Pressler, Stevens, and John McCain (R-Arizona). 
Senator Pete Wilson (R-California) left the subcommittee and senators Conrad Bums (R­
Montana) and Slade Gorton, who was returning to the Senate, were added to the 
subcommittee. Inouye, Packwood, and Gore remained highly active on the issue of cable 
television regulation. 
The membership of the House Telecommunications Subcommittee continued with 
fourteen Democrats and nine Republicans. Markey remained chair of the subcommittee and 
Rinaldo was ranking minority member. Two Democratic positions changed when Wayne 
Dowdy (D-Mississippi) left and Leland died. They were replaced with Thomas J. Manton 
(D-New York) and Ron Wyden (D-Oregon). Two Republican positions changed also when 
Dan Coats {R-Indiana) and Howard Nielson (R-Ohio) left and were replaced with Edward 
R. Madigan· (R-Illinois) and Dan Schaefer (R-Colorado ). 
Table 4.2, lists the congressional activities by committee and issues of major interest 
as they considered the need to reregulate the cable television industry. 
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Table 4.2. Hearings Related to the Cable Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 
1992 
Congress Date Committee Topic 
101st April 12, 1989 Senato Judiciary Committee'• Subcommittee on 
Antitrult, Monopolioa and Businoaa Rights 
Competitive Problems in the Cable Television 
Indusuy 
Juno 14, 21, 22, 1989 Senato Commerce, Science, and Transportation 
Committee'• Subcommittee on Communications 
Media Ownorahip: Diwmty and Concentration 
JW1e lS, 1989 Ho111e Energy and Commerce Committee'• Cable Television Foreign Ownenhip 
Suboommittoo on Telecommunication and Finance 
August 3, 1989 Ho111e Energy and Commerce Committee'• GAO Cable Rate Survey 
Subcommittee on Telecommunication and F"U1811co 
October 18, 1989 Senato Commorco, Scionco, and Tramportation Commercial Time on Children'• Cable TV 
Committoo'1 Subcommittee on Communications 
October 25, 1989 Senate Commorco, Scionco, and Tnmaportation 
Committoo'• Subcommittee on Communicationa 
MustCany 
November 14, 1989 Senate Judicimy Committee's Subcommittee on 
Antitrust, Monopolioa, and Busineu Rights 
Sports Programming and Cable Television 
November 16, 17, 1989 Senate Commerce; Science, and Tranaportation 
Committoo'• Subcommittee on Communicationa 
Oversight of Cable TV 
March 1 and April 19, HOUIO Energy and Commerce Committee'• Cable Television Regulation (Part 1) 
1990 Subcommittee on Telecommunicati0111 and rmanco 
March 21, 1990 Senato Commerce, Science, and Tnmspor1ation 
Committee'• Subcommittee on Communications 
FCC Syndicated Exclusivity Rules 
March 29, and April 4, Senate Commorco, Scionco, and Transportation Cable TV Consumer Protection Act of 1989 
1990 Committoo'1 Subcommittee on Communications 
May 9, & 16, 1990 HoUIO Energy and Commerce Committee'• 
Subcommittee on Telocommunicationa 
Cable Television Regulation (Part 2) 
102nd March 14, 1991 Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation 
Committee'• Subcommittee Oil Communications 
Cable TV Consumer Protection Act of 1991 
]\DlO 18, 26, 27, 1991 Ho111e Energy and Commerce Committee'• 
Subcommittee on Telecommunicationa and rmance 
Cable Television Regulation 
June 20, 1991 Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Broadcasters' Public lntereat Obligations and 
Committee'• Subcommittee on Communications S.217, the Faimou in Broadcasting Act of 1991 
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The Senate Antitrust Committee was also very interested in complaints against the 
cable industry. They were particularly interested in charges of local cable systems operating 
as natural monopolies raising prices because of the lack of competition. They were also 
interested whether there were any antitrust violations in their programming sales practices. 
Senate Hearings 
The first hearing in 1989 was a one-day session on April 12, when the Senate 
Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies, and Business Rights, 
explored "Competitive Problems in the Cable Television Industry." 408 There were three 
panels heard from: representatives of cities and consumers on one panel; organized cable 
industry interests on another panel; and broadcasters and competing video technologies on 
the final panel. 
The Communications Subcommittee held hearings on three days in June. The 
subject of those hearings was diversity and concentration aspects of media ownership. 409 
Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust. Monopolies, and Business Rights Senator Howard 
Metzenbaum presided at the Judiciary hearing with subcommittee members Strom 
Thurmond (R-South Carolina), the ranking minority member of the committee, Dennis 
DeConcini, (D-Arizona), Paul Simon (D-Illinois), Herbert Kohl (D-Wisconsin), and Arlen 
408 Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Competitive Problems in the 
Cable Television lrulustry: Hearing be/ ore the. Subcommittee on Antitrust, 
Monopolies, and Business Rights, 10111 Cong., 1 st sess. ,  April 12, 1989. 
(Y4.J89/2 :S .hrg. 101-5 1 1). 
409 Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 
Media Ownership: Diversi'ly and Concentration: Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Communications, 101st Cong., l't sess., June 14, 21 ,  22, 1989, 
(Y4.C73/7 :S.hrg. 101-357). 
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Specter (R-Pennsylvania) present.410 The hearings came almost exactly one year after 
similar hearings in 1988 on the same topic. In his opening statement, Senator Metzenbaum 
listed the points of interest. They included: 1) the rapid rise in cable rates nationwide -- 20 
percent in the first year of deregulation; 2) vertical integration that discouraged large 
operators of multiple local cable systems from dealing on fair terms with competing delivery 
technologies; and 3) the exclusion of local broadcast stations in favor of programming 
owned and controlled by the cable industry. He viewed these trends as potentially 
monopolistic and possibly violations of antitrust laws.411 Nationally, basic cable rates had 
risen 3 2 percent since deregulation. Metzenbaum contended that the price consumers were 
paying for cable service had increased at a greater rate than any other commodity or service 
in the entire United States. "Scores of local officials from communities around the country 
. . . have written to me asking that something be done to restore the cities' regulatory 
authority to restrain the rates charged by cable systems. "412 To Metzenbaum, the basic 
premise for the Antitrust Subcommittee's review was "the realization and acknowledgment 
that only with competition do you get the free enterprise system working well. The cable 
industry should not be permitted to thwart [Congress' ] will by denying competing 
technologies the programming that is needed to compete. "413 He believed the mistake made 
by Congress was to let the FCC define effective competition. 
The Commission's definition does not comport with reality. The 
Commission's definition was irresponsible. They failed to meet their public 
responsibilities. Their definition provides that a cable system faces effective 
competition if three over-the-air television signals are present in a particular 
cable community. As a result, almost every city across the country is 
prevented from regulating rates. It is axiomatic that if competition is not able 
to restrain prices in a given product market, regulation may be the only 
410 Competitive Problems in the Cable Television Industry Hearing: 1. 
411 Ibid, 1. 
412 Ibid, 2. 
413 Ibid 11. , 
alternative. I have not abandoned all hope that the market for cable 
television can be competitive. But I am convinced that the FCC's mistake 
must be corrected now.414 
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DeConcini described the issues as he understood them. "I am sure all of my 
colleagues receive, as I do, a lot of complaints from my constituents about the cable industry. 
The first problem is the concentration of ownership of cable television, a problem I think you 
are delving into today; and the second is the dwindling number of large companies and the 
integration of ownership of programming services and cable systems in a relatively small 
number of major cable system owners. 11415 Furthermore, he continued, "I am also concerned 
about two other problems related to competition in the cable industry. The first is the 
problem of access to programming for non-cable providers, such as direct satellite 
broadcasters. The second is the right of broadcasters, particularly independent broadcasters, 
to be carried on cable systems. "416 
Similar to the approach taken by Congress in developing . the 1984 act, there were 
negotiations between representatives of the main organized interests aimed at responding to 
the complaints so that new legislative actions could be avoided. DeConcini alluded to these 
efforts, saying "I understand that negotiations are taking place between the Cable Television 
Association and the broadcast industry today, and I hope that these negotiations are 
successful in solving these problems. I am not one that looks to the legislature, the Congress 
of the United States, to solve these problems. I prefer for the marketplace to do so . But I 










Senate Subcommittee on Communications. On November 16 and 17, the Senate 
Communications Subcommittee held oversight hearings on the performance of the cable 
television industry. Of particular interest was the rapid increase in cable rates and the 
apparent restrictive access practices used by the industry regarding its programming. 
Broadcasters, wireless cable providers, and satellite dish manufacturers complained that the 
cable industry was "choking ofP' competition by keeping programming from competitors 
and shutting out other program suppliers. Broadcasters also complained that cable operators 
put them at a disadvantage by the placement of their channels on cable system line-ups at 
locations other than their normal broadcast channel number.418 For example, a local station · 
that broadcasts its signal on Channel 4 might be placed at position 44 on the cable system' s 
channel selections. Another problem was exclusivity rights, where cable operators offered 
syndicated programs in areas where broadcasters had exclusive program rights, monopoly 
power (both vertical and horizontal MS Os), and access to satellite signals for competiting 
media. Other issues were raised by members. For example, Ford commented on the buying 
and selling of cable operations without making investments. 419 Senator Inouye indicated an 
interest in introducing "anti-trafficking provisions" that would prohibit a purchaser of a cable 
television operation from selling it within five years of the purchase date. 420 They also 
expressed larger concerns. Inouye stated, "At the beginning of the 101 st Congress, it was 
apparent that many Americans were troubled about the market power of the cable television 
industry and were hopeful that the Subcommittee would make an examination of this issue 
a priority. " 421 Ford, in his opening statement, said that, "I have had some problems with the 
philosophy of the big cable operators. I believe that their view of government relations is the 
418 CQ Almanac, 1990, 370. 
419 Senate hearings, Oversight of Cable TV, 157. 
420 Ibid. 
421 Ibid, 1. 
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' scorched earth theory, ' in that they beat back every single legislative initiative or 
suggestion."422 He made reference to Danforth's bill, S. 1880, introduced the previous day, 
as evidence of general senatorial concern. "It had 1 5  co-sponsors, eight were from the 
Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee including members of both 
parties. "423 
Pressler, who co-sponsored S 1880, was concerned that between October 1986 and 
October 1988, basic cable rates had increased 29 percent nationally. "This increase is 
unwarranted and was made possible because of the lack of both competition and regulation 
. . .  We created an unregulated monopoly a�d this is the result. "424 Speaking about the 
apparent monopoly on cable programming, he said, "The MSOs and the programmers are 
so corporately intertwined that 'outsiders' in the business have found themselves paying 
much more for the same programming. In some cases they have found that they could not 
get the programming they wanted at any price. " 
Also concerned about the level of competition for cable television, Senator Gorton, 
who had been instrumental in the 1984 deregulation, stated that, "According to the 
Association oflndependent Television stations, of the more than 7,000 cable systems in this 
country, only 36 have competition from other cable systems. " On the subject of rising cable 
rates, Gorton believed that, "While each of the bills takes a slightly different tack, the central 
message remains the same -- consumers are demanding an end to an unregulated monopoly 
and Congress is listening and ready to respond. "425 
422 Ibid, 2. 
423 Ibid. 
424 Ibid, 6. 
425 Ibid, 7. 
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Table 4.3 . Cable Rate Increases in Tennessee: 1986- 1989426 
City Rise 
Memphis 7 1% 
Crossville 99% 
Nashville 1 1 3% 
Chattanooga 1 1 5% 
Murfreesboro 1 1 7% 
Knoxville 1 1 6% 
One of the most adamant critics of rising cable rates was Senator Al Gore. During 
his opening statement, he charged that cable TV was distorting the marketplace. "[We] now 
have empirical evidence citing cable rate increases since the 1984 Act, which are vastly in 
excess of inflation. " He referenced a Government Accounting Office report that showed 
increases of 24 to 29 percent over three years, based on a voluntary survey. He also cited 
the examples of rate increases in Tennessee as shown in Table 4.3 . 
Gore criticized the "huge MSOs that get bigger and bigger; that exercised anti­
competitive muscle." In Gore's opinion, "The point of six bills . . .  is to give cable consumers 
and satellite dish owners some modest relief from skyrocketing rates and pervasive anti­
competitive practices. 11427 
426 Ibid 4. ' 
427 Ibid 5 .  ' 
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Senator Bums, called for an examination of several negative aspects of cable TV 
deregulation. First among his concerns was the lack of competition and the provision of a 
full complement of channels of news, information, entertainment, sports and other 
programming services. Second was the vast number of rural communities that remained 
unserved or under-served by cable. The third concern he listed was the slow deployment of 
fiber optics given the increased consumer services which fiber could provide. Lastly, he 
listed the prospect of telephone company entry into the provision of video programming 
services and whether telephone company entry might solve the problems that had arisen 
since the passage of the 1984 Cable Act. 428 
Senator Bentsen brought up a survey done by the U.S. Telephone Association.429 It 
showed that "cable rates in Texas have increased an average of 80 percent in three years. 
e.g., Dallas $2. 95 in 1986 to $14.95, a 407 percent; Laredo up 1 50 percent; Wichita Falls, 
$6.00 in 1986 to $1 8 .69 in 1989, a 212 percent increase.430 Breaux reported the average 
basic rate in Louisiana in 1986 was about $9 .00; in 1989, the average was nearly $16 .00, an 
increase of over 70 percent. In Shreveport, rates had increased $5 .00 to $17 .00; over 200 
·percent. 431 
Consumer interests were present at the hearing to echo the complaints registered by 
senators. Gene Kimmelman, legislative director for the Consumer Federation of America, 
428 Ibid, 8. 
429 "We [UST A] did it through studies that we paid for and gave them the 
results -- it just happened to be timing and knowing what motivates members." 
Comment by Ward White regarding the USTA cable rate survey; White 
interview. 
430 Senate hearings, Oversight of Cable TV, 9. 
431 lbid, 9. 
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testified on behalf of consumer interests. He stated, "I am here on behalf of the Consumer 
Federation to endorse Senator Danforth's legislation S. 1 880, which has been co-sponsored 
by Senator Gore, because we believe it would address consumers' major problems with the 
cable television industry. "432 He reminded the panel that in the early 1980s, there was a lot 
of talk about competition. 
There was supposed to be direct broadcast satellite. There was supposed to 
be satellite transmission, pay-per-view, pay-per-channel. None has 
developed. Instead, we have seen cable industry's horizontal concentration 
and vertical integration into a complicated web of video ownership which 
controls a large portion of cable subscribers in this country and the most 
popular programming that the American people want to see. 433 
Furthering his case, Kimmelman said, "We have heard [ at this hearing] discussion 
about comparisons to the consumer price index. It sounds reasonable, but when one looks 
at the cable industry, with the new technologies going into place, with expanding services 
and expanding subscribership, it is clear that cable is a declining cost industry; that the price 
per service and the price per subscriber is coming down. "434 Kimmelman continued, 
So the rate increases that the American people have experienced have really 
been a ripoff, Mr Chairman. Market analysis shows that with just half the 
revenue stream of the cable industry cable operators would be able to earn 
a reasonable profit. For consumers, this would mean that cable rates could 
be reduced by 50 percent, with appropriate regulatory tools in S. 1 880, and 
432 Ibid 293 . ' 
433 Ibid. 
434 Ibid 294. ' 
the American consumer would save $6 billion in the video revenue that they 
are currently handing over to the cable industry.435 
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Kimmelman elaborated on the Consumer Federation's position in his submitted 
statement: "If vigorous competition had developed, as the Cable Act envisioned, or its 
surrogate in monopolistic markets -- effective rate regulation -- were imposed, consumers 
would be paying about half of what they are charged today for cable services. "436 Speaking 
of Sections 9 and 10 of Senator Danforth's bill, they 
would increase the diversity of programming available to consumers. By 
preventing discrimination against wireless cable and satellite dish service 
providers, Section 9 would increase the likelihood that consumers not wired 
by cable would have an opportunity to receive a broad package of video 
programming from non-wire technologies. Section 10 would then reduce the 
largest cable operator' s incentive to maximize market power by limiting 
channel availability. 437 
Also speaking for consumer interests and against the perceived monopolistic position 
of cable TV, Sharon Ingraham, Chair of the National Federation of Local Cable 
Programmers, testified that, "Access [for Public, Education, and Government (PEG) 
organizations] remains unavailable to at least three-quarters of the communities with cable 
in this country. "438 She asked Congress to require PEG access in every :franchise and that 
access programs be part of basic service tiers. Ingraham continued, "We ask you to amend 
the Cable Act to allow for facilities, equipment and funding sufficient to let access continue 
to thrive, and make it clear that this support should not be counted by cable operators as part 
435 Ibid. 
436 Ibid ' 306-307. 
431 Ibid ' 309. 
438 Ibid , 3 12. 
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of the franchise fee. "439 Ingraham' s group wanted Congress to limit the use of all franchise 
fees to paying expenses of managing franchise agreements and to require cable operators to 
fund production of local access programs with money other than franchise fees. 
Continuing on the point of the cable industry' s  monopolistic behavior, Gore 
contended that the industry had an incentive to stifle the development of technological 
competitor such as satellite dish systems. For example, he stated that only after pressure 
from Congress did cable operators agreed to provide programming to satellite broadcast 
distributors or rural electric co-ops to reach customers having no chance of cable extended 
to their area "But the head of rural electric co-ops association came to testify and said it has 
been a failure because of one simple reason. The cable programmers have stone-walled 
us. "440 Rural electric co-ops charged that cable TV had given them a small trickle of 
programming, and the wholesale rates were 44 1 percent higher than the wholesale rates 
charged to cable systems for the same programming. Gore believed that because the cable 
industry held economic control over the source of programs, it created an artificial distortion 
in the price charged to the ultimate customer making it appear that it was more efficient to 
have the distributor of programming to deliver it to the viewer. Gore said that situation " is 
absurd and ridiculous on its face, but they come and seek to make that argument with a 
straight face. I do not think it is credible. "441 
In Gore's statement preceding his questioning of FCC Chairman Sikes, he recalled 
that the "single most powerful individual in the cable industry"[Mooney] surprised many by 
439 Ibid, 3 1 3 .  
440 Ibid 360. ' 
441 Gore speaking to FCC Chairman Sikes about cable programmers' 
monopolies over their product, Oversight of Cable TVhearings, 360. 
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endorsing action by the Congress to place limits on the number of cable systems an 
individual company can own, and even contemplated divestiture in order to meet such limits. 
Gore was referring to Mooney who, during his testimony, endorsed congressional action to 
place limits on the trafficking in cable franchises; indicating that in his view the FCC had 
not been active enough in overseeing the activities of the cable industry. Finally, he 
contemplated more regulation, at least at the federal level, and identified market power and 
market concentration as legitimate issues for attention by the Congress, whether in the form 
of horizontal integration, or vertical integration. 442 
Then Gore asked Sikes for his reaction to Mooney' s statement, and Sikes responded : 
I think that from what I understand of the testimony yesterday by the cable 
industry, you are seeing what is frequently played out with the commercial 
evolution of industries in America. An industry begins with certain benefits 
conferred upon it by the government, in order to help it develop. It reaches 
certain concentration levels, and then it rushes in seeking regulation, 
believing that the bar.§ain will preclude new competition. My preference is 
for new competition. 3 
Sikes also addressed Mooney' s comments about "trafficking,'' i .e . ,  the quick sale of cable 
systems for a profit after owning them for just a short time. He said, "I know of 
municipalities that would have liked to have had current cable owners sell their systems, in 
order to facilitate, new cable providers. "444 
Sikes' testified that he was concerned about what seemed to be an effort to 
reestablish municipal empowerment. In diplomatic fashion, he said it is important to 
remember that the municipalities restrained the development of cable, "frequently extracting 
a variety of revenue promises. " Senator McCain not so diplomatically interjected that he 
442 Ibid 3 29. , 
443 Ibid 359. ' 
444 Ibid. 
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believed it was "extorted" rather than extracted. Sikes agreed, continuing, "As we go 
through this, it is important, as some regulation is re-established that we think about what 
jurisdiction is perhaps best able to do that. "44s 
Regarding the idea of telephone entry into cable service, Sikes said, "Turning to the 
rule book question, right now, in most states, cable cannot provide telephony. There are a 
few states, Illinois notably, where that is not true. So, as cable faces a legal block to getting 
into telephony, I think we have to be concerned about letting the telephone company being 
a fully vertical cable operator. "446 He continued, "It also strikes me that the legislative 
approach would be less likely successful, because of the concerns of various media that 
allowing that concentration of power through the local exchange, and through the 
extraordinary revenue streams of local telephone companies, might be just 
overwhelming. "447 
Senator Stevens was next to address Sikes. Stevens was concerned with the treatment 
of cable at the hands of municipalities. " 
The problem that I have with these proposals [ to reregulate the cable 
industry] is I see more and more interference from the municipalities in 
creating fiefdoms that you have to pay dues in order to get through. Have you 
examined these to see what kind of roadblocks are going to be placed in the 
way of the development of national cable as we have had national telephone 
and nationalize other concepts? Or has the FCC taken a position on national 
cable?448 
44S Ibid, 3 63. 
446 Ibid, 368. 
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Expressing perhaps indirect agreement with Stevens, Sikes' indicated that "the 
municipal history in the area of cable has not been such that I would recommend a 
significant re-empowerment of municipalities in the cable area. "449 
Several representatives of competing technologies participated in the hearing. 
Edward 0. Fritts, head of the NAB, presented the concerns of TV broadcasters. For one, 
"When the Cable Act was passed back in 1984 must carry was in place at the FCC. The 
cable industry challenged those rules in court, and today local stations have no assurance of 
carriage. What's more, many stations have been displaced from prime channel positions by 
cable networks which are largely owned by the vertically integrated MS Os." More 
generally, he asserted, "Cable today stands as an unregulated monopoly. It is not regulated 
by the cities. It is not regulated by franchising authorities. It is not regulated by the Federal 
Communications Commission. It is not regulated by Congress, and it is not regulated by 
competition. Cable, in fact, is the regulator of today's marketplace. In short, in our [NAB] 
opinion, the 1 984 Cable Act has failed abysmally. "450 Other competitors presented negative 
assessments of the cable industry, including the Satellite Dealer Coalition, the American 
Home Satellite Association, the Satellite Dealer Communication Association of America, 
the Wireless Cable Association, and GTE Telephone Operations. 
Clearly, if this hearing was indicative, there was much unhappiness with the recent 
performance of the cable television industry. Most of the members of the Communications 
Subcommittee were critical of the cable industry. They based their criticism on constituency 
reactions to cable rate increases and a survey of cable rates conducted by the Government 
Accounting Office commissioned by House Telecommunications Subcommittee Chairman 
44
9 Ibid. 
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Markey. Gore believed the "industry is severely distorting the marketplace."451 Ford of 
Kentucky accused the cable industry of following a "scorched earth theory."452 Senators 
Bentsen, Breaux, McCain, Pressler, Gorton, and Hollings all co-sponsored the Danforth bill 
aimed at reregulating the cable industry, as did Gore and Ford. Subcommittee members 
Inouye, Bums, and Kerry, while expressing concerns regarding complaints about rate 
increases, wanted to investigate the conditions more objectively and had not joined in co­
sponsoring Danforth' s S .  1 880. 453 Stevens and Packwood were the only two members of the 
subcommittee at the hearing who could be considered defenders of the cable industry. 
In more than six hours of testimony on November 16, cable interests offered a 
spirited defense against their critics. Mooney was first to offer testimony to defend the cable 
industry. "Basic service is only one component of most subscriber bills" he said. 454 The 
average monthly subscriber bill rose from $21 . 58 to $24.68 over the same two year period, 
an increase of fourteen percent or seven percent a year. From 1 972 through 1986, when 
deregulation took effect, cable' s basic rates ran 72 percentage points behind the consumer 
price index. 455 Cable deregulation has led to improved cable programming. "Cable 
operator' s spending for basic programming has increased from about $3 00 million in 1984 
to nearly $1 billion [in 1989] ."456 Moreover, the average subscriber in 1989 received 32 
channels, as compared to 27 channels in 1986. The average cost per channel has remained 
451 Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 
Oversight of Cable TV: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Communications, 
10 ist Cong., 1st Sess. , November 16 and 17, 1989, (S . Hrg. 10 1 -464) : 4. 
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relatively flat: 46 cents in 1989 to 44 cents in 1986. Mooney believed the "spurt in basic 
rates which occurred in 1987 and 1988 were a post-regulatory adjustment."4s7 Mooney 
testified that according to the BLS, the overall CPI figure for the first nine months of 1989 
was up 3 .7  percent while cable rates were up only 2.3 percent during that same period . .  At 
the heart of cable's defense against the charges of unreasonable rate increases was the 
increase in numbers of channels offered to subscribers. Mooney pointed out that ''basic rate 
increases have been matched by an increase in the average number of channels received by 
subscribers. [Even] the GAO found that the average cost per channel has remained at 
approximately 45 cents since rates were deregulated."4s8 Mooney went on to list other 
benefits from the deregulation of the cable industry, including his claim that vertical 
integration in the industry led to increased amounts and qualities of programming available. 
He also emphasized that the franchise fees paid by cable operators amounted to significant 
general revenue sources for local authorities. 
In 1984, prior to enactment of the Cable Act, municipalities received $200 
million in franchise fees and were required to devote the money to 
administering cable franchises. Since passage of the Cable Act, from 1985 
through 1989, cable systems have paid an estimated $3 .053 billion in 
franchise fees. That money is available for any municipal use. 4s9 
As for charges that the cable industry was monopolistic because of a lack of 
competition, Mooney's response was that since the 1984 Act cable now faced a growing 
number of competitors. "The number of independent television broadcasters had tripled to 
417 .  Since cable had finished wiring most of the major metropolitan centers, there are 
[ 1989] 9,000 cable systems serving over 50 million households. VCRs are a major means 
of video distribution, increasing from 1 . 1  million units in 1979 to nearly 60 million in 198 9. 
4S7 Ibid. 
4ss Ibid, 14. 
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VCR penetration grew to 65 .  8 percent . . .  surpassing the growth of cable during the 1980's. 
Home satellite dishes, legalized by the 1984 Act, grew from less than 800,000 to nearly 2 .6 
million. 460 
Regarding charges of the monopolistic aspects of vertical integration, where MSOs 
invest in creating programming, Mooney pointed out that, "Three of the five largest 
networks (ESPN, USA Network, and CBN's [Christian Broadcast Network] Family 
Channel), have no operator investment yet have wide distribution."461 Conversely, some of 
the most popular cable programming exists only due to cable' s vertical integration. For 
example, Nickelodeon, Black Entertainment Television (BET), C-SP AN and C-SP AN II 
(funded by the cable industry), Bravo, Turner Network Television (TNT), the Discovery 
Channel, and Cable News Network (CNN), would not exist without the investment by cable 
operators to create the programming. 462 
John Malone, chairman of TCI, focused his testimony on the business aspects of the 
cable television industry and defended it against charges that it was reaping huge profits as 
a result of monopoly power. He stated that, "As further proof in our market economy that 
our product is successful, the penetration of CATV has actually been accelerating, rather 
than decelerating, as the industry matures."463 He believed this was indicative of their 
product/price relationship being more appealing on the margin to consumers than before. 
Answering charges that cable' s prices are too high, Malone retorted that "the cable TV 
industry has the lowest return on invested capital of any media or communications 
460 Ibid, 70. 
461 Ibid, 73 . 
462 Ibid, 75-76. 
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industry. "464 He described how five to six years before, large industrial companies such as 
General Electric, Westinghouse, American Express, and Capital Cities were in the cable TV 
business. They all exited "citing low return on investment."465 Continuing, he cited statistics 
from an unnamed communications industry report "which indicated that regulated local 
telephone companies had a return on invested capital, . . .  pretax profits divided by average 
assets, of 14. 9  percent. The radio and broadcast industry had a return of 10.9 percent and 
the cable industry had a return of 7. 3 percent. "466 Describing the specific circumstances of 
TCI, 
Our cumulative retained earnings over 20 years is zero. We have plowed 
everything back into growth and renewing our technology. Our technology 
is evolving so rapidly, that we cannot wait the fifteen year franchise cycle in 
order to provide good service. Most of our rate increases in TCI have 
reflected direct programming cost increases. We have typically added two 
or three cable networks each year. 467 
It seems, however, that the cable TV industry's defense was a shovel full of 
information thrown against a land-slide of charges about rate increases and monopolistic 
control of the market. 
House Hearing 
Earlier in the year, the House Telecommunications Subcommittee had used a GAO 
survey of cable TV rates to aim criticism at the !ndustry' s performance since deregulation. 
In April 1988, Representative Edward J. Markey, chairman of the House Subcommittee on 
Telecommunications requested the Government Accounting Office (GAO) "to conduct a 
464 Ibid. 
465 Ibid, 108- 109. 
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nationwide survey of cable television rates and services. "468 The survey report was issued 
by the GAO on August 3, 1989, and Markey' s subcommittee held a one-day hearing the 
same date. It would be the only hearing on the House side in that year. 
Markey presided at the hearing and noted that the attendance by eighteen of the 
subcommittee' s  members was the largest number for any hearing that year, a gauge of 
interest in cable issues. 469 It was attended at various times by seven of the fourteen 
Democrats on the subcommittee and eight of the nine Republicans. The GAO's report was 
presented and testimony received from the agency officials who conducted the survey and 
authored the report. Additionally, cities, state regulators and the cable industry were 
represented in a second panel. The fundamental conclusion of the report was that "monthly 
rates for the lowest price basic cable service and the most popular cable service increased 
significantly by more the 25 percent or four times the rate of inflation from 1986 to October 
1988."470 The panel was questioned by Markey and several other members in obvious 
attempts to paint the rate of rate increases as abusive actions by an industry turned into a 
monopoly by the deregulation of 1984. Representative Swift and Don Ritter (R­
Pennsylvania) were the only subcommittee member who questioned the GAO panel in a 
manner that revealed that the numbers could also have an interpretation that rates, when 
controlled for inflation, had increased in line with other consumer prices. Representatives 
from the cities, while sensitive of the complaints they were receiving from local citizens, did 
not believe reregulation was warranted. Rather, they expressed the view that actions to 
468 Congress, House, Committee on Energy and Commerce, GAO Cable Rate 
Survey: hearin;_ before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, 10 1st Cong., 1 sess., August 3, 1989. (Washington D.C. GPO Y4.En 2/3 : 1 0 1 -75). 
Hereafter referred to as the GAO Rate Survey hearing. 40 
469 Ibid, 248. 
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introduce competition were more likely to resolve the seemingly rapid rise in rates 
charged.471 The industry witnesses testified that the conclusions of the GAO were erroneous 
interpretations of the survey. To support that position, Mooney submitted for the record a 
survey conducted by the NCTA to refute the governments findings. 472 
Conclusion 
A strong reaction to the 1984 law emerged quickly and powerfully so that by the end 
of 1989, reregulation by Congress was a distinct possibility. This reaction was initiated by 
a number of interests with serious complaints. Primary among the concerns were increases 
in cable television rates. Additionally, many believed the issue of monopolistic behavior 
was equally important . This concern was articulated as the vertical and horizontal 
monopolization of cable television The charge that cable TV engaged in anti-competitive 
monopolistic practices included two subcategories. One was the negative impact from the 
horizontal concentration resulting from greater numbers of local cable operations being 
owned by a small number of large multi-system operators. The other was the negative 
impact of vertical concentration of programming by large corporations that owned both the 
programming and the distribution systems. Cable system owners in this latter category 
controled both the distribution and the pricing for their programming. 
Regarding rate increases, consumers began complaining frequently and loudly to 
elected officials. Soon after the full implementation of rate deregulation took effect in early 
471 Ibid, 247-248 . 
472 lbid, NCTA: "A Survey of Cable Service Pricing Changes Since 
Deregulation, 13 3 .  
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1987, subscription rates increased steadily. A survey conducted by the GAO found that the 
rate increase was greater than the rate of increase for inflation. Consumers also accused 
cable operators of poor service and ignoring subscriber' s complaints. This was believed to 
be a result of almost all of the nations's approximately 1 1 ,000 cable franchises operating 
without direct competition because of the definition of effective competition in the 1984 Act. 
Even though consumer interest organizations tried to establish themselves as representing 
subscribers, there existed no truly organized group for the expressed purpose of representing 
subscriber' s interest The most effective representation of consumers was the NLC and 
USCM who also claimed to be the principal voice for subscriber interests. 
Another set of interests that complained to policy makers were potential competitors 
using newly developed technologies such as the home satellite dish industry as well as 
microwave and wireless cable services. These interests defined the policy issue as a 
monopolistic industry using anti-competitive practices. They complained that cable 
programming companies charged them up to 500 percent more than cable operators paid for 
the same program, on terms that kept many programs out of the reach of competitors. 
Additional complaints were heard from broadcasters, the main competition for cable 
television. The chief issue for broadcasters was requiring cable operators to carry local 
broadcasters' signals, also known as "must carry. 11473 This question also had two 
subcategories. One was the adverse effects on local broadcast stations of cable TV 
retransmission from distant broadcast stations that negatively impacted exclusivity 
agreements local affiliates had with their parent networks. The other was the perceived 
473 Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 
Must Carry: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Communications, 101 •t Cong., 
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unfair advantages for cable TV industry resulting from free access to broadcast signals. 
Broadcasters also felt that there was not a level playing field since cable TV was deregulated 
in 1984, yet they were subject to much more rigorous regulation at the hands of the FCC. 
For cities and municipalities, the major issues were the provisions in the 1984 Cable 
Act which affected local :franchise authorities, the fees they could charge, and how they 
could calculate them. The final, but by no means the least of the issues, was the question of 




CABLE TELEVISION CONSUMER PROTECTION AND 
COMPETITION ACT OF 1992 
Less than a decade after cable television was deregulated in 1984, The Cable 
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act was enacted in October 1992 over a 
presidential veto. The reregulation of cable television was driven by several factors, 
including those discussed in the last chapter. The new law, it should be emphasized, did not 
reregulate by restoring prerogatives to :franchise authorities that the 1984 law took away. 
Basically, reregulation was national in character manifested in congressional mandates and 
enhanced FCC capability. 
Specifically regarding the FCC' s role, the act required nearly all of the nation's cable 
operators to follow rules of the FCC on pricing of basic program packages and equipment 
rental . Additionally, it allowed the FCC to delegate rate regulation to local and state 
:franchising authorities upon written request with a subsequent finding by the commission 
that the state and local laws and regulations conformed to those of the FCC and that the 
:franchising authority provided a level of consumer protection required by the commission. 474 
474 Public Law 102-385, Cable Television Consumer Protection and 
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The FCC would establish standards for cable system customer service and signal quality. 
In addition, it prohibited those who produced and sold cable TV programming from refusing 
to provide their products to other video distributors and prohibited cable TV operators from 
discriminating against unaffiliated cable TV program networks. On a stronger note, the act 
directed the FCC to issue regulations to limit children's access to indecent programming. 
Another provision in the act intended to "enhance effective competition"47s by requiring the 
FCC to prescribe rules and regulations establishing reasonable limits on the number of 
subscribers and the number of channels carrying programming in which the system owner 
had a financial interest. Congress had in mind the public interest objectives of"ensuring no 
cable operator . . .  can impede . . .  the flow of video programming to the consumer."476 It 
also required the FCC to report to Congress on migration of sports programming from 
broadcast TV to cable networks and pay-per-view systems. Lastly, it obligated the 
commission to establish equal employment opportunity standards for cable systems and and 
authorized it to establish rates and terms for leased access to cable channels, particularly for 
qualified minority or educational programming. 
The act required cable TV systems to carry established local broadcast stations, 
including public TV stations, and limited the authority of cable operators to change channel 
positions of the local commercial stations. It also directed cable operators to obtain the 
consent of those broadcast TV stations to retransmit their signals. Another provision 
required cable operators to allow customers without charge to block channels which showed 
sexually explicit content as part of a premium package. The act established restrictions on 
cable operators that prevented them from selling cable systems for 3 6 months following 
acquisition or new construction, and there were restrictions on cable operator ownership or 
475 Ibid, Section 613(f)(l), 106 STAT. 1487. 
476 Ibid, Section 613(f)(2)(A), 106 STAT. 1487. 
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control of other video programming services within a franchise area. The new law also 
authorized cable operators to prohibit indecent programming. Franchising authorities were 
enjoined against awarding exclusive franchises and unreasonably refusing to award 
additional competitive franchises. Limits were provided to the liability of cable franchising 
authorities in lawsuits arising from cable service franchising and regulation. This last 
provision was supported strongly by local governments who were vulnerable to charges of 
anti-competitive practices over granting exclusive franchises for cable TV operations. 477 
In the category of "public interest, 11 the act mandated that providers of direct 
broadcast satellite video services reserve a portion of their channel capacity for 
noncommercial educational programming, and it established certain privacy-rights 
protection for cable service customers. An additional aspect of the legislation permitted 
broadcasters, who since 1965 had been required by the FCC to allow retransmission of their 
programs by local cable systems, to charge cable operators for use of such programming, 
known as "must carry." However, any station that feared it might be dropped by a local cable 
company could forfeit that right in return for having the cable operator transmit the station's 
signal for free. 
Two years of intense politics were to move regulatory policy for cable television 
from the disaffection of 1989 to enactment in 1992. 
477 The United States Supreme Court held in Community Communications Co. , 
v. Boulder; 455 U.S. 40 (1 982), that "Boulder' s moratorium ordinance is not 
exempt from antitrust scrutiny under the Parker doctrine". 48-57. 
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Legislation Begins in  Earnest: 1990 
After full-implementation of the 1984 Act took effect, it became evident that the 
behavior of the cable TV industry under deregulation was in need of attention. By January, 
1990, the FCC had issued a notice of proposed rulemaking intended to examine the 
"effective competition rules" regarding regulation of basic cable service in light of changed 
circumstances in the video marketplace since 1985. The notice sought comments on 
alternative definitions of effective competition. m This clearly constituted an attempt by the 
commission to interject some regulatory control over cable industry which was viewed by 
many as a non-competitive medium. But by July, the commission issued findings and 
recommendations on the state of the cable television industry, concluding there was no need 
to reregulate. 479 Certainly this outcome had to be seen as a victory for the cable industry. 
The summer of 1990 was a very active period in the effort to reregulate the cable 
television industry, and legislation came close to passing in September. In July, H.R. 5267 
was introduced in the House, the FCC's Report on Cable TV was released, and on July 19, 
the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee reported S .  1880 out of 
committee. On September 6, H.R. 523 7 was reported by the House Energy and Commerce 
Committee, 480 and only four days later, the bill was passed by the House. However, after 
floor debate was blocked on September 28, S .  1 880 died and the Senate took no further 
action on cable during the session. 
478 FCC, 56'1' Annual Report, Washington, D. C., Government Printing Office. 
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Issues, Bills and Positions 
In the evolving debate over cable television, two central issues became the nearly 
exclusive foci for critics of the industry. Those were rates and alleged monopolistic or anti­
competitive practices. Clearly, cable rates had risen dramatically since 1984, but there also 
had been expanded programming. Among the anti-competitive practices with which the 
industry was charged were denying access to, and discriminatory pricing for, programming, 
especially prices private satellite dish owners were charged for programming. Charges of 
anti-competitive practices grew as the industry had become highly concentrated. One anti­
competitive aspect was the increasing vertical integration of the industry where cable 
operators and cable programmers have common ownership. Another was widespread 
horizontal integration where large cable companies owned many systems in numerous cities. 
Such vertical and horizontal integration created potential barriers to competing systems 
from entering the market, thus reducing the diversity of programming available. 481 Also 
contributing to anti-competitive practices was multichannel programming distribution. This 
involved distributors who broker multiple channels of video programming between 
producers and programming providers. This practice was also known as "third-party 
packaging" of programming. Such packaging was typically provided to subscribers as _ 
"premium tiers." 
There were also issues of concern other than rates and anti-competitive practices. 
These included concerns about the constitutionality of must-carry policies. The industry 
questioned whether the imposition of such requirements violated their First Amendment 
rights to free speech. Members of the House Telecommunications Subcommittee had 
concerns about such broad issues as whether to allow foreign ownership of cable systems 
481 Public Law 102-385, Section 2, Findings, Policy, Definitions. 106 STAT. 
1460. 
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and whether cable television would "siphon" sports programming from over-the-air 
broadcast stations by outbidding broadcast networks for the rights to televise important 
sports events. Lastly, the issue of allowing telephone companies to enter the cable TV 
market was of significant concern. Having upgraded their systems using fiber-optics 
technology, telephone systems became capable of carrying video programming. They then 
pursued entry into the video programming market to help recoup their costs. Telephone 
industry interests as well as cities also supported allowing such entry as a means of 
introducing competition for cable operators. 
The two major legislative vehicles for considering reregulation during 1990 were S. 
1 880, authored by John Danforth and H.R. 5267, authored by Ed Markey and Matthew 
Rinaldo.482 Both contained provisions to control cable rates. In areas of providing 
programming to other video distributers and must-carry provisions, the two bills were nearly 
identical. Regarding controlling anti-competitive practices, language in both bills prohibited 
cable TV networks affiliated with cable TV operators from refusing to provide programming 
to other video distributors and prohibited discrimination against unaffiliated cable networks. 
Similarly, both bills required cable TV systems to carry local broadcast TV stations. The 
only notable difference on this specific issue was that H.R. 5267 included public TV stations 
in its must-carry provision. 
Each bill required the FCC to ensure that rates were not unreasonable or abusive. 
However, they differed in the means for accomplishing this objective. S .  1 880 would have 
the FCC apply such regulations only to systems not subject to effective competition. H. R. 
5267 required standards and procedures applied to all systems to prohibit unreasonable or 
abusive rates. The Senate bill allowed for delegation of such regulation to local 
482 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1990. 3 71 .  
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governments where they petitioned to do so, but the House bill did not include such authority 
to delegate rate regulation. 
As the legislative process progressed, various interest groups became involved. 
These included, in addition to the cable industry and broadcasters, wireless cable operators, 
the satellite dish industry, the telephone industry and cities. Consumer organizations that 
claimed to represent cable subscribers contended that the costs to operators for providing 
cable service was declining yet, because of the cable industry's monopoly position, charges 
were rising at a pace greater than the national consumer index of prices. 
Broadcasters and the NAB supporting Danforth's S. 1880 with its must-carry 
provisions and limits on cable conglomerates, as did the cities. In addition, a newcomer 
group, the Wireless Cable Association, also supported such limits as did the Satellite 
Broadcasting and Communications Association. Such non-cable distributors of satellite and 
wireless cable programming complained that exclusive arrangements between cable 
operators and cable programmers such as HBO and Showtime, locked them out of 
programming. 
The U.S. Telephone Association actively backed Gore's S. 1 068 and H.R. 243 7 
introduced by Boucher. Both allowed telephone companies to offer cable services to hasten 
competition and new services through fiber-optic technology. This view was also held by 
the National League of Cities and the U.S. Conference ofMayors.483 [Ward White became 
active in the U.S. Telephone Association upon leaving the Commerce Committee staff.]484 
However, the idea of allowing telephone companies to compete in offering cable services, 
483 Ibid. 
484 Based on Ward White and Cynthia Pols interviews by author. 
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would ultimately take a back seat to other reregulation efforts. Dingell said House action 
on telephone' s entry into cable markets would be considered only after work was completed 
on legislation to lift restrictions on Baby Bells entering new businesses. 48s One example of 
the cable industry's view on this issue was provided by NCTA President James P. Mooney 
when testifying at a hearing on November 16, 1989. He told senators that choosing between 
the two major legislative options -- reregulation or allowing telco competition -- was like 
choosing between "being boiled in oil or vinegar. "486 
The cable industry was neutral on HR. 5467 since they viewed it as less aggressive 
on reregulation than S. 1 880. Conversely, they actively opposed S .  1 880. Their opposition 
was caused by language in the bill that prohibited cable operators from refusing to deal with 
other multi-channel video programming distributors. They objected to provisions 
prohibiting exclusive agreements between cable programmers and cable operators. In 
hearings, Mooney pointed out differences between the original version of S. 1 880 and a 
staff-authored draft revision. "The two documents are different in that the staff draft tends 
to place major responsibility on the FCC for devising methods of handling [ rate increases] 
whereas the original version effectively gives that authority back to city councils. "487 
Desiring to avoid a retreat to local level regulation, cable TV interests supported the staff 
version of the bill. 
48s In keeping with Dingell' s prediction, by June 27, the House Energy and 
Commerce Committee withdrew an amendment to allow telephone companies 
into cable markets. 
486 Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 
Oversight of Cable TV: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Communications 
101st Cong., pt sess. , (Washington, D.C. : United States Government Printing 
Office; November 16  and 17, 1989) 175 .  
487 Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 
Cable 1V Consumer Protection Act of 1989: Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Telecommunications 101st Cong., 2nd sess. , (March 29, 1990) Y4.C73/7 :S .  
Hrg. 101 -702; 134. 
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In an interesting combination of interests, the cable industry was joined by the 
newspaper industry in its opposition to allowing telephone companies to enter the cable TV 
service. The newspapers wanted to keep telephone companies out of information services 
because they were fearful that they could provide video text and become an alternate to 
printed news services.488 Also in opposition was the Consumer Federation of America 
because of doubts about adequate assurances to prevent telephone ratepayers from 
subsidizing cable ventures by telephone companies. 489 It was indeed a rare situation to see 
organized consumer interests on the same side of a question with the cable industry. 
The positions taken by both the Bush administration and the FCC were to oppose the 
efforts to re-establish regulation of cable rates. The administration wrote letters opposing 
the legislation prior to committee mark-up sessions. It argued that deregulation had resulted 
in substantial benefits and that reregulation would put those gains at risk. Additional letters 
from Commerce Secretary Robert A. Mosbacher and James Rill, head of the Justice 
Department's antitrust division, called instead for "emphasizing competitive principles such 
as promoting new entry" into the markets. 490 Possibilities included allowing telephone 
companies into the cable business. This was a clear indication that the battle lines were 
drawn. 
TheFCC's opposition to reregulation was based on a study of the effects of the 1984 
act issued by the Commission in July. 491 It generally promoted competitive markets over 
488 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 371. 
489 Ibid. 
490 Ibid 372. , 
491 Federal Communications Commission, 1990 Cable Report, :MM Docket 
No. 89-600 FCC 90-272, (Washington, D.C. : GPO, 1990). 
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reregulating the cable industry. The report concluded that deregulation had fostered growth 
in cable service. It advocate legislative provisions that promoted easier entry for cable 
competitors, for example, removal of barriers that prevented other multichannel providers, 
such as satellite dish systems and wireless cable, from entering the market. It "supported 
legislative limits on anti-competitive practices" such as limiting vertical and horizontal 
integration. The FCC also believed some form of must-carry requirements were needed. 492 
The report was issued the day before the House Commerce Committee mark-up of H.R. 
5267 . 
Senate Hearings 
In March and April of 1990, the Senate Subcommittee on Communications held 
hearings on S .  1880. Danforth's original bill was introduced in November, 1 989. However, 
the hearings considered a staff draft bill, offered as a substitute for S .  1 880. The March 29 
hearing provides some indication of the temper and tone of the debate over reregulation. 
One of the first witnesses at the March 29 hearing was Mooney. His testimony was 
clear regarding the industry's position on regulation, "Excepting matters such as 'must 
carry,' we would prefer that the cable industry be allowed to continue to be deregulated. "493 
Additionally, Mooney summarized the industry's opposition to reregulation of cable TV 
emphasizing three points: 
First, cable is a national as well as a local medium. To turn control of our industry 
back to city councils would, in our view, merely recreate the irrational and haphazard 
conditions which existed prior to 1984. Our experience is that city councils are 
political bodies with none of the quasi-judicial qualities normally found in regulatory 
agencies. Second, the programming side of our business is just now beginning to 
492 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 372. 
493 Hearing, Cable TV Consumer Protection Act of 1989: March 29, 1990, 45 . 
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flower and is still very fragile. Finally, we respectfully urge that as you consider 
proposals intended to stimulate new competition for cable, you also keep in mind 
that we bear unique regulatory burdens and costs under the Cable Act which are not 
shared by our competitors. 494 
The specific example given of "unique regulatory burdens" was the 14 percent of 
gross revenues paid to Montgomery County, Maryland for franchise fees, access fees and 
other truces, none of which applied to cable TV's competitors such as broadcasters. 
Testifying at the same hearing, Thomas Burchill, President and CEO, Hearst/ABC­
Viacom Entertainment Services described the growth experienced by the industry under 
deregulation. According to Burchill, "The Cable Act has had a favorable effect on cable 
programming networks, allowing them to produce distinct and high quality television. "495 
His testimony traced the history of his company as an example of how deregulation was 
working for the consumer. "We choose to operate as a niche business, becoming a targeted 
or vertical channel. Our mission is to be the first channel choice of women, providing 
programming dedicated to the special information and entertainment needs of American 
women." To that end, "LifeTime [a cable channel] was launched in February 1984 as a 
merger of two failing cable programming ventures called Cable Health Network and 
Daytime. After a fitful start in the days prior to deregulation, LifeTime grew and achieved 
its first full year in profitability in 1986, thanks to the addition of affiliate fees which 
supported the enhancement of our programming. "496 Burchell continued with his vision of 
the effects reregulation would bring: 
The prospect of rate reregulation will choke off those aggressive levels of 
programming investment. Rate reregulation forces downward pressure on 
affiliate fees. It discourages aggressive programming investments by cable 
494 lbid, 46. 
495 Ibid, 132. 
496 lbid. 
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networks such as [LifeTime] . In fact, the programming most likely to 
disappear first from the TV screen in [ a reregulated] environment is the 
narrow appeal for public service product. Rate reregulation will also slow 
system rebuilds, limiting channel capacity for carriage of existing networks 
and with no channel capacity for news networks. The system begins to work 
against the interests of the consumer and the programmer if, as part of a rate 
reregulation tier, we stand to lose affiliate income for programming 
investment or if, as part of a higher tier, we lose the distribution we count on 
for advertiser income, it becomes a negative vicious cycle. The marketplace 
solution creates the best incentive for business arrangements that reflect our 
costs and the right kinds of distributor promotion and marketing plans for 
[Life Time] network. 497 
The cable spokesmen were bombarded with questions about fees. Answering such 
charges about rate increases, Mooney testified, "While there occurred a spurt in cable prices 
in the two years immediately subsequent to deregulation, those prices have now leveled off 
Cable consumer fees in 1989, increased at a rate less than the overall rate of inflation. "498 
In follow-up questions to the panel of witnesses, Mooney addressed the history of rate 
increases and admitted that there was "no question but that basic cable rates went up 
significantly over all during the first two years subsequent to deregulation, and we think that 
was not altogether surprising since during the fourteen years prior to deregulation we had 
run 72 points behind the CPI as a consequence of the city councils holding our rates down. 
However, 1989 was the third year you saw those rates level off "499 
Another defense for rising cable rates was offered by Amos Hostetter, Chairman and 
CEO of Continental Cablevision, Inc. His testimony was that "while our rates have gone up 
less than 5 percent a year, our operating expenses per subscriber have increased nearly 7 
percent a year. u soo Hostetter also offered a somewhat longer-range view on rate increases. 
497 Ibid, 133 .  
498 Ibid, 45 . 
499 Ibid 149. , 
soo Ibid 1 1 8. , 
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"The first systems we built in northwestern Ohio were turned on in 1964, and we charged 
$4.95 for a nine-channel service." He testified that if the industry had increased those rates 
to keep up with changes in the Consumer Price Index, by charging at a constant dollar 
amount, the rate would come out to be something in the range of $20. "Our actual basic rate 
companywide average is $16, so we have lowered our rates by about 25 percent, and our 
average system now delivers over 30 channels. So we have increased the service by 
threefold and in real dollars lowered the rates by 25 percent over a 25 year period. "501 
Danforth, author of the original version of S. 1880, addressed the question of 
monopolies to James Mooney, "The theory of the legislation is that unregulated monopolies 
are wrong, and that cable television does constitute a monopoly within each community and 
unless there is an alternative multi-channel provider, there should be regulation. 11 Mooney 
was asked to explain his view. He responded, "I think I have really given up arguing 
whether or not cable is a monopoly because I think the relevant analysis has to do with 
whether there are things in the marketplace, things that are substitutes or near substitutes to 
cable, that act as a check on cable penetration and cable pricing. 11 502 Mooney continued, 
It is apparent to me - and I must say it is apparent to most ofthe people that 
I represent - that having argued this case for quite a while now, there is 
sufficient concern in the Congress, likely to result in legislation of such form. 
And we are not going to take the attitude that sometimes is taken by the 
business community to the effect that oh whatever you do to us, any little 
change is going to kill us, we are going to see what can be worked out, and 
we will try to the greatest degree we can to cooperate with you. 503 
Mooney believed that, "If you live and work in the television world, you find that 
these businesses are very hotly competitive. If it were not hotly competitive you would not 
501 Ibid 149. ' 
502 Ibid, 134. 
so3 Ibid. 
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have the broadcasters up here involving themselves in the issues like rate regulation and the 
circumstances under which our franchises are to be renewed and whether we can have 
exclusive rights to our product because otherwise they would not care. But I think their 
vigorous presence in this is in itself a kind of negative testimony to the degree to which these 
businesses . . . .  1 1 Danforth cut Mooney off by saying; "I would doubt that. I mean it seems to 
be [ the case] that one industry can affect the health of another industry and still constitute 
a monopoly, and I of course would argue that it is a monopoly. 1 1504 
The tone of the hearing became sharper quickly when Mooney was questioned by 
Gore. The Tennessee senator asked if he thought it _was "anticompetitive for a direct 
broadcast satellite [DBS] company to refuse to sell its signal except through local cable 
companies [ disallowing private dish owners from receiving signals directly]?" Mooney 
replied not necessarily. It would depend on how they might use the technology. Gore then 
asked Hostetter ifhe was "aware that the cheapest rate [to purchase cable programming] that 
DBS had been able to get from the cable industry was 42 1 percent higher than the rate 
charged to cable franchises?" Hostetter responded that he was not privy to the rate packages 
from cable TV programmers that were distributed by satellite signals. Gore related the 
circumstances where the DBS industry said, 
Oh this is great, cable has negotiated with us and we are going to distribute 
this to satellite dish owners. But after one year's experience they came back 
and said these people are impossible to deal with. They are arrogant, they are 
monopolistic, they will not be fair with us and the cheapest deal they will 
give us is 421 percent higher than what they give their cable companies. 
They have asked us to pass legislation. It is just ridiculous that they will not 
be fair. 505 
504 Ibid 13 5. ' 
sos Ibid, 142. 
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Gore tried to establish that cable operators were attempting to exclude competition 
from others who were developing new programming. He then spoke about NBC' s effort to 
secure cable access for its CNBC venture. "Now NBC was told . . .  by the cable industry we 
will not put you on our cable system if you plan to compete with CNN because that will cut 
into our share of the profits from CNN. "506 A major cable system, TCI, had an ownership 
interest in CNN. 
So if you plan competition you can just as well forget about being on cable 
television. So the mighty NBC was brought to its knees and forced to sign a 
formal agreement that they would not in any way compete with CNN. They 
launched the venture with a very ill-defined mission of providing business 
consumer news, and they will work up the courage to sort of nibble at the 
edges of their noncompete clause. But basically they agreed to a provision 
that deprives the public of the competition that would otherwise come if they 
had not been forced to agree not to compete. 507 
Mooney responded that he knew of no testimony before the committee to the effect 
of a noncompete clause. He tried to explain his view of the exchange with Gore, "What I 
recall is Bob Wright [ of CNBC] sitting in front of a Congressional committee one day a 
while ago and being repeatedly and forcefully asked if he thought that anything untoward 
had happened in that matter. He kept saying, no, and finally he just stopped saying anything. 
I suppose people could have drawn an inference to the contrary. "508 Gore disagreed, saying 
he did not remember it that way, but he recalled that the message was, "Do not embarrass 
me by asking me to just spell it out A to Z, but essentially, Senator [Gore], that is exactly 
what happened. "509 Gore contended that no premium program that is not owned by the cable 
operators is allowed on cable anymore. No new ones have been allowed on in quite a while. 
"The problem with CNBC was that it was going to compete with a service that the MSOs 
506 Ibid, 142. 




owned and profited from. Now we can argue about the appearance of this thing all day long, 
but we both know what happened on this. "510 
Mooney continued to disagree with Gore's interpretation of the situation, but Gore 
insisted, "Well, everybody else knows what happened. "  At that, Hostetter responded that he 
was also in the group that does not know. "We have an investment in Turner, and we were 
approached by CNBC to carry their service. While some if not most, of your facts are right, 
I do not think the characterization is correct. "511 But Gore continued to pursue the point. 
You see, you did not have to participate in the dirty deed because there are 
some ringleaders who are the lead horses. TCI led the way on this. They said, 
CNBC, you are going to have to change and not compete or else you will not 
get on the cable. I mean, that is what happened. The larger issue which it 
represents is the one that troubles us. An unregulated monopoly is inherently 
against the public interest, because even if there are good guys in the 
business -- and there are lots of good guys in the business. 
Here is what Mr. Wright said, here is my question, Did you agree not to 
agree directly with CNN in making CNBC a full-scale news operation in 
direct competition with CNN because TCI owns part of CNN's parent 
company? Was this part of the arrangement that also guaranteed you access 
for CNBC? Mr. Wright said, "We have a provision in our affiliation 
agreement that was requested, required if you will, by most cable operators 
that we not enter into general competition with CNN. Is that not anti­
competitive? Well, it is not exactly what we would have preferred. Can you 
understand that language, Mr. Mooney?512 
Mooney responded that it appeared to him that Wright did not want to be tied up any 
more than he had to be in his response to Gore' s question. Gore retorted sharply, "You 
really are going to earn your pay today if you can put a bright face on that statement. " 513 
510 Ibid. 
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Gore summarized his views saying he believed that the temptation to come in and 
make a fast buck was overwhelming, that there was a temptation to shake down 
programmers who want access by demanding some of the ownership or else they will not 
be given access, and there was a temptation to shut down potential sources of competition 
like the satellite dish industry. Finally he said, "There is a temptation to shake down 
customers and to raise rates as swiftly as possible to whatever the traffic will bear."514 After 
describing these temptations, Gore offered no evidence that these tactics actually were being 
employed. 
Packwood seemed to come to the rescue of Mooney when Gore finished his 
questioning by asking him to explain what Gore meant about equity values in the past 
months. 515 Mooney responded that cable stocks had been off as much as 30 percent at the 
same time that money available for loans had become scarce. He believed it was partly, but 
no� entirely, due to the uncertainty over regulation of the industry. Packwood asked if he 
believed that profits would fall "precipitously'' and cable would not be as good a lending risk 
if it were regulated. Mooney responded that it was not if the industry were regulated but 
how far the regulation may go. "I think there is a fear the regulatory changes might go too 
far."s16 
Packwood then quizzed Mooney about the monopoly argument. "What am I missing 
. . .  then, in the allegation that you have such a lock that there simply is no other competitive 
programming, no other competitive delivery system, and it is unfair to consumers?" Mooney 
responded that it was hard for him to make the argument from the other side. 
514 Ibid, 144- 145 .  
SIS Ibid, 147. 
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I think that people somehow sometimes instinctively mistake subscription 
television for a distinct market of its own, but that is not how people treat 
TV. People hooked up to a cable system sit there with that remote, and they 
dial through the broadcast channels and the cable channels and the pay 
channels as if they were all just TV. That is how the public treats television. 
To say that cable is without competitors and has a unique hold on video in 
the home I think just does not comport with reality. 517 
Senate Committee Action 
233 
After the hearings were completed, committee chairman Ernest F .  Hollings, 
subcommittee chairman Inouye, and Danforth drafted another substitute version ofS. 1 880. 
The Senate Commerce Committee approved this substitute version on June 7 by a vote of 
1 8- 1 .  Packwood cast the only dissenting vote. 5 18 One thing in the substitute version that 
the cable industry preferred over Danforth's original bill was that it shifted rate regulation 
from local governments to the FCC. The NCTA came close to agreeing not to oppose the 
measure, but held back because of its objection to language barring cable operators from 
"unreasonably" refusing to deal with other multichannel video programming distributors 
such as DBS, satellite broadcasters, and independent cable operators. 519 Its objection was 
based on the lack of any definition or examples of "unreasonable." The failure to obtain 
agreement with cable "at the very last minute" on this anti-competitive provision angered 
Gore. In return, he offered an amendment to delete the introductory "finding" that would 
have sanctioned exclusive agreements between producers of cable programming and cable 
operators, which limited the availability of the programming to competing system operators, 
as a "legitimate competitive strategy. " His amendment also included another anti-
517 Ibid, 148. 
5 18 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1990, 37 1 .  
519 Ibid. 
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competitive provision that required the sale of cable TV programming, transmitted by 
satellite, directly to home satellite dish users. It was adopted by voice vote. 520 
However, another potentially explosive amendment was diverted. It was authored 
by Burns and allowed telephone companies to provide cable services. Hollings and Inouye 
persuaded him to withdraw it because it would impede passage of the bill. m 
Hou se Hearings 
Hearings were also held in the House in March and April 1990 by the 
Telecommunications Subcommittee. 522 Most of the subcommittee members favored some 
degree of reregulation. As in the Senate, the major issues discussed were rate increases and 
anti-competitive practices. There was also an interest on the part of the members to discuss 
whether the cable industry had delivered on its promises under deregulation. 
Chairman Markey presided at the hearings and listed the issues he was concerned 
about in his opening comments. They were, primarily, cable rates and anti-competitive 
practices. 523 He recounted that competition between cable companies was an expectation 
of deregulation in 1984. " Yet today [1990], in 99 percent of the communities served by 
cable, there is only one cable operator."524 He took the position that "until there is a truly 
S20 Ibid. 
521 Ibid, 371. 
522 Congress, House, Committee on Energy and Commerce, Cable Television 
Regulation (Part /): Hearings before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications 
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competitive market place, some form of reregulation is necessary to protect consumers. "525 
On this latter point, Markey supported allowing telephone company entry into the cable TV 
market place to promote competition. He also supported must carry of local broadcast 
programming. 
Statements by other subcommittee members regarding rates included that from 
Representative Jim Cooper, who agreed with the Consumer Federation of America in their 
belief that reregulation of rates would lower charges to American consumers enough to save 
$6 billion a year. He believed it was possible to cut cable rates in half if Congress could find 
a way to inject competition through reregulation into the situation. 526 Contrasting Coopers 
view on rates was Representative Bill Richardson (D-New Mexico). Richardson took the 
stance that competition, not reregulation, was needed, with some rate regulation. He did not 
want to change the act. He believed that cable operators were victims of a vicious public 
relations campaign. 527 
Various subcommittee members believed that the cable industry could practice anti­
competitive tactics because of the lack of regulation under the 1984 Act. Representative 
Rick Boucher emphasized the lack of competitiveness in the cable service industry when he 
charged that "Cable today is an unregulated monopoly. " 528 Boucher had introduced H.R. 
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until competition could emerge. It would also introduce such competition by allowing 
telephone companies to enter the cable service market. 529 
Representative Christopher Shays (R- Connecticut), who was not on the 
subcommittee, spoke as a guest at the hearing. He portrayed the development of cable TV 
as being at the expense of franchising authorities. In his view, state governments gave away 
cable franchises without obtaining anything significant in return. Then cable operators 
became the beneficiaries of 1984 deregulation when Congress deregulated regional 
monopolies allowing them to change services and increases prices at will. As a result of 
anti-competitive practices, cable operators became multi-millionaires when franchises that 
were purchased for $600 per subscriber were sold for $2,500 per subscriber. "Cable 
operators can't have it and shouldn't have it both ways: no competition and no regulation. "530 
Representative Thomas J. Bliley, Jr. (R-Virginia), spoke of subscriber fees for cable 
television services from a more cable-friendly perspective. He wanted to temper the 
criticism directed at cable rates by comparing what the industry had done to enhance the 
product they offered. Referring to the 1989 GAO study on cable rates, he acknowledged that 
the costs of basic services purchased by most customers rose 26 percent. That same study, 
he continued, "found that when you take into account the number of channels provided in 
those basic packages, the cost remained constant at approximately 45 cents per channel per 
month. "531 Bliley argued that as a result of deregulation, cable operators were able to attract 
the capital investment necessary to expand their program offerings, and that while rates 
increased, services were also increasing. 
s29 Ibid. 
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House Committee Action 
On June 25 the Telecommunications Subcommittee approved an unnumbered 
substitute measure introduced by Chairman Markey and ranking Republican Rinaldo. It was 
so new, members still did not have a final draft in front of them when the subcommittee 
markup started.532 Ultimately, the bill, HR. 5267, granted certain concessions to the cable 
industry. For example, the bill now contained the explicit protection of exclusive 
programming agreements that were denied to the cable industry in the Senate bill. It allowed 
cable companies to continue to enter exclusive agreements with video programmers, such 
as Home Box Office, as long as the cable market was deemed competitive. 533 Such language 
had been struck from S.  1 880 by the Senate Communications Subcommittee, causing the 
cable industry to oppose the measure. Also the bill's approach to limiting monopolistic 
practices was less aggressive than that in S. 1880. 534 The House bill differed from the Senate 
bill by directing study on how to limit horizontal and vertical integration. S .  1880 required 
the FCC to develop rules to restrict the number of channels a cable operator could provide 
to an affiliated programmer. 535 The House favored a market solution rather than regulations 
to address charges the cable industry acted as a monopoly through vertical and horizontal 
integration. Regarding rates, the House bill, as in S. 1 880, required cable systems to offer 
a basic service tier of programming which was to include local broadcasters and public­
access channels and for the FCC to regulate the rates of the basic service tier. 536 The bill also 
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included a compromise reached among cable, broadcasters and public television only days 
before on must-carry that provided for cable operators to devote about 25 percent of their 
channels for local broadcasts and to carry those broadcasts on the same channel number that 
the TV stations used. 537 
Similar to the Senate experience, the question of allowing telephone companies to 
enter cable was deferred when Boucher admitted he did not have the votes to support an 
amendment to that effect. 538 On June 27, just two days after, the full Commerce Committee 
approved the subcommittee's bill by a voice vote with little change. 
Floor Actions 
House leaders brought H.R. 5267 to the floor on September IO under suspension of 
the rules to limit debate and prohibit amendments. Despite Bush' s opposition and a veto 
threat, the bill passed by voice vote. 539 
The legislative process did not run as smoothly in the Senate. When Majority Leader 
George Mitchell (D-Maine) sought to bring S.  1 880 to the floor under a procedure requiring 
unanimous consent, he was unable to do so when Wirth, Packwood and Malcolm Wallop (R­
Wyoming) gave notice that they would object. Wirth acknowledged the importance of the 
cable industry to his state saying he supported a bill to deal with complaints about rate rises 
and service deficiencies, but criticized the provisions that would have denied the right to 
enter into agreements to provide exclusive programming to certain cable operators and 
537 CQWR, June 30, 1990: 2053 .  
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charge discounts to larger cable systems that purchased programming in volume even though 
smaller systems not buying in volume were charged more. According to Tom Rogers, who 
was at the time a Telecommunications Subcommittee staff member, Wirth opposed the bill 
in part because as an author of the 1984 deregulation legislation, S. 1880 would, in large 
part, have eradicated his work. "Wirth was of a view that cable was something that would -­
that deregulation would benefit competition in the telecommunications industry, and its 
reregulation would thwart the development of new programming sources in the cable 
industry. So it was in keeping with his authorship of previous legislation. "s4o In his 
objections, Packwood referred to the bill as an overreaction, and Wallop shared this view. 541 
On October 11, in an effort to salvage some legislation that session, Wirth and Gore 
reached a compromise over preserving some forms of exclusive agreements between cable 
operators and cable programmers. Gore was an advocate of emerging technologies, 
particularly those that served rural areas such as satellite and wireless cable systems. Wirth 
was interested in a compromise because his state of Colorado was home to large cable 
companies. But 24 amendments on file from Democrats to further tighten regulation 
effectively bogged down floor consideration and their compromise and S 1880 died in the 
process. After the measure died, supporters said they planned to push their proposals in the 
102nd Congress. Moreover, cable opponents promised hearings on the issue of allowing 
telephone companies to operate cable systems. s42 
s40 Rogers interview. 




The momentum for legislation to reregulate the cable industry was fueled by the 
activities of several organized interests. With the upgrading of telephone lines with fiber­
optic cables, the telephone industry initiated attempts to allow them to compete in the 
lucrative cable service market. Additionally, because of the perception that rates charged 
to cable subscribers were out of control, cities received the brunt of subscriber's  complaints. 
For that reason, interests representing cities were among the strongest advocates for 
reregulation. Organizations claiming to represent consumers remained active through their 
testimony at hearings. The main thrust of their argument was that rates could be slashed in 
half. However, they also opposed efforts to allow entry into the cable market by telephone 
companies for fear of the emergence of an even more powerful monopoly. Broadcasters, for 
their part, wanted assurances that their programming would be carried on cable to prevent 
a decline in advertising sales in local viewing areas. Lastly, other competing technologies 
pushed for provisions that would require the cable industry to share programming at fair and 
competitive prices. 
Regarding the regulation of rates, both S. 1880 and H.R. 5267 contained provisions 
requiring the FCC to ensure that rates were neither unreasonable nor abusive when cable 
operators did not have effective competition. They also addressed competition in a similar 
manner by both prohibiting cable TV program networks from refusing to provide 
programming to other video distributors and from discriminating against unaffiliated 
program networks. Both would require cable TV systems to carry local broadcast TV 
stations with H.R. 5267 explicitly adding public TV stations in that requirement. 
There were differences in ways to eliminate regulating anti-competitive practices. 
S. 1 880 contained a provision to limit the size of operations by restricting the number of 
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subscribers a single operator could reach nationwide and the number of channels that could 
be used by affiliated cable programmers. It also prohibited cable TV operators from owning 
satellite or wireless cable TV systems servicing their franchise area. HR. 5267 did not 
contain either of these two provisions. In contrast to S. 1880, H.R. 5267 contained several 
provisions not addressed in the Senate bill. For example, the House bill required the FCC 
to establish standards for customer service, signal quality, and assess the needs for requiring 
equipment compatibility among cable systems. It required regulation of rates for use of 
cable systems by nonaffiliated cable networks and to set aside channels for commercial 
leasing. It also prohibited cable operators from selling systems for 3 6 months after 
construction or acquisition and restricted foreign ownership. It addressed equal employment 
opportunity standards and required cable networks to make programming available at 
reasonable rates to satellite dish owners. Probably the most significant difference was that 
H.R. 5267 would require cable systems to offer a basic service tier to include broadcast TV 
and local PEG programming and require the FCC to regulate the rates charged for this basic 
tier. 
The two bills considered in 1990 had received some support from the cable industry 
early on as the NCT A tried to calm the concerns of investors by reducing the regulatory bite 
of any new legislation through compromise on provisions. However, after H.R. 5 267 bill 
passed the House by voice vote, the cable industry withdrew its support of continued 
legislation because of language in S. 1880 assuring competitors open access to cable 
programming by prohibiting exclusive agreements and a deal that would have forced cable 
operators to carry broadcast channels. The industry then began to oppose any reregulation 
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efforts. As one observer reported, "Feeling burned, [by this change in attitude] Senate 
sponsors promised the 1991 bill would include even weightier regulatory language. "543 
The Battle Lines Are Drawn: 1991 
Maintaining their opposition as the 102nd Congress began, the cable industry was not 
expected to cooperate in any reregulation efforts. Furthermore, the Bush administration' s 
continuing support for measures to stimulate competition rather than reregulation lent 
support to cable' s resistance. There was considerable continuity in the new Congress in the 
identity of the major congressional players in cable legislation. New cable reregulation bills 
in the form of S. 12 and its companion H.R. 1303 were introduced. These bills essentially 
reflected the bills that failed in 1990 except that S .  12 was a little tougher on cable. 544 
In March, the Senate Communications Subcommittee held hearings on S. 12, but 
members of the subcommittee were responding in a more partisan fashion on this round of 
attempts at reregulation. Danforth, as the bill 's chief sponsor, had only two other 
Republicans siding with him. In 1990, he had six that supported his efforts. Most 
Republicans on the Telecommunications Subcommittee opposed the bill in the March 2 1  
hearing. This took place after they met on March 6 with senior White House officials who 
encouraged them to fight the bill. 545 
543 Mike Mills, "Foes ofReregulation Effort Turn-up the Heat This Year," CQ 




On May 14, the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee reported 
S. 12 by a vote of 16  to 3 .  
The House Telecommunication Subcommittee held hearings in March and June to 
consider H.R. 1303 and H.R. 2546. These two bills would be replaced by H. R. 4850, 
introduced by Ed Markey and reported in June. However, after subcommittee passage, 
House supporters of the measure decided to wait for the Senate to act first because of the 
late-session collapse of cable reregulation efforts at the end of the previous Congress. 546 
However, the Senate did not act in 1991  when in November of 1991  a banking deregulation 
bill was taken up, leaving no time on the schedule for cable. 547 
Recurring Issues 
As new rounds of legislative effort began, local governments continued to seek 
reregulation of cable and restoration of local "control over cable television operations. "548 
A record had now been developed adding weight to the claims of the cable industry. The 
199 1  report by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation on S. 12 
said, "While deregulation fueled explosive growth, it has led to abuses and problems"549 and 
the stakes were large. Since Congress deregulated cable, it had grown into a $20 billion 
546 Ibid. 
547 Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 
Cable Television Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Senate Report 102-92 on S-
12, 102 Cong., 19t sess. ,  (CIS9 1 : S263- 14). 
548 Jean Dimeo, "Local Governments Want Their MTV, " American City & 
County; Vol. 106, (December, 1991), 13 : 54-58. 
549 S. Rpt. 102-92 on S. 12. 
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industry. It was available to 90 percent of all homes in 1991 ,  and 61  percent of those 
households subscribed. sso 
Sensing how the political winds were blowing and to counter claims of economic 
abuse, the NCT A had adopted voluntary service standards in 1990, which were accepted by 
85 percent of cable operators. However, the Senate report said local governments had 
adopted standards that were more sensitive to consumers' needs than the NCT A's and that 
strong mandatory requirements were necessary. 551 Similarly, The FCC acted in June of 1991  
to tighten the standard which cable companies had to meet to avoid regulation to six stations. 
Still, only 1 8  percent to 34 percent of the nation's 1 1 ,000 cable systems were subject to 
regulation under the existing commission standards. 552 
Congressional Actions in 1991 
By early 1991 ,  the debate became more partisan and heated. The Bush 
administration still strongly opposed any reregulation as both houses of Congress remained 
under Democratic control .  Furthermore, the cable industry refused to cooperate as it had 
through most of 1990, adding to the intensity of conflict. 553 David Alyward explained one 
cause of the resistance as an arrogant attitude on the part of the cable industry. 
By 1990, the cable industry had gone from a zero bank account [ of political 
support] to a huge deficit in its bank account on Capitol Hill. They had a 
whole lot of people really really upset. And merely, I think, over the issue of 
rate increases. But also because they couldn't wear that "we're the little 
guys" [label] anymore. They had passed that point on the development 
sso Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1991,  1 58. 
m S .  Rpt. 102-92 on S. 12. 
552 CQWR, 1991 ,  742. 
m Ibid. 
curve. Will McGowan, who had founded MCI, use to come in and lobby. 
He was the start up guy. I mean, MCI can't walk around now and say: 
"Yeah, I'm the little start-up guy, help me out. " They've ji0t office buildings 
all over the place. That's [also] what happened to cable. 5 
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Even though realizing that they had not adequately cultivated the necessary support 
on Capitol Hill, James Mooney offered further explanation of why the cable industry 
continued to be uncooperative in the legislative process. 
The industry's unwillingness to compromise on any form of reregulation 
proved fatal to its interests; I mean my board just didn't want to compromise. 
They just said "No. " And they thought that George Bush was going to save 
them with a veto because George Bush's guys had promised that he would. m 
Regarding the new bills, in the Senate, S .  12 was introduced by John Danforth. It 
was cosponsored by Hollings and Inouye. ss6 In the House, H.R. 4850 was introduced by 
Markey, but Rinaldo, who had co-authored the 1990 bill, did not co-sponsor the 1 991 
version. The sole co-sponsor was Dingell, chair of the Energy and Commerce Committee. 
Legislative Proposals 
Senate Bill. Senate bill S .  12 sought to strengthen FCC regulations for basic cable 
service. The bill was similar to S .  1 880 in its provisions for FCC regulation of the basic tier 
of service when not subject to effective competition, including allowing the FCC to delegate 
such regulation to local and state franchising authorities. It retained S .  1 880's prohibition 
on denying cable programming to other video distributors and discriminating against 
unaffiliated cable networks. To control horizontal integration, it also required the FCC to 
limit the number of subscribers a single operator could reach nationwide and restricted cross-
554 Aylward interview. 
m Mooney interview. 
s56 CQWR, March 23, 1991 ,  742. 
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ownership of satellite or wireless systems in their franchising area. One difference between 
S. 12 and S. 1 880 was the approach to "must-cany." As a result of the must-carry 
compromise that collapsed at the end of 1990, a provision in S .  12 did not require carrying 
local TV stations, but did require cable operators to obtain the consent of local broadcast 
stations and limited cable operator' s in changing channel positions of broadcast stations. 
The additional provisions in S. 12 included authorizing the FCC to establish rates and terms 
for leased access to cable channels and limiting the liability of cable franchising authorities 
in lawsuits that might be brought by cable operators charging violations of their First 
Amendment rights. This latter provision was one desired by cities. The bill also added to 
the definition of effective competition the presence of another video programming 
distributor, such as satellite or wireless cable that served at least 1 5  percent of area 
households and was available to more than half of them. 557 
House Bill. H.R. 1303, was essentially the same as H.R. 5267 from 1990. One 
different provision was that H.R. 13 03 required the FCC to regulate basic rates for all cable 
operators regardless of how competitive their markets were. However, this bill would 
eventually be replaced with H.R. 4850 as a subcommittee substitute amendment in April 
1992. That version would contain several changes from H.R. 13  03 that will be discussed 
later. 
Senate Hearings. On March 14, the Communications Subcommittee held hearings 
on S. 12, the Cable TVConsumer ProtectionAct of 1991. 558 Senator Inouye presided at the 
hearing, with Exon and Breaux present. As the hearing progressed, Packwood, Danforth, 
ss, S .  Rpt. 102-92. 
sss Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 
Cable TV Consumer Protection Act of 1991: Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Communications, 102nd Cong., pt sess., March 14, 1991 ,  (CIS9 1 :S26 1 -56) 538 .  
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and Pressler also participated. The subcommittee heard testimony from a balanced set of 
organized interests. First were witnesses who represented the views of municipal and local 
governments. Senator Joseph I. Lieberman (D-Connecticutt ), then testified on why he 
supported S. 12 and why reregulation was needed. The next panel represented the cable TV 
industry and another represented the broadcast industry. A mixed panel presented views of 
consumers, community broadcasters, and the telephone industry. The final panel consisted 
of representatives of competitors to cable operators. 
David C. Adkisson, the Mayor of Owensboro, Kentucky, and Sharpe James, the 
Mayor of Newark, N.J. representing the NLC and the USCM, gave the initial testimony. 
They testified about the problems posed by lack of competition and excessive subscription 
rates in community cable TV systems. They supported the importance of S .  12's provisions 
to promote competition and the need for regulation to offset the economic power of cable 
TV systems. Adkisson shared the frustrations he and his constituents faced regarding the 
cable television industry, including stating, "During the past year we have had two rate 
increases in our community'' amounting to a forty percent increase over the past twelve 
months. "559 The second problem he described was the lack of authority that cites had over 
cable TV since passage of the 1984 Act. "We are held responsible. We are expected to 
control rates. But cities are absolutely helpless when it comes to controlling rates of cable 
television."560 The other problem Adkisson discussed was franchise renewals. With no 
competition available to existing cable operators, the cities have no negotiating strength 
when renewing franchise agreements. He concluded by saying, "The 1984 Cable Act was 
just that. It was a cable act. In 1991 this bill is a cable television consumer act. The 
559 Ibid, 59. 
560 Ibid, 60. 
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difference is highly significant. "561 Mayor James described the 46 percent rate increase the 
Newark had experienced since 1986. But he focused more on the anti-competitive aspects 
of the cable industry. He testified that, "Local governments believe the renewal amendments 
in S. 12 are essential to any cable legislation_ ,,562 By supporting S.12 and its "comprehensive 
approach to resolving concerns resulting from horizontal and 
vertical integration" cities believed that stimulating competition would help with the 
franchise renewal problems. 563 
In Lieberman, s view, Congress should act rather than await FCC action, because 
"cable companies offered a truly monopoly product in their multi-channel programming 
packages. "564 He described the problem as, 
Under the 1984 Act, no one can legally regulate that full package. The FCC 
is actually prohibited by the 1984 Cable Act from reviewing the rates 
charged for services other than those that consumers can already get free with 
an antenna. That is, local broadcast television. Under the 1984 Act, cable 
companies can deregulate some of their most popular offerings, such as 
MTV, CNN, Nickelodeon, or ESPN simply by placing that program in a 
separtate teir from local broadcast services. The FCC has no power to alter 
this restriction on its own powers through [ rule making] alone, and that is 
why regulation must be adopted by Congress. 565 
During Lieberman's testimony, Senators Danforth, Packwood, Pressler and Bums 
arrived at the hearing. Danforth had actually taken the chair while Lieberman was testifying. 
A very interesting development occurred next. Danforth, the sponsor of the bill, recognizing 
that the minority had assumed control of the committee, attempted to report the bill. 566 But 
561 Ibid, 61. 
562 Ibid, 78. 
563 Ibid. 
564 Ibid, 100. 
565 Ibid, 100-101. 
566 Ibid, 10 3 . 
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Packwood, as the ranking minority member, corrected Danforth by stating that he would 
take the chair. He next stated that, "As I do not like this bill, the hearing is adjourned, and 
we will have no further hearing. "567 Burns seconded his motion. Packwood preceded to 
make an opening statement in which he said that he could "see no justification for this bill 
or any step backward into reregulation."568 Subsequently, while he was making an opening 
statement, the majority returned and the chair reverted to Exon. When Packwood attempted 
to adjourn the committee at that point, he recognized, "Oh, there is a majority here. I cannot 
do that."569 The hearing continued with Exon presiding. Packwood and Burns took the side 
of the cable industry by linking the increase in channels provided by operators to what they 
saw as reasonable price increases. They tried to bring out this point in their questioning of 
city witnesses. In similar fashion, Danforth, Exon and other supporters tried to use 
testimony by the cable industry to establish they were participating in anti-competitive 
practices. 
Next to testify was a panel representing the cable TV industry consisting of James 
Mooney, President of NCTA, James C. Kennedy, Chairman and CEO of Cox [cable] 
Enterprises, and, R. E. (Ted) Turner, ill, President and Board Chairman of the Turner 
Broadcasting System. They provided their review of improvements made in cable TV 
programming and consumer value because of deregulation and expressed their collective 
opposition to S .  12. This panel anticipated adverse effects on cable TV industry investments 
in programming and technological improvements if Congress passed S. 12 .  They were 
critical of provisions that mandated competitor access to cable programming. Mooney 
emphasized the enhanced product that cable subscribers receive over that of six years ago. 
567 Ibid. 
568 Ibid, 104. 
569 Ibid. 
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He also pointed out that the industry was on the threshold of another technological upgrade 
through the use of fiber-optic cable to carry even more programming to its customers. 570 He 
also mentioned that provisions in S. 12 on "must-carry'' did not reflect agreements reached 
on S. 1880 with cities in the waning hours of the 101st Con�ess. 571 Kennedy emphasized 
increased channel capacities that would not have materialized without the investment 
available to a deregulated cable industry. His fear was that reregulation would stem further 
technological growth for cable TV. 572 In closing, they emphasized that competition for the 
cable TV industry did indeed exist. Specifically, Turner pointed out that "basic cable 
receives strong competition from broadcasting."573 He testified that "In 1990, broadcast 
stations had a 70 percent share of all television viewing in the United States, and basic cable, 
including super stations, had a 24 percent share."574 
Representatives of the broadcast industry testified next. Edward O. Fritts, President 
of the NAB and James B. Hedlund, President, Association of Independent TV Stations 
represented these interests. As expected, they expressed their support for S. 12 and the need 
for legislation requiring cable TV operators to carry local programming. A detailed analysis 
of anticompetitive trends in the cable TV industry was presented, including the practice of 
repositioning of channels for local stations. 575 Broadcasters believed this was an 
anticompetitive practice, charging that it confused viewers. The panel also described what 
they believed were adverse economic effects of cable TV practices on non-cable TV stations 
570 Ibid, 1 18. 
571 Ibid, 139. 
572 Ibid, 154-165. 
573 Ibid, 171 .  
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and networks. They presented their views on the impact and importance of S .  1 2's 
provisions for the future of free TV. 576 
The fourth panel of witnesses represented a mix of interests. The three witnesses 
were, Gene Kimmelman, Legislative Director for the CF A, D. J. Everett, ill, President, 
Community Broadcasters Association; and John Sodolski, President, U.S .  Telephone 
Association. This panel collectively supported S. 12 because of its perceived benefits to 
consumers. They also supported its proposed controls on rate increases and on 
anticompetitive practices. 
The final panel included Robert L. Schmidt, President, Wireless Cable Association 
International and Bob R. Phillips Ill, CEO, National Rural Telecommunications 
Cooperative. The basis of their support for S. 12 was the status given to the satellite-TV 
industry as an alternative to cable television. They believed it important for S. 12 to ensure 
access to programming for alternative distributors on reasonable terms. To make their point, 
they told of problems with obtaining satellite TV programming for distribution in rural areas. 
S. 12 Clears Committee. On May 14, the Senate Commerce Committee approved 
S. 12, by a vote of 16-3 after a mark-up of the bill. Among the more interesting aspects of 
the politics involved in marking up the bill between the subcommittee hearings and full 
committee consideration concerned the "must carry" issue. Support from broadcasters for 
the bill was enhanced when Inouye inserted a "retransmission consent" provision into the 
bill. It was a new approach to the "must carry" requirement that had generated so much 
conflict over the years. lnouye's measure gave broadcasters the choice of either forcing 
cable operators to carry their signals free or forfeiting that option and asking cable operators 
576 Ibid, 205 . 
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to compensate them for their programs. The measure attempted to heal a rift within the 
broadcast industry over whether to force cable systems to carry local broadcast stations. On 
the one hand, powerful broadcast stations wanted to sell their signals to cable operators. 
Conversely, smaller, independent stations perceived the so-called 'must-carry' option as 
more beneficial and wanted retransmission of their signals to be compulsory.m They feared 
that cable operators would drop them rather than negotiate to buy their signals. Inouye' s 
amendment, approved by voice vote, was an effort to please the two factions in the broadcast 
industry by including both options in the bill. 
lnouye's move gained support from among broadcasters, but there was an 
unexpected backlash from the film industry. It opposed the measure because studios would 
not receive any of the new revenues from retransmission payments. Ironically, this cast the 
powerful lobby for the movie industry as an ally of cable television in opposing passage of 
the bill. 578 The retransmission approach also provided organized cable industry interests 
with an historical basis for opposing the bill. It was able to emphasize that "must carry'' had 
been tried before, but was struck down by the courts. As early as 1965, the FCC had 
required cable systems to carry local stations. However, two federal courts rejected those 
rules in 1 985 and again in 1987, saying they violated First Amendment rights of cable 
programmers. 579 The NCT A strongly objected to the new provision. Moony characterrized 
the "supposed ' consumer bill' as a boondoggle for cable's main rivals."580 
577 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1991 ,  1 59- 160. 
578 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1992, 173 .  
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Thus, much of the concern over the bill in the Senate Commerce Committee markup 
focused on the legal effects of the Inouye provision. 581 A number of variations on the "must­
carry" concept were offered as amendments. In one particular case, the power of the 
subcommittee chair was demonstrated when Inouye denied a request by John B.  Breaux to 
offer an amendment that excluded home-shopping stations from the benefits of the must­
carry provision. Breaux had singled out the Home Shopping Network, a Florida-based 
broadcaster that sold merchandise over its own television stations. Breaux said it should not 
be accorded the same status as other over-the-air stations. Another variation involved 
Senator Ford when he offered a must-carry amendment that included low-power television 
stations. He wanted stations that had locally generated programming to be included under 
the definition of the over-the-air broadcasts signals that cable operators would be forced to 
carry. His amendment was adopted by voice vote. 582 
S. 12 set its own new standard for effective competition. It would consider 
competition adequate when at least half of an area's households are served by other 
competitors such as satellite systems or other cable operators with at least fifteen percent of 
the market share in the area. This standard was expected to bring a larger percent of cable 
operators under rate regulations. The bill also increased local authority to regulate rates and 
service and encouraged cities to seek second cable franchises to increase competition. The 
bill also included a new provision that would limit the ability of cable operators to avert 
regulation by shifting their most popular programming to another package. In addition, it 
would prohibit cable programmers from 'unreasonably' refusing to sell programming to 
competitors. It also prohibited cable programmers from discriminating against competitors 
581  Ibid. 
582 Ibid. 
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in pricing and terms on programming and ensuring that satellite networks did not favor cable 
operators over distributors for home satellite dishes in prices and programming access. 583 
Although Commerce Chairman Hollings expected changes to the essential provisions 
of the bill before it went to the floor, he still opted to report it, but not without complaints 
that the action was premature. In responding to this criticism, proponents asked to delay 
Senate floor action to see what steps the FCC would take to toughen regulatory guidelines 
for cable operators. While proponents waited, opposition to the bill became more intense. 584 
House Hearings. As the House awaited Senate action, members of the 
Telecommunications Subcommittee held hearings on March 20, and June 1 8, 26, and 27. 
Markey introduced H.R. 13 03 as a starting place for considering reregulation . 585 The bill 
as introduced was nearly identical to H. R. 5267 that passed the House in 1990 . 586 However, 
most Republicans who spoke at the March 20 subcommittee hearing opposed Markey' s bill. 
Matthew J. Rinaldo, ranking member of the subcommittee, was not a cosponsor of the House 
bill, as he was in 1 990. The sole co-sponsor was Chairman John Dingell. The partisanship 
that was developing around this bill was similar to that evident in the Senate. 587 
583 Ibid. 
584 Ibid. 
585 Mike Mills, "Cable Reregulation Backers Seek Broader Support," CQ 
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On March 20 the subcommittee heard from cities who mainly listed again the 
problems they had with cable operators. Collectively, they tried to paint a picture of the 
FCC as ineffective in regulating rates for cable service. m · The only other witness to testify 
was FCC Chairman Alfred Sikes. In his testimony, he urged the committee to allow the new 
FCC rules raising the criteria for eff ecitive competition to six other video sources to take full 
effect before legislating again. s89 
In the 1990 House bill H.R. 5267, a balance was achieved when a fragile agreement 
was reached between broadcasters and the cable industry that required cable operators to 
carry local broadcast stations. 590 However, the willingness of cable interest to cooperate on 
any provisions was squashed when, on June 27, Markey added provisions to H.R. 1303 
requiring the FCC to regulate basic rates for all cable operators regardless of how 
competitive their markets. The NCT A urged the subcommittee to not adopt a must carry 
proposal that was similar to the one Inouye placed in S.  12. James Mooney, speaking for the 
association, likened the provision as "imposing a surcharge on the community antenna 
function of cable systems."591 Conversely, Laurence Tish, chairman of CBS defended the 
retransmission consent plan as important to the future viability of free broadcast television. 
The hearing on June 26 considered H.R. 2546, a bill introduced by Representatives 
Boucher and Oxley. Their bill intended to allow independent telephone companies, and in 
some cases, Bell companies to carry video programming, own up to 25 percent share of the 
programming they carried and set up franchises to compete with cable operators. In return 
588 Cable Television Regulation Hearing, 101- 186. 
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the telephone companies would build a nationwide broadband communications system. 
Gore and Bums had offered a companion bill in the Senate. 592 
The remaining hearing sessions focused on the demands made by broadcasters and 
phone companies to allow them to compete with cable operators. 
The Administration 's Role 
The White House. In 1991 ,  the administration opposed bills more actively and at an 
earlier stage in the process. 593 Senior White House officials met the week of March 6 with 
some Republicans on the House Telecommunications Subcommittee to encourage them to 
fight the cable reregulation. On March 13,  the administration wrote to Congress on its 
position that "more competition rather than more regulation, was needed. "  In addition, the 
administration expressed its preference for removing restrictions prohibiting telephone 
companies from entering the cable programming industry.594 
Federal Communications Commission Action. On June 13, 1991 ,  the Commission 
adopted new rules that redefined effective competition, established guidelines for the 
regulation of basic service rates in the absence of effective competition and revised the 
procedural requirements for franchising authorities regulating such rates. 595 Supporters of 
reregulation claimed the FCC ruling would improve, not diminish, support for new 
regulations. The agency tightened the standard that cable companies must meet to avoid 
59
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regulation. Under the 1984 Act, the FCC did not regulate rates for cable television service. 
After the effective date in 1987, rates for basic cable service were regulated by local 
franchising authorities, but only if the cable franchise area was served by fewer than three 
unduplicated broadcast signals. In 1 991 ,  the FCC increased the threshold to six signals, 
boosting the percentage of cable systems subject to local rate regulation from only 3 percent 
to an estimated 34 percent. 596 However, what may appear as a loss for the cable industry 
might actually have been an attempt to stem the flood of legislative actions by acquiescing 
to a tighter set of agency regulations that could be open to negotiation at a later time. 
However, the Senate gave serious consideration to the GAO report which demonstrated that 
the FCC's June (1991)  effective competition decision did not address the problem of 
runaway cable rates. According to the GAO report, under this definition, 80 percent of cable 
subscriber rates would not be subject to rate regulation. 597 Convinced that the FCC actions 
were too little too late, S. 12 included its own more rigorous criteria for effective 
competition. 
Summary 
During 1991 ,  the debate over cable TV reregulation became more partisan. The Bush 
administration strongly opposed reregulation of the industry. Ironically, the basis for the 
Bush administrations opposition was its preference for introducing competition into the 
cable area rather than more regulation. This included allowing telephone companies to 
compete with cable operators. The administrations strong stance against reregulation 
encouraged the cable industry such that they refused to cooperate in any way in preparing 
596 CQWR, 1991,  160. 
597 Ibid. 
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new legislation. If no legislation could be passed, neither could telephone companies enter 
the cable service market. 
Senate bill S. 12 was introduced primarily to strengthen FCC regulations for basic 
cable service. It established more rigorous criteria for effective competition. The provisions 
in the 1984 Act that allowed cable operators to be considered subject to effective 
competition when as little as three broadcast stations were operating in the area had resulted 
in regulation of rates to apply to only a very few cable systems. There was a lack of 
confidence in the ability of the FCC's new rule to raise the number of stations constituting 
competition to six to produce the necessary regulation of rates. Although it was introduced 
early, S. 12 never reached the Senate floor because of other pending business at the end of 
the session and because of the threat of many amendments to weaken the regulatory 
provisions. Additionally, many Republican opponents wanted the Senate to wait to vote on 
the bill until after the FCC had the opportunity to issue new regulations of their own. While 
one bill was introduced in the House of Representatives, the only actions taken was to hold 
hearings. Many members of that chamber wanted to wait to see what action the Senate 
would take. 
Reregulation is Passed: 1992 
Enactment of The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act 
occurred after the following key congressional actions in 1992. On January 3 1 , the Senate 
overwhelmingly passed S. 12 by a vote of 73 to 18 . This vote occurred after the Senate 
rejected a weaker substitute measure offered by Packwood. On July 23 , the House passed 
H.R. 4850 by a vote of 340 to 73 . The Senate failed to pass the House version of S. 12  (as 
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amended by passage of H.R. 4850) on August 12, thus establishing disagreement between 
the House and Senate versions of the bill. The Senate did, however, agree to a conference 
on the legislation. On September 14, the Conference Report on S. 12 was submitted to the 
House and three days later, on September 17, it was adopted by a vote of 280 to 128. The 
Senate adopted the report on September 22 by a vote of74 to 25 and sent S .  12 to President 
Bush for signature. However, as he had threatened, Bush vetoed the bill. 
President Bush' s veto came on October 3 ,  very close to the end of the congressional 
session when many members were anxious to leave in time to tend to election business. But 
on October 5, just before Congress adjourned, both houses voted to override the President' s 
veto, the Senate by 74 to 25 and the House by 308 to 1 14. 598 The heat of the battle to 
override the veto overshadowed the fact that the enactment was the "only large scale 
reregulation of any industry in the Reagan-Bush era."599 It was also the first and only 
override of a veto by President Bush. Thirty-two days later, on November 7, 1992, George 
H. W. Bush lost the presidential election to William Jefferson Clinton. 
Senate Action 
On January 3 1 , the Senate overwhelmingly passed S. 12 by 73- 1 8  with Senator 
Inouye serving as the floor manager.600 Consideration of the bill began on January 27 and 
ended on January 3 1  after twenty-one amendments were offered. Seventeen of the 
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amendments were adopted, two were withdrawn, and two were rejected. The most notable 
of the rejected amendments was a motion to consider a substitute version of the bill. 
Senate Floor Debate. Senator Inouye, Chairman of the Communications 
Subcommittee served as the floor manager for the bill. Senator John Danforth, was the 
sponsor of the bill, and senators Inouye, Hollings, Gore, Gorton, Lieberman, and 
Metzenbaum, were the original co-sponsors of the bill. Six other co-sponsors were added 
in the year after introduction. However, of those six, only Gorton and Hatch were 
Republicans. S. 12 was very similar to S. 1880 which was approved by the Commerce 
Committee in June 1990 by a vote of 18 to 1. The focus of the bill, like S. 1880, was to 
address consumer's problems with rates and services while at the same time promoting 
competition. 601 
As the floor manager for the bill, Inouye was clear about his position. 
I believe that the cable industry has begun to take advantage ofits popularity. 
In certain instances, . . . rate increases have been excessive and, for many 
systems, customer service has been abominable. Programmers argued that 
they could not get carried on cable systems without relinquishing control of 
their product. Competing video distributors alleged that the programmers 
refused to deal with them. In general, it appeared that the cable industry 
possessed undue market power. Over three years, the Communications 
Subcommittee held 13 hearings on cable related issues. They listened to over 
50 hours of testimony from 113 different witnesses. At last, the bill passed 
the committee by a vote of 16 to 3 .  602 
The amendment offered as a substitute to S. 12, was proposed January 3 0  by 
Packwood, Wirth, Stevens, Bums, Dole, Shelby, Rudman, Simpson, Breaux, senators Wyche 
Fowler Jr. (D-Georgia), Jake Garn (R-Utah), and John Kerry (D-Massachusetts). It 
601 Congress, Senate, Senator Inouye of Hawaii speaking in favor of adoption 
of S. 12 during floor debate, 102nd Cong. , 2nd sess. , Congressional Record, 
January 29, 1992: S561. 
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attempted to weaken the regulatory provisions of the bill. It eliminated language aimed at 
giving cable competitors better access to cable programs and contained no limits on cable 
system ownership. It contained favorable language on franchise reform that fundamentally 
favored cable's renewal rights. It also contained extremely liberal language in defining 
effective competition as at least "one or more independently owned multichannel video 
programming distributors."603 On January 3 1 , The amendment was soundly rejected by 3 5-
54. 604 Though the substitute was rejected, sponsors agreed to add two ofits provisions to the 
main bill to encourage the administration's support. One would prohibit local governments 
from awarding exclusive cable franchises. A second would broaden an exemption to a 1984 
ban on telephone company entry into the cable business by allowing rural phone companies 
in areas with populations of 10,000 or less to offer cable services. 605 
With the exception of the Packwood substitute amendment and another amendment 
by Jessie Helms, all amendments were disposed of by voice votes. Six of the adopted 
amendments dealt with prohibiting violence, indecency or unsolicited pornography in cable 
programming. The Helms amendment was approved 95-0 and allowed cable operators to 
ban pornographic programs and require operators to place such shows on one channel 
available only upon subscriber request. 606 Another amendment, offered by Fowler and 
approved by a voice vote, allowed cable operators to ban the use of any public educational 
channels for programs containing "obscene" material. Of the two amendments rejected, one 
was the Packwood substitute and the other was offered by Brown and intended to modify 
provisions related to the "must-carry'' provisions in S. 12. It was rejected by voice vote. 
603 Congressional Record, January 30, 1 992: S 689. 
604 Congressional Record, January 3 1 , 1992: S 71 1 .  
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During his urging for floor passage, Inouye promoted his provision addressing 
retransmission consent for broadcasters. "I want to respond once again to the cable 
industry's campaign of misinformation about its effect on consumers' cable rates. One 
fallacy they promote is that S. 12 will allow the TV networks to add a '20 percent surcharge 
to cable subscribers' bills. "'607 He believed the cable industry had misinterpreted the 
provisions and encouraged the NCTA to study the measure carefully. In defending the 
retransmission provision, he stated, 
Gone are the days when the broadcasters received their revenues from 
advertisers and cable received there revenues solely from subscribers. 
[Today] as we all know, cable competes with broadcasters for local and 
national advertising. The retransmission provisions of S. 12 will permit local 
station� not national networks, as I have indicated, to control the use of their 
signals 8 
To eliminate any doubt about this issue, Inouye offered a manager's amendment to 
the bill to make certain that retransmission consent did not result in rate increases. In 
addition, the FCC would be required to regulate the rates for the basic tier -- this is the tier 
that contains the broadcast signals -- to make certain that those rates remain reasonable. 
Thus, the FCC had a clear mandate to ensure that retransmission did not result in harmful 
rate increases. 609 
S. 12 was then sent to the House with a request for concurrence. 
House Action 
The House waited until mid- 1992 to weigh in on the increasingly controversial cable 
debate. On March 25, Markey introduced an unnumbered bill, later to become H. R. 4850. 
607 Ibid, S562. 
608 Ibid, S563 . 
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It was adopted by the subcommittee in the form of a substitute amendment for H.R. 13 03 to 
reregulate cable TV. He vowed to "rein in the renegades" who charged "exorbitant rates, 
provided poor service and hoarded programming. " He believed the bill was "pro-consumer, 
pro-competition legislation. "610 
Markey's bill was the product of subcommittee "Democrats, backed by the lobbying 
support of consumer groups, labor unions, and -- most importantly -- the National 
Association of Broadcasters. "611 This pitted a coalition of powerful lobbying organizations 
against the cable industry and its allies. 
Subcommittee Republicans were cool to the bill and had not been involved in its 
preparation. In fact, no Republican attended a March 25 briefing on the bill. And indeed, 
key Republicans on the subcommittee met with White House Chief of Staff Samuel K. 
Skinner on March 25 to discuss strategies to defeat the bill. In the end, the bill did move 
from subcommittee to committee, then to the floor and passage. 
At the Committee Level. An early complication concerned the struggle among 
broadcasters, Hollywood studios and cable operators for use of over-the-air signals. Similar 
to the Inouye retransmission consent provision in S .  12, Representatives Markey and Dennis 
E. Eckart (D-Ohio) sought to give broadcasters the option of negotiating with cable operators 
for permission to retransmit their local signals for a fee, or simply allowing the cable 
operator to carry the signal for free. 612 The movie studios had tried to revise the provision 
610 Mike Mills, "House Panel's Reregulation Bill Targets Cable TV 




in the Senate bill that allowed broadcasters to negotiate fees when their signals are carried 
by cable operators. The studio interests contended that the bill, as written, diminished their 
control over copyrighted programming. Jack Valenti, the major lobbyist for the motion 
picture industry, sought help from the House Judiciary Committee, which had jurisdiction 
over copyright issues. 613 This produced a jurisdictional conflict. Jack Brooks (D-Texas) 
chairman of the Judiciary Committee, and Intellectual Property Subcommittee Chairman 
William J. Hughes (D-New Jersey) opposed the retransmission consent provision on the 
grounds that the copyright claims of film producers were ignored, and copyright matters 
were within the jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee. They wanted language that would 
produce revenue for local broadcasters and for Hollywood. 614 In the end, Markey prevailed 
when he insisted that retransmission consent fell fully within the jurisdiction of 
Telecommunications Subcommittee and was unrelated to copyright questions. 615 
A markup on the bill was scheduled for March 30, but was delayed for a week 
because it became apparent that several Democrats were siding with Republicans to push for 
a weaker bill. 616 On April 8, Markey had to struggle to muster the votes to get his bill out 
of his subcommittee. The panel approved the draft by a vote of 17-7, after rejecting a 
weaker alternative by Representative Norman F. Lent (R-New York) by a 12 - 14  vote. 
Markey' s bill prevailed despite the defections of Democrats Thomas J. Manton and James 
613 "Inside Washington: Down but Still Wired," The National Journal, (The 
National Journal, Inc.), February 1 5, 1992, Vol. 24, 7: 373 .  
614 CQWR, March 28, 1992, 797. 
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616 Mike Mills, "Protests From Panel Democrats Snag Cable Reregulation 
Bill," CQ Weekly Report, April 4, 1992, 872. 
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H. Scheuer of New York and Bill Richardson ofNew Mexico. The three Democrats voted 
"present" on the final bill, while three Republicans switched to support the measure.617 
The divisive actions of the subcommittee centered on two of the bill's key 
provisions: One would require the FCC to set rates for broadly defined basic cable service 
that would include local and distant over-the-air signals and possibly even the most popular 
cable channels such as CNN and MTV. Lent' s alternative, backed by the cable industry, 
accepted the notion of basic rate regulation but proposed limiting the definition of a basic 
program tier to only broadcast and public, educational and government channels. 618 The 
other provision most objectionable to opponents would ban cable affiliated programmers 
from unreasonably refusing to sell programming to cable competitors such as satellites and 
so called wireless microwave cable systems. 619 
Questions were raised about why Richardson, Manton and Scheuer so strongly 
supported the cable position for weaker regulation, particularly because none of them had 
overtly sided with cable in the past . In reaction, consumer groups launched a media 
campaign to criticize the Democrats, with whom they had largely been allied on other issues. 
For New Yorkers Manton and Scheuer, the hometown influence ofTime-Wamer Inc. played 
a role. The nation' s second-largest cable operator controlled systems in Manhattan, 
Brooklyn, and Queens. "Like all congressmen, we take into account the hometown 
industry," Manton said, adding that "Time-Warner employed about 2,000 people in his 
district, while complaints about cable rates had been few. But there wasn't any pressure. I 
617 Mike Mills, "Markey's  Cable Reregulation Bill Survives Democrats' 




keep my own counsel. "620 A Scheuer spokesman said any implications that his vote was tied 
to campaign contributions was "stretching it. His only motivating factor was to get a bill 
that could pass."621 Richardson said he wanted to "ensure that cable operators would not be 
banned from negotiating exclusive deals with program providers. "622 
Markey's only defeat came with the rejection, by voice vote, of a provision that 
established local citizens' groups to monitor local cable operators and franchising 
authorities. The groups would have no authority to lodge complaints about cable abuses. 
The provision was pushed by consumer organizations, including Ralph Nader' s Public 
Citizen Group. 623 A similar provision was proposed to the Senate Commerce Committee 
staff by the CF A, according to Ward White. "There were some things that people tried to 
get in [the bill] that would have killed it if they had gotten in. For example, the consumer 
federation wanted a CUB [Citizens Utility Board] put in. Well, I told them that if they 
wanted that, the bill would never go anywhere. "624 
H.R. 4850 went next to the full Energy and Commerce Committee for consideration. 
On June 1 7, it approved a scaled-down version of the bill. Two controversial provisions 
were eliminated which Chairman Dingell said would cause the bill to get bogged down by 
opponents on the Judiciary Committee. One was the broadcast retransmission consent 
proposal. The other provision was to bolster competition by giving satellite distributors and 
other potential competitors lower-priced access to cable programming. 
620 Ibid, 945. 
621 Ibid. 
622 Ibid. 
623 Ibid, 946. 
624 White interview. 
267 
On the other side, the bill was amended to make it tougher on the industry.625 An 
amendment by Jim Cooper authorized the FCC to order refunds to consumers for any rate 
increases collected by a cable company after a complaint was lodged until it determined 
whether price-gouging had occurred. It passed by voice vote with little debate. Another by 
Ralph M. Hall (D-Texas), allowed local broadcasters to expand the number of cable systems 
that would be forced to carry their signals under the so-called must-carry requirements if 
they transmitted between two large metropolitan areas. It also was approved by voice 
vote.626 
Other amendments adopted by the Energy and Commerce Committee included 
requiring the FCC to study the migration of sports programming from free broadcast 
television to subscription cable and pay-per-view television; allowing cable franchise 
authorities to set local rates for pay-per-view events that involved any professional sports 
championship featuring their hometown team, and requiring broadcasters to comply with 
equal employment opportunity guidelines. 627 
An attempt by Cooper to set up consumer watch dog groups were defeated by voice 
vote. 
The full committee approved the bill 3 1 -12. A substitute was offered by Lent that 
was similar to that offered in the subcommittee, but it was rejected by a party-line vote of 
1 5-27. Four Republicans crossed party lines to support the final bill: Matthew J. Rinaldo, 
Carlos J. Moorhead (R-Califomia), Michael Bilirakis (R-Florida), and Fred Upton (R-
625 CQWR, June 20, 1992, 1787. 
626 Ibid. 
627 Ibid 176. , 
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Michigan). Democrats Manson and Scheuer ofNew York, and Richardson ofNew Mexico, 
who had supported Republicans wanting a weaker bill in the April 8 action of the 
subcommittee, switched back to vote with their party. 628 
House Floor Action. On July 23, the House passed the cable bill by a vote that was 
viewed as a solid victory for cable TV's opponents, broadcasters and consumers. Markey 
was the floor manager for the bill. Ten amendments were offered. Three, offered by 
Dingell, Slattery (R-Kansas), and Billy Tauzin (D-Louisiana) were adopted. Four offered 
by Oxley, Shays, Manton, and Lent were rejected. And three amendments were 
withdrawn. 629 
The first real sign that President Bush was on the losing side of the cable issue came 
on a crucial amendment by Tauzin to replace the program access provision dropped from the 
bill by the Energy and Commerce Committee. Tauzin' s amendment received overwhelming 
backing 238-68. 630 
Before consideration of Tauzin' s amendment, Manton had offered an amendment to 
weaken an anti-vertical integration provision in the bill regarding programming access. He 
called the Tauzin amendment "far-reaching and radical," saying it would set a government 
mandated price for programming and cause program creators to lose control over their 
product. Manton stated that the satellite industry wanted "more than a jump start, they 
wanted a free ride."631 His amendment was less restrictive than Tauzin's. It would bar any 
628 Ibid, 175 .  
629 Congressional Record, July 23, 1992: H 6520-6545 . 
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programming vendor "controlled" by a cable operator, rather than "affiliated," from refusing 
to deal with cable competitors to restrain competition. It also did not address discrimination 
in the prices, terms or conditions of program contracts. It also allowed programmers and 
operators to enter into exclusive contracts. Manton' s amendment was backed by Dingell, 
members of the House Democratic leadership and the cable lobby. Yet, after impassioned 
speeches by both Tauzin and Manton, the Manton amendment failed by a vote of 1 62-24 7. 632 
In comparison, Tauzin' s amendment would bar cable affiliated programmers from 
refusing to sell programs at fair prices and terms to home satellite dish and wireless cable 
industries. It would also allow exclusive contracts between programmers and operators only 
if the FCC determined they were in the public interest. 633 The Administration opposed the 
Tauzin amendment because it restricted the discretion of cable programmers in distributing 
their product. Requiring programming networks that are commonly owned with cable 
systems to make their product available to competing distributors could undermine the 
incentives of cable operators to invest in developing new programming. 634 Nevertheless, the 
amendment passed overwhelmingly, 23 8-68635 
After adoption of the Tauzin amendment, the House considered an amendment 
offered by Lent. 636 Supported by the Bush Administration, it eliminated or significantly 
modified many of the excessively regulatory provisions ofH.R. 4850. It reduced the use of 
632 Congressional Record, July 23, 1992: H 6532. 
633 Ibid, H 653 1 .  
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exclusive local franchising which the White House saw as one impediment to competition 
in the cable industry. It was still defeated by a vote of 144-266.637 
The bill, as amended, then passed the House by a wide margin of 340-73 . 638 Ninety­
eight Republicans joined with 24 1 Democrats in voting aye. Many of these defectors were 
from rural areas where broadcast signals could not reach and viewers had to rely on cable 
and satellite television for reception639 Coupled with a voting margin of 73- 1 8  for the 
Senate's  companion bill, a confrontation was set up between Congress and President 
Bush. 640 The Bush administration continued to voice its opposition to reregulating cable TV 
until competition was established. In that regard, the White House pointed to a July 16 
ruling by the FCC that allowed telephone companies to carry video programs over a "video 
dial tone. "641 
Easy passage was attributable to the fact that sponsors had succeeded in keeping 
some controversial issues out of the debate, the telephone-cable issue, for one. They also 
avoided a fight with the Judiciary Committee over how to compensate broadcasters who 
provided programs to cable operators. Furthermore, the Rules Committee declined to allow 
two competing amendments to the bill: One was the Eckart retransmission consent provision 
dropped in the committee markup. The other was Hughes' that would overhaul the entire 
637 Ibid. 
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copyright royalty payment system while requiring the cable industry to pay broadcasters, 
program creators and sports leagues for use of broadcast programs. 642 
Sponsors were confident that the broadcaster retransmission consent provision that 
was in the Senate bill would be retained in the final conference version. Even though 
Judiciary Committee Chairman Brooks promised to continue to fight against the provision 
in the conference committee stage, he ultimately declined to attend the conference meetings 
after he concluded he did not have the votes to prevail on the issue.643 
Final Action 
As the two bills headed for conference, the differences in the bills were, as expected, 
concentrated in the areas of rate regulation and competition. 
Differences. Regarding regulating rates charged for cable service, the House version 
authorized the FCC to set maximum prices and to ensure that rates for basic packages 
offered by cable systems were reasonable. H. R. 4850 defined basic packages to include all 
broadcast signals carried by a cable operator, and all public, educational and government 
access channels. Local franchise authorities would enforce the basic service prices by using 
FCC guidelines. To monitor prices of other program packages, a franchising authority or 
a state or a local government could protest unreasonable cable prices. Subscribers would be 




the FCC. The automatic annual rate hike of 5 percent allowed under the 1 984 Act was 
repealed.644 
In S. 12, the FCC would ensure that basic cable rates were reasonable, and at a level 
that would be left up to the agency to define. Basic cable service simply included at least all 
local broadcast signals. Local government :franchise authorities would be able to regulate 
basic rates as long as such authorities followed FCC regulations. To monitor prices for 
packages other than the basic tier, excluding premium movie channels and pay-per-view 
events, cable subscribers and :franchising authorities could protest to the FCC about 
unreasonable rates, and the FCC could lower rates it found excessive. 645 
An issue related to rates was the topic of basic packages. In the House bill, cable 
operators were required to offer all local and distant broadcast signals as part of their basic 
package, including so-called superstations. Also, within five years, or where technically 
feasible, cable operators were banned from forcing customers to subscribe to a higher-priced 
package in order to receive a premium movie channel, such as HBO or Cinemax, or a 
pay-per-view event. The Senate version limited cable operators from avoiding rate 
regulation by turning their basic program packages into stripped- down, unpopular packages, 
by applying rate regulation to the lowest-priced cable package subscribed to by at least 30 
percent of all customers. 646 
The provisions to control of competition provided the most significant differences 
in the bills. The House bill contained a provision intended to give cable competitors, such 




as home satellite dish program packages and microwave "wireless" cable systems, better 
access to cable programming at fair terms. It barred cable-affiliated programmers from 
unreasonably refusing to deal with cable competitors in the price, terms and conditions of 
programs. But cable-affiliated programmers would be able to set different prices, account 
for differences in the cost of creating, selling, delivering or transmitting programs, and offer 
volume discounts. They also could enter into exclusive contracts when the FCC finds such 
contracts to be in the public interest. 647 The Senate bill included a similar program-access 
provision, but it had fewer allowances for price differences and would offer no explicit 
permission to enter into exclusive contracts. In a key difference with the House bill, the 
Senate bill also would give broadcasters the power to extract fees from cable operators. The 
so-called retransmission consent provision, authored by Inouye, would allow broadcasters 
to either force a cable operator to carry their signals free of charge or to forfeit that option 
and negotiate with the cable operator to receive compensation for the retransmission of its 
signal. This provision did not make it into the House bill because of an effort to avoid a 
jurisdictional dispute with the Judiciary Committee. 648 
In the House bill, franchising authorities would be prohibited from granting exclusive 
franchises to cable operators. Cities and towns would be allowed to establish and operate 
competing cable systems. However, in S. 12, franchise authorities would be barred from 
unreasonably refusing to award additional franchises. Cities would also be allowed to 
establish and operate competing cable systems. 649 
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H.R. 4850 included a provision for the FCC to study the impact of cable operators 
owning programming, or vertical integration, and limit their control over large shares of the 
nation's subscribers, or horizontal integration. In the Senate bill, the FCC would limit 
vertical and horizontal integration within the cable industry. 6so 
Conference. On September 9, House and Senate negotiators approved the conference 
report for S .  12 by voice vote. In a rapid two and a half hour meeting, conferees settled the 
few substantial differences between the two bills that had not been resolved by the respective 
staffs over the August recess. 6s1 Issues settled before the conferees met included the 
provisions for rate-setting and granting cable competitors better access to cable-originated 
programming. 6s2 
Regarding the regulation of rates, the conferees adopted the language from the House 
bill with two changes. One was to state specifically in Section 623(b) that the FCC shall 
regulate rates for basic service tiers to ensure they are reaso_nable. The other was to add a 
provision that directed the FCC to seek to reduce the administrative burdens on subscribers, 
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permit subscribers, as well as franchising authorities or other relevant state or local 
government entities to file complaints with the FCC. 654 
Regarding anti-competitive measures, the conference agreement adopted the Senate 
provision that bars national and regional cable programmers affiliated with cable operators 
from unreasonably refusing to deal with any multichannel video programming distributor 
and in discriminating in the price, terms, and conditions in the sale of their programming to 
multichannel video distributors to avoid impeding retail competition. m 
The House version required that any television broadcast station signal carried by the 
cable operator be provided in the basic tier, including superstations. The conferees agreed 
to delete the requirement that superstations be carried on the basic tier. The conference 
agreement allowed cable operators to decide whether to carry superstations in the basic tier 
or on other tiers in their own discretion. 656 
Two controversial provisions were dropped from the final bill by the conferees. One 
in the House version dealt with the migration of sports events from free television to pay­
per-view charges. It was dropped from the final version by the conferees agreeing to rely on 
the Senate' s provision on uniform rate structure. 657 Another dealt with a House provision 
to bar foreign ownership of cable systems. The conferees adopted the Senate position, which 
was silence on the issue. 658 
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The home satellite-dish and wireless cable industries enjoyed an advantage in their 
effort to gain cheaper access to cable programming. The conferees accepted House 
language, similar to the Senate bill, that would bar cable operators who owned a financial 
interest in programming from improperly influencing decisions regarding the price, terms 
and conditions of program sales to non-cable competitors. 659 Also a House provision that 
would have allowed local governments to set the price for pay-per-view championship 
professional sporting events was rejected because of opposition from the Senate conferees 
and House Republicans. However, conferees did agree to allow the FCC to study the 
issue.660 
The provision from S. 12 to broaden an exemption to a 1984 ban on telephone 
company entry into the cable market by allowing rural phone companies in areas with 
population of 10,000 or less to offer cable service was dropped from the bill in conference 
committee. 
On September 17, the House adopted the final version of the conference committee's 
cable bill. 661 Even though continuing intense opposition from the cable industry and the 
movie producers, causing 5 8 House members who had voted for passage to vote against the 
conference report, the House passed it by 280-128. 662 The strength of this vote indicated that 
the House could still manage the two-thirds votes necessary to override a threatened veto by 
President Bush. 663 Bush sent a letter to Republican leaders that same day saying, "My vision 
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for the · future of the communications industry is based on the principles of greater 
entrepreneurship and less economic regulation. This legislation fails each of these tests and 
is illustrative of the congressional mandates and excessive regulations that drag our economy 
down."664 
On September 22, the Senate passed the final version of S .  12 by a vote of 74-25. 
The vote for passage represented more than the two-thirds majority that would be needed to 
override a veto by the President and included many Republicans.665 The Bush 
administration, however, did not back away from its threat to veto the bill. 
Veto Override 
On October 3, President Bush vetoed the bill stating that the burdens ofreregulation 
would cause cable television rates to rise, and not decrease as proponents claimed. 666 Bush, 
his Chief of Staff James A. Baker ill and Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole (R-Kansas), 
worked hard to persuade enough senators to abandon their support for the legislation. In 
doing so, the White House cast the showdown vote on the cable bill as a critical test of 
presidential loyalty. But on October 5, the Congress resoundingly rejected the argument in 
overriding the veto. 667 Both chambers surpassed the two-thirds majorities needed for the 
first override of 3 6 vetoes, despite intense pressure on Republican senators to side with the 
president just weeks ahead of the November 3 national election. 668 Minority Whip Al 
Simpson, who supported the bill, but offered to switch his vote in behalf of Bush, said the 
664 Ibid. 
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White House came close to winning the 34 senators needed to sustain the veto. "We never 
could bump up past 33 votes, said Simpson, who ended up voting for the final bill. But if 
we had two or three more votes, we'd have made it. "669 In the end, only 25 senators took the 
President' s side. 
The House followed by voting to override by 308-114. That was a greater margin 
than the 280-128 vote in the House when it adopted the conference report on September 17. 
No members switched their votes to the President' s side, but 14 went from ' nay' to override 
the veto. 670 
Conclusion 
During this round of legislation, the cable industry lost on nearly every policy 
position they supported. The results were directly opposite to the outcome of the 1984 Act 
when the cable industry received a real boost from Congress. This outcome was rooted in 
a number of the cable industry' s actions. One was the rapid manner in which operators 
raised rates while failing to pay attention to the need to educate the subscribing public to the 
increases in programming and channel capacities that drove those increases. In fact, the 
industry was often accused of being arrogant in dealing with customers. Similarly, it did not 
cultivate the support of elected officials until too late in the reregulation effort, depending 
too heavily on the anti-regulatory, pro-market philosophy of the Bush Administration. This 
669 Ibid. 
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false sense of security extended to the belief that the FCC and courts would strike down 
regulations that could be found to violate First Amendment rights of cable operators. 
On the other hand, consumers and broadcasters were winners on issues important to 
them. They were successful in defining the policy issue as the need to control a powerful 
monopolistic industry. Here it is clear that the cable industry failed to realize the importance 
of the majority party change in Congress and what that meant in terms of a preference for 
regulatory policies. The rapid economic success for the cable industry did not provide the 
necessary political savvy to assure a continuation of that success. As a result, the new policy 
was a boon for broadcasters. 
It is easy to view these outcomes as a "war'' between large competing industry 
interest groups. However, it was more of a struggle between advocates of regulation and 
advocates of competitive market approaches to eliminating or avoiding potentially 
monopolistic industries. The policy struggle was fought over defining the issue. Advocates 
for regulatory policies were successful in defining the issue as a consumer protection 
function and were willing to support the policy needs of cable' s main competition in 
exchange for their support in framing the issue as protecting American consumers . . 
Conversely, interests that supported policies directed at creating more competition were 
unsuccessful in making their case to allow free-market approaches to control any long­
standing dominance by any individual industry or technology. Advocates of this approach 
envisioned free competition that would allow new technologies to develop, flourish, and 
replace older technologies. These in turn would be replaced by even newer technologies. 
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Thus the winners were those who defined the policy issue in terms best understood 





This chapter presents an analysis of the case studies conducted. It will examine the 
cases in terms of general aspects of cable television regulation issues and some of the 
problems Congress faced in establishing a national regulatory policy. It discusses the 
essential features of the politics of cable television regulation in relation to the literature on 
group interests. Observations about the deregulation and reregulation experience are 
compared with some of the primary theoretical models of interest group activities. Finally, 
the relationship between politics and policies are discussed in terms of outcomes of the two 
cases. 
In the general realm of studying regulatory policy development, focus is on the 
actions of Congress in deciding whether or not the cable TV industry should be regulated, 
and if it so, how regulatory policy should be structured. 
Regulatory Policy for Cable Television as a Case Study 
This study is essentially the story of the difficulties regarding formulating a national 
policy for a relatively new industry that relied on a rapidly developing technology and that 
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lacked a mature regulatory structure. These two aspects serve as crucial influences 
throughout the quest to resolve the policy issue and caused the development of regulatory 
policy to follow a jagged path. Regulation of the industry wandered from little or no 
regulation, to a hodge-podge of regulation at the state and local levels, to a national policy 
of deregulation enacted after contentious legislative battles. After becoming deregulated in 
the first phase of national policy, the industry soon faced political charges of operating as 
an unbridled monopoly, gouging consumers and systematically excluding competitors. 
Congress then reregulated the industry less than ten years after deregulation occurred. The 
path proceeds from early rule making by the FCC to rulings by federal courts through 
campaigns by organized interests to stymie the growth of the industry, on to negotiated 
compromises with the major opposition interests, to finally surviving attacks by rival 
communications competitors. 
As one former staff aide described the progression of communications policy, "The 
key to understanding communications problems in politics is not to focus on one institution. 
It's to focus on the interplay of Congress, the FCC, and the courts."671 This study begins with 
the time when several federal institutions were struggling with the need to change the 
regulatory scheme for the communications sector. The FCC, the courts, and the Department 
of Justice were trying to modify the manner in which the dominant telecommunications 
monopoly, AT&T, would be regulated as a result of unprecedented challenges from newly 
developed technologies. In response to those changes, certain policy entrepreneurs in 
Congress, who believed that starting over was the only way to create an effective national 
communications policy, attempted to completely re-write the Communications Act of 1934. 
These entrepreneurs also tried to include cable television in their revision of the act. The 
time in which these efforts took place coincided with a wave of deregulation in the late 
671 Aylward interview. 
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1970s and early 1980s. Deregulation had already taken place in other economic regulatory 
arenas such as motor carriers and airlines. 
The journey · took place amidst rapid technological changes in the industry and 
uncertainty as to how best to regulate the medium. Similar to the telephone industry, the 
issue of regulating cable TV became problematic as rapid changes occurred in the 
technology used. The initial methods were simple. Community antenna television used tall 
towers to receive signals and used cables to extend television programs into areas that could 
not receive broadcast signals. They usually provided four to six local channels through 
connections to a community distribution system. Then, the development and use of satellite 
broadcasting to transmit programming enabled cable operators to import additional signals 
from distant markets and to provide twelve or more channels of entertainment to any who 
wanted to subscribe. Finally, when broad-band transmission capabilities were developed, 
twenty-four to forty-eight or more channels were offered along with the possibility of two­
way communications. The first of these technologies had been in place since the early 
1950s. The second phase in the technology development occurred in the late 1970s and early 
1 980s when Congress sought to establish a deregulatory policy for cable TV. The latter 
phase occurred during the time the industry was considered deregulated between 1987 and 
1992. These rapid technological advances in cable capacity had a severe impact on, among 
others, local broadcast stations. The FCC found that importation of distant television signals 
could seriously degrade the programming product offered by broadcasters, causing a 
reduction in advertising revenues for service to households not subscribing to cable systems. 
Cable TV was in serious conflict with broadcasters for local video entertainment markets. 
In the context of rapid technological changes that were taking place, there existed a 
great deal of uncertainty regarding regulation of cable TV. Since there existed no national 
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policy on regulation of the industry, and the courts had at various times ruled the FCC lacked 
authority over the medium, the existing regulatory vacuum was filled by local and state 
governments. However, lacking any cohesive national policy, the regulation of cable TV 
evolved inconsistently across states and municipalities, resulting in many dissimilar 
schemes. Generally, local governments regulated cable TV through provisions in franchise 
agreements negotiated with individual cable operators. Each franchising authority imposed 
a different set of rules and obligations on its cable system providers. Many times these terms 
reflected political considerations more than economic factors or consumer demand. This 
variation from city to city produced uncertainty in regulatory restrictions which, in turn, 
inhibited development of the cable television industry because of the difficulty in attracting 
capital investment. The situation became one where the interests of municipal regulators and 
cable system owners differed sharply on how cable TV should be regulated. These two 
groups became the main protagonists in the battle to deregulate or, more accurately, relieve 
the industry of the burden of local regulations in 1984. 
At the heart of the regulatory uncertainty for cable television was how its technology 
differed from others in the communications sector. Early interpretations of the FCC's 
jurisdiction over cable derived from the requirement of the Communications Act of 1934 to 
oversee interstate communications by wire or radio. What was complicated about this was 
that cable operators provided television programming to consumers, but not by use of the 
frequency spectrum. The result was an FCC attempt to apply a regulatory scheme based on 
a "spectrum scarcity rationale" to a medium that did not use the spectrum. Conversely, even 
though cable used "wire" to deliver its programming, it did not fit into the FCC's regulatory 
framework for common carriers as did telephone companies. Probably more significant was 
the question of whether the Commission even had the authority under the Communications 
Act of 1934 to regulate the CATV industry as common carriers. As a consequence, in April, 
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1958, the FCC declared that CATV systems were not common carriers, because their 
customers did not select the particular messages they could receive. Also, since they were 
not regulated as broadcasters, because they did not use the frequency spectrum, cable TV 
was essentially allowed to compete with broadcasters without having to satisfy the same 
regulatory requirements. Consequently, broadcasters turned to Congress for relief 
Eventually, the characteristics of a rapidly emerging and developing technology and 
the lack of an existing regulatory structure steered the parties with interests on both sides of 
the issue to seek a national policy. As is typical for cases where the regulatory bodies are 
inconsistent and the courts fail to establish precedent, interests turned to Congress for a 
resolution. But the lack of an existing policy structure proved problematic for Congress in 
dealing with the issue. As we have seen, the operations of the cable television medium did 
not fit at all well into the two existing regulatory structures for common carriers and 
broadcasters. The earliest attempt to legislate a national policy for cable TV was in 1958, 
when a few members of the Senate from western states tried to establish a regulatory 
framework but were defeated. The leadership of the NCTA at that time willingly supported 
federal regulation of CATV. Its motive was to centralize regulatory authority at the federal 
level and avoid the variations and complications of state and local regulations that were 
expanding with each passing year. However, the supporters from the broadcast and cable 
industry groups who advocated federal intervention could not persuade the rest of the 
members from their own organizations to accept their positions. They represented only 
small but vocal portions of their respective industries. The western senators who developed 
the legislation to address a problem unique to rural western areas were a minority in the 
Senate and could not garner the necessary votes without the full support of either the NAB 
or the NCT A. When the first cable bill failed it was not so much from opposition as from 
lack of interest among senators whose constituents had no interest in the question. The 
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rejection of that first legislative attempt was because of the collapse ofa compromise among 
a minority ofinterests rather than a victory for, or defeat of, any particular faction. It should 
be noted that it was the larger cable companies and the broadcast networks that formulated 
the first legislation. Both would be considered "powerful industry interest" groups in the 
view of elitist group interest theory. 
The next notable attempt at formulating a policy occurred almost a decade later, in 
1966. The House ofRepresentatives held hearings that resulted in a bill to extend the FCC's 
statutory authority to include CATV. During that time, the FCC also began to review and 
approve cable TV franchise agreements as they were granted or renewed by local 
governments. The Commission attempted to extrapolate its authority over CATV from the 
1934 Act in a piece-meal fashion as a reaction to its lack of explicit statutory authority to 
regulate cable television. This was the prevailing approach until a very important decision 
by the Supreme Court in 1968. In that case, the Commission's regulation of cable television 
was affirmed in United States v. Southwestern Cable, when it upheld the authority of the 
FCC to impose restrictions on the number of distant signals a cable television system could 
import and make available to its subscribers. 672 The Court held that the Commission had 
jurisdiction under the Communications Act of 1934 to promulgate such regulations, but the 
Court warned that the Commission's authority was limited to areas reasonably ancillary to 
discharging responsibilities for regulating television broadcasting. 
Another decade passed before the U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia 
Circuit, in March 1977, held that neither the Communications Act nor the First Amendment 
authorized the FCC to promulgate restrictions on program availability to Cable TV 
672united States et al, v. Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. 1 57, ( 1968). 
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operators. 673 The FCC, the NAB and ABC appealed this ruling. But the Supreme Court 
refused to hear their arguments and in October, 1977 left standing the appellate court 
decision that the FCC lacked the authority to restrict the programs offered by cable television 
stations. The industry was again without any national policy. 
In 1979, requirements for cable operators to provide access to their channel capacity 
by other programming entities again brought the issue of the FCC' s authority regarding 
cable before the U. S. Supreme Court in a second case involving Midwest Video. This time 
the Court ruled that access requirements that could not be imposed on broadcasters could not 
be imposed on cable systems either. But most importantly was the statement by the Court 
that, "The Commission may not regulate cable systems as common carriers, just as it may 
not impose such obligation on television broadcasters. We think the authority to compel 
cable operators to provide common carriage of public-originated transmissions must come 
specifically from Congress. "674 
Some of the basic problems that faced congressional policy makers included: Should 
the industry be regulated at all at a time when the trend in national policies was toward 
deregulation of industries so they could compete in open markets. Another problem was 
how to generate a policy structure for an industry where none existed before? If the industry 
is to be regulated, what should that look like? Should it be applied at the federal level, the 
state or local government levels? 
The question of whether regulation was even necessary had been raised as early as 
the mid-1 970s when President Gerald Ford's Domestic Council Review Group on 
673Home Boxoffice, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (DC Cir. 1977). 
674FCC v. Midwest Video, 440 U. S. 689, 709 (1979). 
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Regulatory Reform (DCRG) in March 1976 concluded that "rules on signal use over the 
cable should in good part be eliminated. "675 This conclusion was part of the general 
deregulatory trend during the late 1970s. Historically, however, when important industries 
are involved and when their development and operations are seen to be impeded by state and 
local regulations or no regulation at all, the answer to the question about the need for 
national policy usually has been yes. Examples of this include industries such as railroads, 
motor carriers, airlines, banking, securities and broadcasting. In the case of cable TV, early 
regulatory attempts by states proved difficult and were by their nature inconsistent across 
the nation. It was difficult simply because in general, their regulatory experience was in 
controlling large corporations providing electric power and common carrier communication 
services. On the other hand, local government control over cable TV was based on the 
authority to grant franchises for the use of local streets and rights-of-way as well as access 
to poles to attach the cables. As cable regulation developed in its early years, franchise 
agreements became very creative. Cable companies tended to bid for exclusive franchises 
by offering increasingly greater services and in-kind perquisites to communities. These 
offers in many cases failed to materialize. This in tum raised complaints about unfulfilled 
promises by cable operators. Simultaneously, members of Congress were sensitive to the 
desires of their constituents in the form of local elected officials who had become somewhat 
dependent on the revenue generated by local franchise agreements with cable operators. 
Most wanted no change, or at best, to preserve the franchise arrangements as part of any 
newly developed policy. Clearly, a cohesive and comprehensive national policy was needed. 
At the suggestion of the courts and initiatives by cable TV industry interest seeking 
consistency, Congress sought to establish that national policy. 
675 MacAvoy, Deregulation of Cable Television, i. 
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Once it was clear that a national policy was needed, the next question to address was 
the form it should take. The answer was influenced by prior deregulation efforts by 
Congress. However, the debate over cable television that occurred in the 1980s differed 
from other debates over deregulation that started in the mid-1970s. The conventional view 
of deregulation as a policy alternative had involved economic arenas that were marked by 
long standing relationships within "subgovemments" comprised of legislators, regulating 
bodies and the regulated industry. Some notable areas include trucking, airlines and banking 
services. Many differences existed in the case of cable television. One was that the 
deregulation of the 1970s occurred for industries that were seen as affecting the general 
economy through non-competitive pricing structures and exclusionary practices sanctioned 
by the agencies charged with regulating them. The result, in the eyes of critics, was that 
customers and interstate commerce were burdened by long-standing relationships between 
the involved industries and the agencies responsible for regulating them. The prevalence of 
these kinds of arrangements in economic regulations were generally believed in the 1970s 
to produce negative impacts on the national economy. Cable TV differed in two ways. One, 
there was no "cozy'' relationship with a regulatory agency. The other was that the initiative 
to regulate cable TV did not come as a result of its pricing structures or any exclusionary 
practices. It came from the industry itself to gain relief from the widely varied application 
of franchise agreements. 
Until the Cable Act of 1 984, there existed no true national policy on cable television. 
The FCC had established various regulations through rulemaking and courts had reviewed 
them, supporting some and rejecting others. Cities were an immediate regulatory presence 
for increasingly larger cable enterprises who argued the need for policy that allowed the 
industry to grow effectively and efficiently without the kinds of regulations that prevented 
them from competing with the broadcast industry in a fair and equitable manner. 
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So, in 1984 Congress determined that a national policy was required. The policy 
established was, in essence, a policy to reduce what was seen to be burdensome local 
regulation. While it was called deregulation, it established a regulatory framework at the 
national level that allowed greater growth and technological development for the industry 
and severely restricted the force of regulation by local governments. Conversely, in the 1992 
policy revision, this approach was changed to a system of tighter regulatory authority to be 
exercised nationally by the FCC. 
The distinguishing features of a rapid and continually developing technology in 
combination with unique regulatory aspects clearly justify the study of cable television 
deregulation and regulation as worthwhile cases to examine. Now we will discuss how the 
essential features of the politics of cable regulation fit into the existing literature on interest 
groups. 
Essential Features of the Politics of Cable Regulation 
Another purpose of this study has been to compare the insights and observations 
drawn from these case analyses with the literature reviewed. This is accomplished by 
comparing the activities of interests against the framework of a number of interest group 
theories. The first observation is that the cases discussed are varied in their particulars and 
in the perspectives set against the interest group literature. A second is that the literature on 
group interests does not distinguish between emergent and mature policy regimes. In the 
case of cable television, there was no mature system in place. The situation of interest 
groups -- in many ways, powerful interests -- competing to establish policy regimes is 
fundamental to this study. A third observation is that a critical variable at the heart of 
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dispute over cable television policy is not well treated in the literature. That variable is 
technological change and its effects. In general, the question then is, how does the cable 
case fit with the literature? 
Starting with basic areas of interest group literature, one would ask, do the efforts to 
deregulate and then reregulate the cable TV industry fit better into the pluralist, or the closed 
elitist model of interest group politics? David B. Truman believed pluralism was a 
characteristic feature of the governmental system in the United States in that its 
decentralized nature contains a multiplicity of independent centers of power and vantage 
points to secure access to the national government.676 For Truman, the success of groups in 
gaining access to governmental institutions comes as a result of interactions among complex 
factors which he places into three categories: ( 1) factors related to the strategic position of 
the group in society; (2) factors related to internal characteristics of the group; and (3) 
factors that are particular to the governmental institution that is the target of access by the 
group.677 This view of pluralism is furthered by the writings of Robert A. Dahl in his 
conclusions that through bargaining and compromise among groups and politicians, public 
policy decisions are made without any single group always being dominant. Pluralistic 
politics typically result in decisions that involve limited, acceptable degrees of change in 
small increments, or incrementalism. 678 What we have seen in this study is the presence of 
multiple access points and multiple interest groups bargaining to reach compromises in the 
fashion of an open system, without any one group interest dominating the agenda. In the 
cases of the cable industry and cities in 1984 and again with the cable industry versus 
broadcasters in 1 992, this framework served to limited the policy debates to those that 
676 Truman, 507. 
677 Ibid, 506. 
678 Dahl, Who Governs. 
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multiple factions could accept rather than result in wholesale loss of policy positions by 
main interest groups or one of the competing interests gaining all advantages sought. A 
dominant interest would not have to negotiate multiple times to continually reach consensus 
agreements. 
In the cases addressed in this study, pluralistic characteristics were manifest in the 
propensity to negotiate compromises on legislative issues. In the 1980s, as the issues 
became more contentious between the main antagonists of cable TV operators and local 
governments, congressional leaders encouraged the two sides to negotiate. The objective 
was to establish legislative language that they could both live with through a consensus 
compromise. After several iterations of compromise agreements, S. 66 passed the Senate 
on June 13 ,  1983 . 
Antithetical to pluralism is the elitist model of group interest theory. This model is 
based on powerful interest groups interacting with government institutions in a manner 
similar to the "capture of government. "679 The cable TV industry's experience in the 
regulatory struggles reveal anything but a "capture of government," especially during the 
reregulation efforts of the early 1990s. Indeed, none of the interests involved in the 
deregulation of 1984 nor reregulation of 1992 could be found guilty of capturing the 
policymaking process. 
Another variation on capture theory is Emmette Redford's  "subsystems" discussed 
in Chapter I. His three defining aspects of regulatory subsystems are first, they serve to 
provide stability and equilibrium in a particular policy area. Second, they provide access and 
representation for non-dominant interests, but third, they also prevent substantial changes 
679 McConnell, Private Power, 6. 
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in the equilibrium of interests. Jeffrey Berry extends this definition of subsystems to include 
interest other than those directly regulated. His subgovernment models lead to or give the 
appearance of closed systems which limit access to participate in policymaking efforts. 
This was not the case in considering policy for the cable TV industry. The experience seems 
quite open to participation for any who were interested. Additional interests that participated 
other than the cable industry, cities and broadcasters included consumer interest groups, 
newly developing competing technologies, and interests supporting public, educational, and 
government access to cable systems for local PEG programming. 
Let us now examine how the cable TV cases fit with regulatory politics schemes of 
Theodore Lowi, Randal Ripley and Grace Franklin. As presented in Chapter I, Lowi' s 
category of"regulatory policies" are characterized by decisions that directly raise costs and 
reduce or expand alternatives of private individuals. These policies are distinguishable from 
the "distributive types" in that they involve direct choices as to who will be a loser and who 
a winner. Lowi' s regulatory policy area involves participation of a multitude of groups that 
interact in conflictual interplay so that policy tends to be a residue of the compromises 
formed to accommodate coalitions seeking preferred policy outcome. This arena is best 
described by the pluralistic model. Similarly, Ripley and Franklin define "competitive" 
regulatory policy as involving competition between prospective deliverers of goods or 
services for the right to deliver them by winning the competition for the right as it is held by 
a government regulatory agency. Ripley and Franklin state that the policies in the 
competitive subarena are typically routine and very protective of well established interests 
represented therein. 
These categorical policy areas described by Lowi and Ripley and Franklin, also fit 
reasonably well with the cable television cases which concerned competitive subarenas of 
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the telecommunications arena. Multiple interests were involved in an open process, and the 
outcome was the result of negotiations between the main interests. In the context of choices 
made in legislation, on the major points of dispute there were winners and losers but, as 
noted previously there was no winner take all. 
Another perspective to consider is issue networks. Hugh Hecla defines an issue 
network as "a shared knowledge group" that ties together large numbers of participants with 
common technical expertise. They are made up of technical specialists, journalists, 
administrators and political entrepreneurs working out of varied institutional settings. Issue 
networks are characterized by sloppy and ill defined organizational boundaries; participants 
move in and out easily. Issue areas overlap; as an issue develops, new coalitions form in 
response. Networks are distinctive in terms of their large size and accessibility to new 
participants. They tend to be shaped in two ways: (1) a central grouping involved in .a wide 
range of issues such as when trade associations act as brokers of information or provide lines 
of communication on an issue; or (2) clusters of individual groups that share common 
interests and concerns and form coalitions. Issue networks can be highly conflictual when 
diverse viewpoints are represented. Another distinction is that they lack the stability of 
sub governments. 
For Thomas A. Gais, Mark A. Peterson, and Jack L. Walker issue network systems 
are fluid, shifting, conflictual, and characterized by multiple access points for organized 
interests. 680 Authority is fleeting. The "insiders" of legendary iron triangles would not be 
familiar with the rapid formation and mobilization of the new coalitions that are constantly 
emerging and dissolving. The authors believe most important changes in the 1980s in public 
680 Gais, Peterson, and Walker, "Interest Groups, Iron Triangles, and 
Representative Institutions," 1984, 161-1 85. 
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policy were fashioned within issue networks. They also contend that one of the most 
important causes of this change is the rapid expansion in the number and variety of interests 
that have achieved formal representation in the American system. In addition, as the range 
ofissues have increased, single subgovernments have gradually lost the capability to manage 
the issues. Mass media gets involved with distributing information about the policy 
questions and who is involved. More citizens are motivated to make their preferences known 
to their elected representatives and the widening of the participation in the conflict includes 
outsiders of the policy area. 
Many but not all characteristics of an issue network were evident in the cases 
presented in this study. The issues involved in cable regulation were highly conflictual, 
which in tum enticed Congress to consider negotiated resolutions among the major factions 
within a telecommunications issue network. As described by Jim Mooney of the NCT A, 
"If there is going to be a bill, and both sides are willing to sit down at the table, most 
frequently Congress will allow -- within reasonable limits -- the rival commercial interests 
to work out a solution. That was something that was pretty much done between the two 
industries"681 in 1992. The tendency for Congress to take this approach was a strong one, 
"especially in matters which are basically regulatory statutes. And which involve highly 
technical areas of the law. Which are to a very significant degree, battles between rival 
commercial interests. "682 
In the case of deregulation in 1984, there was a shared knowledge group, with large 
numbers of participants having common technical expertise. When the reregulation effort 
began, it can be argued, that there existed a more visible network of technical specialists, 
681 Mooney, Interview. 
682 Ibid. 
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journalists, administrators and political entrepreneurs working out of varied institutional 
settings. In the deregulation case, the issue network involved murky organizational 
boundaries; with participants moving in and out easily. With reregulation, there seemed to 
be more structured stability. Related to this, the congressional component appeared to be 
stronger as a result of several years of experience with cable issues. 
In this connection and among those involved, policy ideas also played an important 
role in the development of national policy for the cable TV regulation. John Kingdon 
characterizes ideas as tools of policy entrepreneurs who are members of a community or 
network of specialists in a particular policy area. They are researchers, staffers, bureaucrats, 
academics, lobbyists, and legislators. Ideas as solutions to policy problems emerge in such 
communities. He discusses the aspect of "ideas" as goals or motivations in the sense of 
rational-choice theory other than the classic, more narrowly focused self-interested quests . 
He argues that "argumentation, persuasion, the construction of effective appeals, and the 
evocation of values and ideology seem as important as interest group pressure, reelection, 
career advantage, and the pursuit of power'' in the motivation of political behavior.683 
Senator Tim Wirth is an example of a policy entrepreneur who cultivated a particular 
idea to solve a policy problem. He clearly supported the cable industry throughout the 
process. His former aide, David Aylward, recalled that he had a public interest goal in 
promoting the idea of diversity of programming. "Wirth had in his head that the goal was 
not to regulate networks; it was to create alternatives to networks. "684 In the mass media 
area, he focused on the issue of television violence. He was concerned about what violence 
on TV was doing to children. It became apparent to Wirth that attempts to regulate content 
683 Kingdon, "Agendas, Ideas, and Policy Change," 1994, 22 1 .  
684 Alyward interview. 
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were a waste of energy. Eventually his idea about the amount of violence on TV was 
matched with the idea of developing an alternative new industry in cable television. Wirth's 
strategy was to get as many channels as he possibly could. It was not to defend the NAB; nor 
to develop new revenue sources for the cities; it was to remove barriers to the commercial 
entity investing in the capacity, which then will create the opportunity for programming and 
then somebody will fill the programming and if they can charge money for that, that will 
create more programming. 
Another prominent example of a member of Congress as a policy entrepreneur was 
Senator Al Gore. After election to the Senate, he decided to become a champion for satellite 
dish users who were predominately rural residents, a major part of his Tennessee 
constituency. Satellite dish manufacturers as well as distributors wanted legislation to force 
favorable distribution agreements with the cable programmers. Mooney characterized Gore 
as an astute politician who realized that the "degree that other groups of people who had a 
bone to pick with cable could be united under one broad measure to punish the cable 
industry for its various sins, that there would be a greater chance of something happening 
to relieve the particular interest group he was concerned about which was the backyard dish 
people."685 This was a populist position which meshed well with partisan Democratic 
politics. 
The Part Played by Partisan Politics 
Partisanship joined with ideas was important in Congress' actions in setting cable 
policy. Generally, the partisan dimension of cable issues was shown in the political 
685 Mooney interview. 
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philosophies of many Democrats who were in favor of regulation and Republicans who 
generally favored deregulation. More specifically, it is noteworthy that in 1984, Republicans 
controlled the Senate, and in 1992, the Democrats were in the majority. However, at the end 
of the process in both 1984 and 1992, partisan lines were not sharply drawn. Votes in 1984 
were divided more along regional lines and perceptions of constituency interests. In 1992, 
the bipartisan outcome was the result of proponents of reregulation successfully 
characterizing the bill as a consumer protection measure at a time very close to a national 
election. Actually, most partisan phases in the evolution of policy were at times when bills 
were introduced to either deregulate or reregulate the industry. Over time, as differences 
were worked out, extreme positions were moderated. 
Opinions on the influence or degree of partisanship overall, varied. Former Senator 
Packwood recalled little partisanship. To his recollection it only existed to the extent that 
Democrats are generally for regulation and Republicans are against it. As an example of 
bipartisan acts, he recounted that, "Tim Wirth and I in 1990 filibustered against legislation 
that year. And he was a Democrat. In 1992, I found a bunch more partisan things although, 
in the end, McCain and I were the only ones who voted against it. "686 
From a staff perspective, Ward White described communications legislation as 
generally not partisan. Similarly, Tom Wheeler, from a cable perspective, agreed that 
telecommunications legislation is, traditionally, not a partisan issue. From the perspective 
of the cities, Cynthia Pols believed it was non-partisan. "Many times we got lots of help 
from Republicans as well as Democrats. Senators Gorton and Goldwater, were very helpful. 
Often times Democrats were very unhelpful. "687 
686 Packwood interview. 
687 Pols interview. 
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Jim Mooney, a representative of cable interests, viewed the reregulation process as 
partisan during the formulation stage, particularly in the House Energy and Commerce 
Committee where the Republicans were tal<lng a strong ideological stand against regulation, 
per se. But in the end, considering how the votes were actually cast on the floor in both 
bodies, as well as in the Senate Commerce committee, this issue wasn't all that partisan. If 
it was all that partisan, Bush's veto would have been upheld. However, Roy Neel, a Gore 
aide at the time, recalled reregulation as being partisan. Democrats were generally for it and 
Republicans were generally against it. But there were anomalies in that. "You had 
Democrats, such as Tim Wirth, who opposed this and worked hard to kill it. He represented 
major cable interests in Colorado."688 Conversely, there were Republicans on the other side, 
like Representative Chris Shays of Connecticut who was a supporter of reregulation. The 
outcome, however, was obviously bipartisan because Congress overrode the veto. 
But for Neel, reregulation was really more a matter of constituencies. If you 
represented Denver where TCI, a major cable firm, was headquartered, as did Wirth, you 
were going to be pretty violently opposed to it. He also recalled that another member who 
was a strong advocate for reregulation was Senator Danforth from Missouri, who was the 
ranking Republican on the Senate Commerce Committee. "We probably worked as closely 
with Danforth as we did with Hollings. He and his staff helped write the bill. "689 
The NAB' s Jack Goodman's recollections of Senate Commerce Committee 
policymaking reinforce Neel's view. The leadership there acted in a very bipartisan fashion. 
688 Neel interview. 
689 Ibid. 
300 
Democratic senators Inouye and Hollings and Danforth, who was the ranking member of the 
subcommittee, all worked together very closely. 690 
As noted previously, another important political aspect was the significance of 
changes in the control of the House and Senate between deregulation and reregulation. The 
Republican control of the Senate beginning in 198 1  helped bring deregulation to the policy 
agenda and eventually enactment. However, when control changed to Democrats in 1 989, 
a high degree of interest developed in reregulating the cable industry. Arguably, the cable 
industry failed to cope with the importance of this majority party change in the Senate and 
what that meant in terms of regulatory policy preferences. 
In the end, policy was produced out of the interaction of group interests, ideas about 
policy, and the activities of policy makers, especially the key congressional actors, 
responding to the partisan aspects of the issue and their own political interests in ways that 
are extraordinarily difficult to sort out. The policy struggle culminating in the 1992 Act, was 
fought over defining the core issue. Advocates for stronger regulatory policies were 
successful in defining the issue as a consumer protection function and were willing to 
support the policy needs of cable's main competition in exchange for their support in 
framing the issue as protecting American consumers. Conversely, interests that supported 
policies directed at creating more competition were unsuccessful in making their case to 
allow free-market approaches to control any long-standing dominance by any individual 
industry or technology. Advocates of this approach envisioned free competition that would 
allow new technologies to develop, flourish, and replace older technologies. These in turn 
would be replaced by even newer technologies. 
690 Goodman interview. 
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Summing Up 
What can be said about the relative success of the various interests involved in the 
struggle over cable policy? One point is that all of the interests, except perhaps for the cities, 
although they eventually came around, won in the advocacy of a national regulatory system, 
a set of rules founded in national authority and administered by a national agency. 
Overall, despite the 1992 set back, the cable industry was advantaged. A central 
factor was congressional appreciation of the power and potential of the technology and 
preference for dealing with the negative effects on other interests without impairing its future 
development. 
Cable' s prevalence over the cities in 1984 was key and not to be undone. The 
industry flourished under this policy. That policy was created because they had many 
sympathetic ears in Congress that viewed its technology in favorable light, though 
previously restricted by cumbersome and awkward restraints. 
In 1992, to be sure, there were set backs. Those who wished to compete with the 
cable industry, such as the satellite broadcast industry, for one, and the wireless cable 
industry, for another, benefitted from the program access provisions of the 1992 law. 
Broadcasters won the ability to charge for their programming that was retransmitted over 
cable systems, which became a financial boon for them. While many of the restrictions 
consumer interests wanted placed on cable TV were enacted, many other provisions they 
lobbied for were ignored. 
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On the other side, municipal interests were no more successful in 1992 than they 
were in 1984. Just as important, what cable won in the overall struggle, including 1992, was 
to not have to compete with the powerful telephone companies. Perhaps most important of 
all, despite increased regulation, including more restrictive criteria for effective competition 
to be free of rate regulations, it retained the ability to attract the investment needed to 
continue to develop the technology and grow as a business. A decade after 1992, our own 
viewing habits attest to the viability of a developing technology that was moderately 
restrained, but not impeded in any fundamental sense by the legislation enacted in 1984 and, 
especially, in 1992. 
Because technological advances in the telecommunications field occur so rapidly, 
it could, in theory, be totally deregulated to allow free-market competition to sort-out 
survivors. However, because of the pervasiveness of the communications sector and the 
level of dependence on telecommunications in today's society, this would play havoc with 
the nation' s economy. The strongest survivors would become monopolies, even if only 
temporarily. However, this outcome is mitigated by the deliberative policymaking process 
in Congress and the influence of pluralist politics with its associated incrementalist 
characteristics. In a balancing act, these two influences mitigate against both the rise of 
monopolies and the undermining of the telecommunications sector of the economy by 
protecting emerging companies, their employees, equipment suppliers, and investors. 
The conclusion of this study is that establishing regulatory policy for 
telecommunications in America is more of a process than a terminal objective. It is fluid and 
must always remain flexible to accommodate enhancements of the technology which occur 
so rapidly that demands for new policy create almost constant pressure for new decisions. 
In the telecommunications arena, the policy-making question is how to prevent dominant 
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levels of economic power from accumulating in monopolies or oligopolies while still 
allowing adequate access for emerging new technologies to develop, compete, and 
ultimately supplant "older'' technologies. The pluralist model of interest participation 
appears the best suited to answer this question. To accomplish this, the institutional 
components of the American policy-making structure, including the legislative process and 
administrative rule-making, tend to navigate toward a neutral course. Along the way, course 
corrections are provided by the review of laws and rules in the courts as demands by 
interests raise new policy issues. Singularly important course corrections or some threshold 
number of lesser corrections bring the policy-making process to a new decision point. 
Thus, the policy-making process for cable television becomes analogous to a journey. 
In this analogy, legislative policy decisions are more like crossroads than destinations. If, 
in turn, one views policy itself as a vehicle, it can be examined as it arrives at a crossroad, 
chooses the path for the next leg of the journey, and then passes through the crossroads 
(policy decision) to move in a new direction. As the policy-vehicle pauses at the decision 
crossroad, it takes on new passengers in the form of competitors and emerging interests as 
these opportunities occur. The journey then proceeds anew through administrative rule­
making, court challenges, business mergers, and then new demands for correcting the policy 
course. Each new demand for course corrections represent yet another crossroad in the 
continuing policymaking journey. 
That the journey continues for telecommunications policymaking will be evident in 




After the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 
became law, it met immediate resistance in its implementation. Suits were filed that 
challenged the constitutionality of some provisions. Some of the new regulations 
promulgated by the FCC were also challenged in the courts, and others caused unintended 
economic harm to the ability of the industry to expand and develop its operations. Just four 
years after the 1992 Act became law, Congress completely rewrote policy for 
telecommunications when it replaced the obsolete Communications Act of 19 3 4 with the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996. Since then, emerging new technologies continue to 
develop and challenge the nation' s regulatory policy on telecommunications . 
Implementation of the 1992 Act 
After enactment, implementation of the policy changes in the 1992 Act proved 
problematic. Language in the 1992 Act mandated that the FCC set rates for cable TV based 
on what would have been produced by competition. The ambiguity of that language made 
the FCC's job difficult which lead to prolonged rule making. As the FCC approached 
deadlines on setting rates it implemented a price freeze for cable operations subject to 
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regulation under the 1992 Act. 691 These initial rules on cable prices had two effects: one, no 
cable company lost revenue, and two, one-third of the country' s cable consumers had their 
prices raised. 692 
In late 1 993 , the FCC developed a complex formula to set prices equitably. When 
the FCC issued new rules based on the formula, it reduced rates that cable operators charged 
subscribers, which in tum caused an investment crisis for the cable industry. Such rate 
control frightened away investments needed to expand and upgrade operations. Thus, rate 
regulation reduced the cable industry's cash flow, lowering its attractiveness for investors. 693 
This in turn effected cable TV programmers who could not get their programs carried on 
cable systems because rate cuts caused operators to cut back on their plans to expand the 
number of channels provided. Thus market values of cable operations were lowered at a 
time when the businesses needed to raise money to compete with telephone companies. 
Cable operators challenged the rate rules in the courts. Then a year after the price freezes 
were instituted, the FCC approved conditional price increases for those cable operators who 
were willing to add six or more new channels to their service. This conditional arrangement 
was not satisfactory to anyone. Subscribers viewed the changes as cable operators simply 
raising their prices once again. Cable operators, on the other hand, were concerned about 
the uncertainty for revenues under arrangements of conditional rate increases. In addition, 
telephone companies continued to pursue the authority to enter cable markets through FCC 
rule m�ng rather than legislation. 694 
691 Dick W. Olufs, III, The Making of Telecommunications Policy, (Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. , 1999), 67. 
692 Reed E. Hundt, You Say You Want a Revolution: A Story of Information 
Age Politics, (New Haven: Yale University Press; 2000) 2 1 .  
693 Ibid, 3 1 .  
694 Olufs, 67. 
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When William J. Clinton became President in January 1993 , he brought a new 
perspective to telecommunications issues. To encourage the industries to rebuild their 
networks and compete with each other, his administration sought to permit the cable 
companies to compete in the telephone business, and the telephone companies to sell video. 
The Clinton administration also brought with it an interest in an "information revolution" 
soon to be known by the catch phrase "information superhighway." The rapid development 
of new technologies to support the revolution carried consequences for the established major 
telecommunications companies. In order to compete in a rapidly changing technological 
environment, cable companies wanted to offer local telephone service, but they wanted 
protection from direct competition with the economically powerful regional bell operating 
companies (RBOC). They sought FCC rules to control the degree of competition that would 
have to exist before telephone companies could compete. 695 They also wanted an end to 
regulation of their rates. What worried the cable industry most was concerns about the 
possibility of being treated as "common carriers" and having to provide access to 
competitors if they were allowed to compete with telephone companies. These 
circumstances produced pressures for new regulatory legislation from Congress. During the 
1 03rd Congress, bills were introduced in both the Senate and the House that were aimed at 
allowing telephone companies to compete in the cable market. H.R. 3 63 6 enabled telephone 
companies to provide cable service as long as they allowed competing telephone and video 
services to use their lines. S. 1 822 allowed regional bell companies to compete in long 
distance markets as soon as they could demonstrate they had actual and demonstrated 
competition. However, no new telecommunications legislation was enacted in the 103rd 
Congress. 
695 Olufs, 7 1 .  
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Another development which eroded the policy established by the 1992 Act was the 
court decision on the suit filed immediately after enactment. As soon as the 1992 law went 
into effect, Turner Broadcasting System and Daniels Cablevision Inc., two of the most 
prominent cable programmers and large system operators, filed suit against the new law. 
They claimed that the law's requirements to carry broadcast programs infringed upon their 
First Amendment rights.696 On June 27, 1994 the Supreme Court agreed with the cable 
operators. In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 
the Court decided 5-4 to remand the case to the federal District Court for the District of 
Columbia, finding that federal regulators needed to do a better job justifying their 
requirements on which programs cable operators must carry. Cable operators argued that 
the law' s mandate to carry local stations infringed on their free speech since they had to 
displace their own programming to make room for local stations. In its remand, the majority 
expressed the need for effected local broadcasters to provide more direct evidence of their 
harm if their programs were not carried on cable systems instead of just a presumption that 
not being carried would cause irreparable harm. It's interesting that the minority opinion 
was to strike the must-carry provision entirely as unconstitutional rather than to remand. 
Evidently, none of the justices believed the provisions in the law should be supported as 
written. Clearly, the Court felt that cable operators deserved more constitutional protections. 
In allowing cable operators more protection against government intrusion on First 
Amendment freedoms than broadcasters enjoyed, the Court made an important distinction 
between the two technologies. 697 Once again, a cycle of court challenges, passing laws, and 
writing rules was initiated. 
696 Congress and the Nation, Volume VIII, 451. 
697 CQWR, July 2, 1994, 1778. 
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In the election of November 1994, Republicans were elected to a majority in both 
houses of Congress. Two new Republican chairmen for both the House and Senate 
Commerce Committees wasted little time in announcing they would consider new legislation 
to deregulate telecommunications, including cable television. On March 3 0, 1995 , Senator 
Larry Pressler, as chairman of the Commerce Committee, introduced S. 652 to deregulate 
cable television so it could raise the necessary capital to compete with telephone companies 
in the new service arenas. A similar bill, H.R. 1555 was introduced on May 3 ,  1995 . The 
Senate bill passed on June 15 , 81-18. The House bill passed their version on July 14, by 
voice vote, but amended the bill to replace it with H.R. 15 15. This caused a long and 
protracted conference to take place with both sides finally reaching agreement on December 
12, 199 5 .  This was also during the time when the Republican Congress had a face off with 
the Democratic White House over the budget and the government was actually shut down 
for a time. Finally, the conference bill was passed by the House on February 1, 1996, 414-
16. The Senate passed the bill 91-5 that same day. 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 
On February 8, 1996, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-104) was 
signed into law by President Clinton. The intent of the act was to again "promote 
competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services 
for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new 
telecommunications technologies. "698 In that bill, existing rules restricting concentration of 
ownership by media companies were essentially eliminated. Among other deregulatory 
698 Legislative History of P.L. 104-104, Telecommunications Act of 1996. 
(Washington, D. C. , Congressional Information Service, Inc. ) 1996. 1. 
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provisions, cable television regulations were relaxed three years after enactment. It also 
allowed telephone companies to enter the cable TV business. 699 The act contained provisions 
to establish numerous procedures to promote competition in telecommunications markets. 
Title Ill of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 dealt with cable television services. 
State and local governments could not act in a way that limits the ability of a company to 
enter any market. Rate regulations were to disappear in three years, except for the basic 
services, which means airwave broadcasts and educational and public-access channels. 
Telephone companies were allowed to enter cable television businesses, but their video 
transmissions were subject to telecommunications regulation, and their video programming 
was to be subject to the same regulation as cable companies. Companies could offer "open" 
video programming (the notion of a video dial tone, where customers can dial what they 
want and not just flip through the package offered by one company). Small cable companies 
were freed from many regulations, as were companies that face real competition. 700 
After telephone and cable industries were subjected to open competition by the 1996 
Act, FCC Chairman William Kennard predicted a boom for consumers. Telephone 
companies would carry TV shows and cable would provide voice services. The result would 
be more channels and lower prices. 701 
699 Olufs, 2. 
700 Ibid, 9 1 .  
701 Deborah Soloman and Robert Frank, "Comcast Deal Cements Rise of an 
Oligopoly in the Cable Business," Wall Street Journal, December 2 1 ,  200 1 ,  
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New Technologies, New Interest Representation 
One result of the deregulation of cable television and the telephone industry was the 
AT&T acquisition of TCI. In this merger, the largest long-distance telephone company 
acquired the nation's largest cable company.702 AT&T had found a way to bypass regional 
and local telephone companies in its quest to provide direct long distance service through 
the potential for using existing broad band cable connections. But by the beginning of 1999, 
the growth of the internet and the development of higher capacity computer hardware also 
brought new pressures from group interests on the issue of access to the high-speed 
capabilities of cable' s broad-band system. As a result, the cable TV industry found itself 
targeted also by companies who provided internet services principally over phone lines and 
manufacturers of computer chips that were capable of ever faster data transmission speeds. 
Because of the explosive development of digital technology, the traditional use of copper 
telephone circuits to homes and business locations (known as the last mile) were too slow 
to capitalize on the potential for speedy transmission of data. However, cable' s broad-band 
circuits were capable of carrying the amounts of information that matched the speeds of the 
new computer hardware. 
Group interests representing internet service providers began to campaign for 
changes to telecommunications policy to allow their access to cable's network. In January 
1999, America Online (AOL), began a lobbying campaign to gain access to the broadband 
network that was under the control of the cable TV industry. They wanted Congress and 
regulators to "require that cable TV lines to be opened to all competitors seeking to provide 
702 Hundt, 2 19. 
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high-speed Internet service via their broad-band technology''703 The lobbyists for AOL and 
a coalition of other internet providers and long-distance telephone companies also 
approached municipal regulators to impose open access requirements on cable providers. 
They were only successful in Portland, Oregon in getting such requirements adopted. They 
targeted AT&T as it pursued its acquisition ofTCI. In tum, AT&T sued in federal court to 
have the requirements ruled illegal. 704 The NCTA opposed the approach because it would 
create a dangerous policy. It believed "Either your have a view that the online marketplace 
is competitive and emerging, and that the government should stay out, or you have a view 
that government should come in. "705 
On this issue, Congress was reluctant to interfere with the internet, but was also 
concerned about the tendencies of cable operators to operate as monopolies. The Chairman 
of the FCC was empathic to the idea of open access to cable broad-band circuits, but some 
commissioners questioned the authority of the FCC in this area. On the other hand, the pent 
up anger of cities was evident by the growing interest of municipal regulators in supporting 
the open-access approach to promote effective competition. 
In 2000, another approach was undertaken by an internet provider to gain access to 
cable TV broad-band systems. Internet Ventures Inc. petitioned the FCC to allow it access 
to a cable system in Washington state. Internet Ventures used provisions in the 1 996 Act 
that required cable operators with 3 6 or more channels to set aside space for commercial use 
by third parties. The FCC ruled that the section of the law did not pertain to varieties of 
703 Brian Gruley, "AOL Leads Lobbying Campaign to Gain Access to 'Broad­




services but was limited to video programming. 706 This ruling was favorable to the cable 
industry as the FCC avoided forcing cable companies to share their high-speed lines with 
competitors, believing it was premature for government to regulate the industry. 
By 2001 ,  rulings in federal courts generally favored the cable TV industry. On 
March 2, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled to invalidate limits on how 
many channels cable operators can fill with programming in which they have a financial 
interest (vertical integration). They also threw out government rules restricting the number 
of subscribers a cable operator could serve. 707 The court concluded the FCC could not 
support its reasoning for the restrictions. Cable operators argued the restrictions infringed 
on their First Amendment rights by restricting them from speaking to as large an audience 
as possible. This ruling was also favorable for AT&T, already the largest cable operator due 
to its acquisition of TCI, as it pursued a merger with MediaOne. Without the court's ruling, 
AT&T would have been in violation of the rules.708 
Internet Access as the Dominant Issue 
At the tum of the century, "access" became the dominant issue in 
telecommunications policy. Rules created as a result of the 1996 Act required companies 
to share their systems with others. "The goal was to stop monopolies, but what regulation 
706 Kalpana Srinivasan, "FCC refuses to force cable TV company to lease cable 
space to internet provider," Knoxville News-Sentinel, February 20, 2000, D4. 
707 Kalpana Srinivasan, "Customer limits on cable firms rejected by court."  
Knoxville News-Sentinel, March 4, 2001 ,  D8. 
10s Ibid. 
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did was to bar . . .  investment by privatizing the risk and socializing the rewards."709 These 
open access rules were used first to restrict telephone companies, but had been extended to 
cable operators. One solution to the gaining access to local broad band capacity was to buy 
existing cable operations. One example occurred at the end of 200 1 when AT&T announced 
a merger with the Comcast Corporation cable company. If successful, it would become the 
largest cable operator in the nation. As a result, the three companies of AT&T Comcast, 
AOL Time-Warner, and Charter Communications would control sixty-five percent of the 
nation's cable market. The cable industry that was "once a hodge-podge of family-owned 
companies has become one of the nation' s most visible and profitable oligopolies, as smaller 
operators are unable to cope with the rising costs of the business. "710 
Also in 200 1 ,  the RBOCs again tried the legislative route to change regulatory 
policy. At mid-year, the House Energy and Commerce Committee passed a bill, supported 
by representatives Tauzin and Dingell, to allow the Bell companies to carry internet traffic 
without having to first meet strict government requirements that they open their local phone 
markets to competition. 711 The requirement for allowing competitors to compete in their 
markets by using their equipment. The Bells argue this was a disincentive for them to invest 
the capital necessary to upgrade their systems if their competitors would immediately gain 
benefit from the upgrades before the Bell companies could recoup their investments. The 
new bill provided a way around those requirements and eliminated the disincentive for 
capital investment. However, Senate Commerce Committee Chairman John McCain did not 
support any loosening of regulations for regional and local telephone companies. 
709 George Gilder, "Tumbling Into the Telechasm," Wall Street Journal, 
August 6, 2001 .  
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The most recent technological advance in the telecommunications area involves 
satellite based television and digital services. In February 2002, the nations two largest 
satellite dish companies proposed a merger to offer their services across the nation. The 
services offered would provide a viable nation-wide competitor to the cable industry. It 
would also further a technology that could provide both television programming and wireless 
internet access to the nations most remote rural areas. In their effort to generate approval 
of the merger, the two companies have promised uniformed pricing of their services as a 
solution to uncertain and varying cable rates in different local jurisdictions.712 
In summation, since enactment of the 1996 Act, intended to regulate cable rates and 
protect consumers, cable prices have risen 3 1 . 9 percent, with most Americans still having 
a single cable provider to choose from. Local phone rates, still regulated under the act, have 
risen 12 . 1 percent. On the other hand, long-distance prices have fallen 13 . 1  percent since 
1 996.713 The emergence of new technologies is promising in its potential for offering 
effective competition, but also in its activation of the policymaking cycle once again. 
712 Andy Pasztor and Yochi J. Dreazen, "Hughes, EchoStar Offer to Span the 
U.S . .  " The Wall Street Journal, February 27, 2002. 
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